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**ORIGINS, ARTICULATIONS AND CONTINUITIES IN
FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION
- THE CASE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY GOVERNMENTS
IN NIGERIA 1960-1990 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO SOUTH AFRICA**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE PhD
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF KENT
AT CANTERBURY
1994**

**IN THE MEMORY OF MY BELOVED BROTHER
BARTHOLOMEW UWAZIE
WHO DEPARTED THIS WORLD
ON THE 9TH OF JULY 1993**

ABSTRACT

Much has been written in recent years on Nigeria's foreign policy behaviour but little attention has been paid to the institutional structures, political processes and problems in the formulation and implementation of these policies. This study addresses itself to these neglected areas in the study of Nigeria's foreign policy. It highlights not only the influence of other countries on foreign policy formulation, but also investigates the influence of international organisations. Most importantly, it points out the continuity of foreign policy within the various Nigerian governments, be they military or civilian governments.

The author has also sought to address vital issues, such as how dependent foreign policy formulation is upon the presidential office, and whether this limits the influence of the Ministry of External Affairs. Also investigated is the degree of Nigeria's involvement with the Southern African liberation movements and material to do with the actual financial subventions made by Nigeria to them.

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PART I:

THE ORIGINS OF FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

The thesis is divided into three parts. Each part seeks to illuminate a distinct area of Nigerian foreign policy formulation. The first part is to do with the origin of foreign policy, particularly with regard to South Africa. The second part investigates the application of this policy, particularly within international organisations such as the United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, and the Commonwealth. The last part discusses the continuity of foreign policy within the various Nigerian governments, particularly since the military has played a major role in foreign policy formulation and in doing so has collaborated with civilian personnels. How this role has been discharged, and what it means for many existing treatments of civil-military relations is also investigated.

Although there have been many studies of Nigerian foreign policy, the present thesis makes an original contribution in three areas, related to the divisions of the thesis described above. The first contribution is to do with its critical reading of the history of policy formulation. The findings of this thesis on the role of Ghana are original ones.

PART I:

THE HISTORY OF POLICY FORMULATION

At first there was no foreign policy at all. The vacuum here is described using both primary and secondary sources. When they came, the first views were conservative. Nigeria had a different view of the OAU in comparison to Ghana. Although disguised under the umbrella of non-alignment, Nigerian policy was in fact biased one, at all times pro-western and anti-communist.

It was not until the civil war that Nigeria saw that there were non-western powers who were prepared to lend support and realised then the need for more complex views of international relations. Among other things, it came to a new recognition of how it should approach the USSR as a result of the civil war. So, the historical starting point of having no foreign policy at all changed, first to the development of a conservative foreign policy, and later developed to a more complex foreign policy as a result of the civil war and embraced relations with some of the eastern states.

The difficulties of relationships with Ghana were made even worse during the civil war because before then, they were purely difficulties based on ideological differences. During the civil war, Biafra attracted unofficially Ghana's support and this certainly, as the thesis shows, complicated Nigeria's view

towards Ghana. However, the events of the civil war made Nigeria realise that the world is larger than simply Ghana or even West Africa. It made Nigeria realise three things in particular.

Firstly, it made Nigeria realise the problem of white rule in Southern Africa with Portugal and South Africa supporting Biafra. This led Nigeria to a policy change, looking at Africa as a whole and seriously addressing the need for liberation of the whole continent. Secondly, Nigeria was worried and continued to be worried by Ghana's stand in the civil war and it was precisely the civil war which made Nigeria come closer to the original Ghanaian idea of Pan-Africanism which sought the completely free and liberated continent, including the liberation in the south. This led Gowon's government to introduce policy on South Africa. This policy was not conservative and it was complex. Thirdly, Gowon's government was able to view the future of West Africa and took into consideration how the region could be a model for the rest of Africa in terms of its struggle for liberation, followed by non-dependence on the outside world. It was at this time that Nigeria conceived the idea of ECOWAS.

The importance of these things was realised by a military government, and was occasioned by the civil war. It was designed not to depend on outside states, not to interfere in the internal activities of other states, but to build the region both to resist South African aggression and also to be a model to the

rest of independent Africa. Interdependence was seen as a foundation against dependency, and as a natural derivative of liberation.

PART II:

APPLICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN

TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:

In my thesis I investigated how three institutions have been used by Nigeria to further its foreign policy objectives as they developed in terms of the history I have outlined overleaf and lay out in deeper terms in the chapters that follow. Here, it becomes clear how Nigeria viewed the importance of each organisation by the amount and level of activity it sought to engender through each one.

PART III:

CONTINUITY OF THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN

POLICY FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT

There are three major issues to be expressed. Firstly, the major steps in foreign policy over the years would not have been possible without there having been military governments. These

governments were able to cut through domestic hesitations, and cut through red tape. The process of formulation and implementation, however, depended heavily on the military governments' involvement of civilians. Here there are two subsidiary issues. First of all there were a number of military governments, revolving often from one government to another. But always there were military governments with civil servants as advisers, and a great deal of co-operation existed. There is, secondly therefore, the case of a developing military culture in government which nevertheless depended on co-operation between the military and civilians.

When Finer talked about weak institutions, such as civilian governments, drawing in the strong, i.e. the military,[1] this view can no longer be applied to Nigeria. Strong institutions (the military) have drawn in the strong (the military again), but such strong institutions have actively and successfully cooperated with the 'weak,' civilians. Chan's view of revolving door governments and of technocratic military governments drawing on technocratic civilian services and support seems more apt than Finer's.[2]

Nigerian foreign policy was not therefore, 'militarised.' The sort of foreign policy developed in Nigeria is the type of foreign policy that any government of Nigeria, civilian or military, mindful of its emerging role as an African power, would have wished to embark upon. What the military did was to

make this crossover of both military and civilian policy decisive.

However, as the 1980s drew to a close, the 1990s began with links and exploration between Nigeria and South Africa, as in the case of De Klerk when he visited Babangida at Abuja. This is a sign that one era is ending and another is beginning with economic pragmatism between former enemies.

To conclude this introduction, therefore, I have made original investigations as outlined above and developed in the body of the thesis below. In addition, are two other areas of originality:

1. The second one is the actual formulation of Nigerian foreign policy. This is dependent on the views of the presidential office. The author's recorded interviews of some Foreign Ministers who were very close to the centre of foreign policy formulation, who disclosed for the first time, at length, the feelings of frustration with their role in foreign policy formulation, even though they were in senior positions, provide original evidence. Very often foreign policy was simply the decisions made by the President often without major reference to anyone else. This, however, seems to be common in Africa and, even, in some developed countries. This is not

therefore an argument against my findings on civil-military relations outlined above.

2. Finally, I have made an original survey of the financial aid made available to the liberation movements. These figures have not been uncovered before because they were regarded as highly secret. In fact, I was unable to remove any of the relevant documents but I was able to obtain these figures during my interview with senior officers who were part of the budgetary allocation process.

CHAPTER 2:

PRE-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL THOUGHT ON FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter begins with a brief account of Nigeria as it was before its creation through the Anglo-French agreement in June, 1898.[1] Even up to the time of this agreement, though Britain had gained a colony by pushing the French out of Nigeria, the territory had no name until the deal to buy out the Charter of the Royal Niger Company was completed on the 1st of January 1900, whereby the governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria were created, while Lagos formed a third administration.[2]

Nigeria being the most populous country on the African continent,[3] its history did not begin only when the British Government amalgamated its North and South in 1914. It has been alleged that Nigeria was the creation of European ambition.[4] The newly created country contained not just a multiplicity of what were called "pagan tribes" but also a number of "great kingdoms" that evolved complex systems of government, independent of contact with Europe.[5] These kingdoms included such widely differing groups of peoples that not only the British but the inhabitants themselves often doubted whether the territory could survive as a single political entity.[6] During this period much migration was on a short term basis only; men from the south emigrated mainly in search of jobs. There were no attachments formed to the towns of such temporary domicile.[7] There were, however, strong ethnic associations in these towns, particularly

among the Ibos, whose social structure is based upon localised descent groups.

NIGERIA AFTER 1914

After the amalgamation of the Northern and the Southern Protectorate by Lord Lugard in 1914, a careful survey was made both of the different attitudes and cultures within the amalgamated country. The British ruling system had two categories – known as the 'Direct' and 'Indirect' systems. Under the 'direct' rule system, the administration was carried out by the British colonial government, while under the 'indirect' system which allowed local administration, a relationship was maintained between the community leaders and the colonial leaders. Here, the colonial rulers acted only as advisers and overseers.[8] Though the colonial rulers used this to exercise power peacefully in Nigeria, it created a misconception among the Nigerian elites since the direct/indirect dichotomy to them represented a difference in degree of importance.

However, it could be argued that the direct/indirect dichotomy did not arouse so much political agitation as the 1945 Richard Constitution. Many Nigerian leaders recognise the Richard Constitution as the 'seeds of regionalism, and the disease which killed Nigeria.' [9] The three-regional state was the worst of all possible worlds once the attitude of the North had been ascertained; it was an attempted marriage of irreconcilables.[10]

The North demanded not only to be allotted fifty per cent representation at the central government (during the inauguration of the Richard Constitution in 1947) but also separation from the rest of Nigeria on the arrangements existing before the 1914 amalgamation. This request was granted (in order to avoid any possible secession), and the Northern domination of the centre became an inbuilt feature of Nigerian politics.[11]

FORMATION OF PARTIES

The pattern of power struggle in Nigeria followed closely the lines of regionalism laid down by the Richard Constitution.[12] The East was dominated by the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) party, headed by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the North by the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) party, headed by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello. The West was dominated by the Action Group (AG) party, headed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The attitude of the political leaders created a very great impact in a society where only few were literate and, to achieve their aims, the elites had to draw on the language of primordialism and communal parochialism for the terms of political discourse.[14] Irrespective of their political differences, the inability of any one political party due to parochial reasons to form a majority, created the atmosphere whereby the NCNC and the NPC entered a coalition government both in 1954 and 1959, while the AG remained the Opposition Party.[15]

SOME DEBATES ON THE FORMULATION OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

Bearing in mind the party system which reflected the country's regionalism, forms of ethnocentrism playing a major role, it can be seen how decisions on national interests in terms of foreign policy formulation could arouse much controversy.

There were many pros and cons in the different debates towards foreign policy formulation amongst those Nigerian leaders who were interested and whose views were influential. In July 1959, in a newspaper article, Dr. Otegbeye of the Nigerian Youth Congress (who later became the president) advised Nigeria to emulate the Indian policy of neutrality. He also warned the Nigerian government against out-of-date 'waves of anti-communism,' particularly when the government did not really know much about the doctrine of communism or communist countries.{16}

According to him:

The new Nigeria must maintain its national integrity and must put itself in a position to mediate between the two blocs - East and West, in the interest of world peace and prosperity.

He called on Nigeria to endeavour to "project the African

He called on Nigeria to endeavour to "project the African personality and to champion oppressed negro peoples all over the world." [17]

Aminu Kano and his Northern Elements Progressive Union Party remained constantly Pan-Africanist as regards his opinion on Nigerian foreign policy. As Whitaker observed, [18]

The outlook of the party was enthusiastically Pan-African though preliminary unification on a regional basis (West Africa, East Africa, etc) was generally regarded as a more realistic immediate goal; in principle, they welcomed economic assistance from Eastern bloc countries and unreservedly subscribed to 'neutralism' as a foreign policy for Nigeria.

The Action Group Party leaders had different views on foreign affairs in Nigeria. Chief Enahoro, an influential Action Group member (later the party's spokesman) during the All African Peoples' Congress at Accra in 1958, emphasised his support for the evolution of a West African Federation, with the ultimate objective of an African Commonwealth of States. [19] But a year later after the Accra congress, Chief Awolowo put forward a different view. Chief Remi Fani-Kayode, another influential member of the Action Group whose foreign policy view was significant, expressed his fear that Arab influence (especially Nasser's) was growing in Africa whereas, in his opinion, a more black approach to African relations was preferred. [20]

In the 1958 Action Group Party Congress, Chief Awolowo provoked a debate on Nigerian policy regarding military power and armaments. He argued that Nigeria should reject power politics and armament and go instead for welfare politics for its people. Chief Awolowo thus based the completion of his foreign policy in the light of his party's domestic policies. The Action Group's motto was: "Life More Abundant." [21] But the consensus of the Congress was simply against such a simplistic view of choice between power and welfare politics. Awolowo, at the end, accepted the views of his colleagues that an armed force was necessary after independence.

There was one thing which all the three major political parties (the NPC, the NCNC, and the AG) agreed. They all proclaimed in their constitutions or as one of their objectives that Nigeria should remain within the Commonwealth. [22] It was observed that the NCNC leaders spoke more about foreign policy for Nigeria than the NPC leaders did. The latter saw foreign policy as an entirely new dimension of official concern. There was the prospect of a continuing close relation with the British; therefore, foreign policy was not regarded as important until after independence at least. This was eventually articulated during the 1956 parliamentary debate on the training of the Nigerian diplomats; Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Vice President of the NPC party (who later became the Prime Minister of Nigeria) stated that "as a teacher, I am used to starting from the known to the unknown." [23] To him foreign policy was still an unknown then.

during this early period.

In 1955 the British administration in Nigeria still retained constitutional responsibility for Nigerian foreign affairs and did so until independence in 1960.[24] It also instituted a ban on communist papers and literature on the grounds that they were subversive. On the attainment of independence the ban was not removed immediately by the Nigerian government until a year after independence and even then it was emphasised that the lifting of the ban was tentative. The Nigerian Prime Minister still refused free visits to communist countries by Nigerians as witnessed by the government's reaction on Mrs. Ransome-Kuti's visits to communist countries which led to the withdrawal of her Nigerian passport by the Nigerian government. In defending this particular action before parliament in March 1958, Balewa declared:[25]

I and my colleagues are determined that while we are responsible for the government of Nigeria and for the welfare of its people, we shall use means in our power to prevent the infiltration of communism and communistic ideas into Nigeria.

Also the 1955 White paper on the training of Nigerians for future overseas representation as presented by the British colonial government to the central legislature was not fully debated by most Nigerian representatives. The paper stressed the intention of the British foreign service to continue to represent Nigeria in many world capitals irrespective of their attainment of independence. It stated that "it does not mean that in the course

independence. It stated that "it does not mean that in the course of time Nigeria would automatically have to find men and women to represent it everywhere." [26] This was not challenged in the legislature; rather those who questioned it concentrated only on the need to increase the number of trainee diplomats. During this period it seems no one wanted anything to upset the British government; the major political parties, the central executive council and even the appointed Prime Minister (1957) inclusive. At the regional government levels all the Premiers shared the same opinion with the central government. They all favoured a very strong association with Britain. This was formally confirmed by the Prime Minister when he moved the motion which formally demanded independence from Britain.

Eventually, there was an attempt to formalise the desired cooperation between Britain and Nigeria in defence matters at the 1958 conference on Nigerian defence, but Nigerian leaders realised that it would create problems for both governments. Northern Nigeria in particular had that vision of a very long dependency on the British for both economic and personnel assistance irrespective of self-government. Such an intention was demonstrated by its agent-general in the United Kingdom, Abba Gana, when he declared that "although Nigeria has attained independence but we shall still be dependent in many ways upon Britain." [27] This dependency, indeed overlap, was to create serious foreign policy problems after independence in 1960. [28]

The 1959 electioneering witnessed a gigantic struggle among major

advancement by any party were utilised. Foreign policy was one of such instruments though most of the Nigerian people could hardly comprehend exactly what foreign policy stood for but it was mainly aimed at the intellectuals and the more politically oriented citizens. It would be necessary to take note of just a few of such debates which concentrated on the foreign policy issues, as this would give an insight to what transpired between Nigerian leaders and why it was so difficult for Nigeria to present a confirmed foreign policy to its people even four months before independence.

In an address to the London Branch of the NCNC, in his electioneering debate on foreign policy on behalf of his party, Dr. Azikiwe pointed out that on winning the election his party's foreign policy goals would be highly concentrated on "national security and national interest." [29] Though remaining a member of the Commonwealth after independence, Nigeria would 'remind Britain to be persistently democratic in its relations toward Africa.' [30] He further stated that Nigeria would not inherit anybody's prejudices regarding its consideration of future diplomatic relations with China and the USSR. On African issues, he spoke of a United States of Africa to be moulded as a final product from the base of cultural exchanges and customs unions. Nigeria's membership of the United Nations was recommended too. He also added that both in Africa as well as in global security matters, Nigerian foreign policy would be formulated "in the national interest based on an independent and not a neutral attitude." [31]

On the strength of Dr. Azikiwe's address, a spokesman for the Action Group Mr. Agunbiade-Bamishe, attacked his views on a policy for a free Nigeria. He accused the NCNC of "asking for a blank cheque and exhibiting its own ignorance of foreign affairs." [32] But the AG failed to put forward any alternative proposal. The NCNC seized this opportunity once more to respond to AG's criticism. Mr. Fred Anyam, Deputy National Secretary of the NCNC, dismissed the AG's criticism as the "effort of a waning party to drag others down to its level." [33]

As the electioneering rhetoric continued, with Dr. Azikiwe appearing to get tougher on the United Kingdom government and on the AG's position of foreign affairs, he declared that his party would establish a consulate in Pretoria in an effort to mobilize African opinion to bring together the blacks and whites in South Africa. He therefore pointed out that, should this effort fail, his party and the government would tell the British government and the Commonwealth that South Africa should leave the organisation or Nigeria would not stay in such an organisation. [34] **This was a starting point for debate to come on South Africa.** He also stressed that it was not in the interest of Nigeria to align itself with the Western bloc as the AG eventually wanted. He disagreed with the AG's claim that "there was no community of interest whatsoever between Egypt and the Arab states on the one hand and the other African states on the

other, particularly those in Africa - south of Sahara."[35]

The Action Group leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, at the Action Group's Sixth Annual Congress in 1959, outlined the party's ideas on foreign policy. He stated that: the Action Group wanted to promote friendship between Nigeria and all African countries and, indeed, the whole world, but warned that any serious attempt to bring about political union among the states of Africa was bound to engineer suspicion, distrust and disharmony among those states. He also saw economic and cultural association, presupposing common economic problems and similar political, social and cultural patterns such as had created the European Common Market, as being as fanciful as a political union of African states.[36]

From AG's point of view, Egypt was regarded as more Arab than African, and its leader, Nasser, they saw as territorially ambitious overseas and totalitarian at home; therefore Awolowo recommended that there should be no cooperation between African states and Egypt. He warned that cooperation between African states and Egypt "would only be possible if the black races of Africa were prepared to remain as satellites in Egypt's orbit in the same way as Syria."[37] Besides he argued, there were no similarities in substance in the economic and social problems of Egypt and Nigeria.[38] On the same presidential address to his party's congress, Chief Awolowo referred to John Foster Dulles' castigation of neutrality in international affairs by arguing that, neutrality, whether "passive, positive or independent was an unmitigated disservice to humanity." He believed that such

neutrality as the basis of foreign policy of certain nations was "no more and no less than the projection, consciously or unconsciously of deepseated prejudices which these nations have had towards the countries of Western democracies." [39] These were Chief Awolowo's views and remarks on the formulation of the Nigerian foreign policy as at that time, whether or not this position on foreign policy was maintained after independence would be seen in due course.

Though these debates had been strongly argued by both parties it would be necessary to note that it had an 'attentive public' only in the Southern part of Nigeria. The NPC had its own ideas on its foreign policy formulation which were close to that of the AG. The NPC also rejected the policy of neutrality in international affairs, and preferred an alignment with the Western powers, with close ties with the British government in the Commonwealth and with the United States of America. [40] Sir Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the NPC party regarded the idea of a United States of West Africa as too premature, but that the party welcomed friendly relations and closer cooperation with all African countries, especially those of West Africa. [41] Nigeria, he declared, should also subscribe to the Charter and principles of the United Nations and become a member of the organisation. The NPC wanted a large military force but for internal security and border protection duties only. [42]

Despite the fact that there was no great difference between the AG's and NPC's position on foreign policy proposals, except the

issue concerning Egypt, the NCNC concentrated its attacks on the AG's ideas on foreign policy while ignoring those of the NPC; though it could be argued that, since there was resemblance between the two in their approach towards foreign policy formulation, the NCNC implicitly was attacking the NPC too. It was noted that the absence of direct attack on the NPC by the NCNC on this and many other issues during this election campaign had more to do with the underlying domestic political understanding between the two parties.[43] Apparently in this election, the NPC and the NCNC saw the AG as the greatest enemy.

When the elections were held in December 1959, none of the three major political parties gained enough seats to form the federal government. The NPC and the NCNC, whose positions on foreign policy were somewhat divergent though they campaigned without open expression of their differences in foreign policy, formed a coalition government.[44] It is also important to state that none of the alliances entered by the major political parties had been based on ideological compatibility but rather on 'national unity.' Due to the coalition between the two parties, the NPC and the NCNC both had to smooth the sharp edges of their foreign policy positions. It had been suggested that, without the coalition, Nigerian foreign policy would perhaps have been assertive, more Pan-Africanist and more-neutral especially if the NPC had taken exclusive control of the Federal Government.[45] But up till the end of March 1960, the coalition government had nothing to offer as a distinctive or a defined foreign policy. It turned out to be a time consuming issue for the coalition

government. There were some circumstances surrounding such a delay. The fact was that the government at that time was faced with so many initiatives to take which included consolidating itself and completing the final arrangements for the constitutional as well as the ceremonial transfer of power from the British to the Nigerian leaders. Secondly, the government did not want to make pronouncements on foreign policy which might cause division in the country. In fact, it has been suggested, the Prime Minister made several attempts to bring in the Opposition party's Chief Spokesman, Enahoro, as Nigerian Foreign Minister but his offer was rejected. Above all, the Prime Minister did not see any need to hurry in making official pronouncements on foreign policy.

The Federal Parliamentary Committee of the NPC confirmed the Sardhana's views on this subject. The Committee observed that "Nigeria's problems cannot be solved by a 'West African Union' nor by Pan-Africanism since it would be suicide for Nigeria to sacrifice its leadership role which it is bound to play on the continent and in the world as a whole." [46] On the other hand, the Nigerian Socialist Group (based in Enugu, Eastern Nigeria), called for a greater support for both Pan-Africanism and a Union of West African States. At a one week symposium - entitled 'Nigeria can be Great', which included a lecture on the foreign policy of an independent Nigeria, Mr. B.C. Okwu, a Regional Minister, called for the elimination of apartheid, imperialist and white minority regimes all over Africa. Nigeria was also called upon to open its door and extend the hand of friendship

to everyone, whether the USSR or the USA.

After so much pressure, the Federal government could no longer resist it. On the 20th of August 1959, a White Paper was presented which the Daily Times summed up as follows;

We will consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs.[47]

In short, the government stood for the policy of non-alignment with any power bloc, the promotion of national interest, and membership of the Commonwealth and United Nations. On African affairs the government would prefer to pursue "clear and practicable policies," and that colonial boundaries in Africa, however arbitrary and artificial, would be respected in the interest of peace and non-interference.

This policy statement provoked many reactions: the Daily Times supported the idea, while the AG criticised the government for proclaiming neutralism and non-alignment which were at variance with its practices,[48] such as the banning of communist literature, the refusal to employ suspected communists in the Civil Service, the refusal to allow citizens of Nigeria to visit communist countries, assurances given to Western countries of the safety of their investments, and the granting of special facilities to the British in Nigeria for their military aircraft. There was a great deal of disagreement with the Prime Minister

over his foreign policy formulation, but he refused to heed to any such criticisms. The main reason for what so many Nigerians recognised as an ambiguous attitude was that – the government had a desire not to embark on a foreign policy which would antagonise various sections of the articulate public and the major political parties. At the same time the British still retained a substantial influence in both the domestic and foreign policies of the country. The attitude towards Nigerian foreign policy then was very much consistent with the Prime Minister's own personal and political views which dominated the national agenda. In addition, the idea of all-party coalition (to symbolise Nigerian unity) remained with him all through his years in the office. During his last interview before his assassination, he still maintained that as at that time Nigeria was not ripe for such a system which would maintain a full-fledged opposition party, and gave a strong approval for a coalition government which he commended as the only answer to problems of workable "Nigerian Democracy." [49] Awolowo described the Prime Minister's foreign policy principles as "vague and hypocritical in the extreme." [50] It would be worth noting that Awolowo's *reaction and shift from* his first view of Nigerian foreign policy was after the 1959 election, which he lost, and he had never been Pan-Africanist before then. It was after this period that he started his attack on the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact and he seems to have become vigorously Pan-Africanist as an anti-government policy.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

It would be necessary to point out that such ups and downs observed in the formulation of the Nigerian foreign policy is not unique to Nigeria alone but rather a common experience for many other new democratically-oriented independent states. Nigerian foreign policy in the 1960s remained very vulnerable to criticisms and amendments.

The issue of foreign policy in the first civilian government played a divisive role among the Nigerian elites. The division was owed much to the system of party formation. The party system had much influence on what transpired during the period especially since the central government did not have much power over the regional governments which made it easier for the opposition party to make constant criticisms of the government's foreign policy principles. For example, in August 1960, the government was forced to restate its foreign policy principles twice in four months. The attitude of the Nigerian leaders towards the formulation of foreign policy was not a surprise to people who are conversant with Nigerian history and background in general. The British Diplomat, Mr. Clifford, stressed that Nigeria meant a collection of 'nations' ruled by government from abroad.[51] Apart from the 'direct' and 'indirect' rule established by the British rulers, the 1945 Richard Constitution had been so much blamed for such an overwhelming loyalty being shown on a regional level instead of a national level.

In conclusion, the first civilian government maintained vagueness

and abstraction in its foreign policy. This may be seen as an attempt to transpose to it the inherently conservative Nigerian nationalist objectives (sovereignty, self-reliance, equality). In addition, the Nigerian leadership elite perceived their foreign policy options to be limited by a degree of historical determinism, which dictated a strong practical economic and psychological commitment to Britain (and by extension, the West), and other issues concerning African affairs were dealt with pragmatically.

At independence in 1960, the Nigerian state represented a contrived federal balance between three ethnically and politically divided federal states. The political rivalry and tension between the three factions precluded the evolution of any specific "Nigerian ideology or doctrine" and the emergence of any single charismatic national leader (as was the case in many other emergent African states) who could be identified as the voice of Nigeria.[52] The bitterness, hostility and distrust thus created by the influence of regionalism in Nigeria culminated in the tragedy of the Civil War.

CHAPTER 3:

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE: THE COMPARISON WITH GHANA

The colonial status of most peoples in black Africa made it possible for them to look for a common platform in the fight for independence. In this struggle the 'African Motherland' was exalted.[1] It was not uncommon to hear some spokesmen of Pan-Africanism such as Azikiwe, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Senghor say that independence for their own country alone was not enough, and that the anti-colonial struggle would not be at an end until the whole continent had been freed.[2] This was summed up in the words of Sekou Toure after he had become President of the Republic of Guinea:

We look upon Africa as a human body; if its finger is cut, it is not the cut finger alone which feels the pain, but rather the whole body.[3]

This chapter will be reviewing to what extent Nigeria and Ghana shared the same perspective since at first glance they seem to have passed through a similar historic phase.

Ghana was the first tropical African colony to secure its independence in 1957; Nkrumah was the pioneer.[4] Nkrumah was noted as having had a long association with Pan-African ideas right from his student days in USA, Africa, (under the influence

of Marcus Garvey and his movement - 'Back to Africa') and later in London.[5] During the period of the 1960s many more African states gained or regained sovereignty. Some of the new independent states were much larger than Ghana and inherited what they regarded as more important internal problems to solve than the problem of African unity. In large, conceptual terms, there was what might be called the choice of either 'micro-nationalism' or 'macro-nationalism.' In other words it was a choice between national sovereignty on one hand or some form of African federation or unity on the other. The problems of national sovereignty gave rise to a foreign policy conservatism in some of these larger states, leading to continuing reliance on their former colonial masters, especially where sovereignty was gained without any major sort of antagonism. Professor Gambari, interviewed by the present author, identified Nigeria's position here as that of uncertainty and timidity.[6] Between 1960-65, the major issues were the official foreign policy declaration which included the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact; the Congo Crisis and the Organisation of African Unity; negotiations for associate status with the European Economic Community; the Rhodesian crisis and Commonwealth relations; and the Arab-Israeli antagonism and the search for a cohesive policy toward the Middle East.

THE CONSERVATIVE VS RADICAL GOVERNMENT LABELS AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES:

Most African leaders shared the notion of Pan-Africanism, but with different perspectives. On attainment of independence, the Nigerian leadership (being a conservative alliance as seen in the last chapter) was ideologically opposed to, and resented the radical views of Nkrumah. Nkrumah, on the other hand, due to the Anglo-Nigerian military alliance, felt politically distanced from the Nigerian government and more supportive of opposition political factions.[7] Although Azikiwe initially was more responsive to Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism, perhaps due to his involvement in the movement during his stay in the US and Britain, the Action Group (AG) and the Northern Peoples Party (NPC) opposed any plans for political unity and economic-cooperation embracing the whole of the African continent. This type of attitude by the AG and NPC may be attributed to national interests, or perhaps national pride, centred in the perception that the population of each region of Nigeria was greater than the entire population of Ghana. Hence, Awolowo, Balewa and the Sardauna, as potential leaders of an independent Nigeria, resented what they regarded as an attempt by Nkrumah to arrogate to himself the leadership of Africa.[8] According to Professor

Gambari, the basic problem was that on all these issues Nigeria did not speak with one voice and, even when it sought to do this, it leaned towards the West. In other words, foreign policy as at that time was made and conducted by a government which reflected the country's disunity, a weak coalition of regional and ethnic-based political parties.[9]

By 1958 the relationship between Nigeria and Ghana had deteriorated; firstly due to ideological differences over whether and what type of Pan-Africanism was to be adopted by Africa.[10] It has been noted that Ghana was the one striving at all times to challenge Nigerian leadership rather than the other way round,[11] and this view suggests that Ghana used Pan-Africanism as an instrument in its rivalry with Nigeria. There is little real doubt, however, of Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist credentials.

Pan-Africanism certainly was an old aspiration to which Nkrumah gave a new turn. Nkrumah as a Pan-African visionary "saw that political independence would mean little if it were unaccompanied by economic independence from the former colonial masters; and he saw that this economic independence could not be gained by a plethora of small states. Faced with Africa's technical and economic backwardness he wanted a united Africa which, by pooling its economic and human resources, might operate independently in a world from which, as Nkrumah well knew, Africa could not opt out." [12] Nkrumah's argument was based on his perception that irrespective of the widening economic disparity between the northern and southern hemispheres, the disparities of power in

the political kingdom could be challenged. This understanding remained very vital to Nkrumah and his new state. He was very convinced that power in terms of nuclear and military strength could not hold continuously as the method of measuring a state's strength and looked forward to the emergence of a new pattern of international relations. This notion of 'new pattern' was expected to emerge from Africa or Asia, hence his perseverance in seeking to make such an ambition a reality through the unity of all African states or perhaps all black people which would serve as a deterrent to the growing strength of the northern hemisphere. In Nkrumah's own words:

"Force alone is no longer a decisive factor in world affairs"...
he visualised a distinctive African contribution to international discussions and the achievement of world peace through its contribution.[13]

Sociologists and ethnologists who have carefully studied African social life have laid much stress on what seems to a common dominant trait of a form of socialism in traditional African societies. The individual hardly considers himself as other than a member of the group.[14] 'Socialism' in most cases is used in its widest sense. But there is a sharp difference between 'Socialism' in a European context and 'Socialism' in a traditional African context. As Reverend Father Temples and Marcel Griaule (expounding their concept of African 'negro philosophy') put it:

African negro socialism rests on a cosmogony, an explanation of the universe, according to which the being is not individualised, is not an irreducible real presence, but constitutes the cell of a unity into which he is integrated and from which he draws strength and life.[15]

In other words, this type of socialism reflects on the presence of a 'community' and not the creation of a 'collectivism' as in the case of the European socialism. The latter represents a victory by society over individuals. By contrast, the phenomenon of African community is not the result of a fight, or of conquest, rather an agreement, harmony and mutual fulfilment.[16] It seems however that the contemporary African leaders saw socialism from different perspectives. Some accepted socialism on European terms while others accepted it on traditional African terms.

The building of African unity gave the doctrine of Pan-Africanism a political expression. The desire to achieve African unity was as old as the desire to achieve independence. But whereas all the colonial territories were in unanimous agreement about the attainment of independence there had been disagreements on the type of unity which Pan-Africanism was proclaiming. This type of disagreement gave rise to the formation of groups like - The Conseil de l' Entente, the Brazzaville Group, the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group. The formation of these groups reflected the fact that all the African states were animated by two movements, forces and aspirations pulling simultaneously in

opposite directions - micro-nationalism and Pan-Africanism. To some, nationalism remained uppermost. The thesis at this stage will briefly touch on the activities of the last two groups which witnessed discord while pursuing what on the surface seemed to be the same goal of African unity. The major difference between the Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group was not anti-colonialism but the anti-colonialist movement expressed in different ways.

THE CASABLANCA GROUP:

The Casablanca Group which originated from the Union of Guinea, Ghana and Mali, claimed to be laying the 'United States of Africa.' On the 23rd December 1958, they plainly proclaimed that "following the example of the thirteen American colonies which finally gave birth to the United States of America, and in sympathy with the trend among the peoples of Europe, Asia and the Middle East to organise themselves in a rational manner, we decide to adopt a 'Flag of Union' and to encourage the closest contacts between governments, in order to harmonise the policies of our countries, notably in regard to defence, foreign and economic policy. Our second task will be to frame a constitution giving stability to the Union, now established." [17]

The formation of the Casablanca Group was in circumstances which affected the interests of those states which formed it. These included the danger which the three states, Guinea, Ghana and

Mali, felt of numerical inferiority vis-a-vis the twelve Brazzaville states. It is necessary to note that Mali and Senegal had been in dispute since the break-up of the Federation of which they had been both members. On the strength of this, an option for Mali was to go north of the Sahara in search of alliance. Secondly, Morocco, not recognising the sovereignty of Mauritania (which was a member of Brazzaville Group and supported by all the states of this group), turned to the Union of Guinea, Ghana and Mali for support. The formation of the Casablanca Group was characterised by virulent anti-colonialism. Its leaders wanted to stand to the left of other groups in Africa and to appear as representatives of a trend known as that of revolutionary Africa. These states grouped themselves as they did because some were motivated by anti-European hatred and looked on African unification as a last dramatic or radical expulsion of all European influence in the continent, as in the case of the Casablanca Group. The others were more nationally-minded and concentrated on the progress of their newly won independence e.g. the Monrovia bloc.[18]

The Casablanca Group resolution on Mauritania reflected its rejection of European influence and declared that:

France has cut Morocco off from its southern portion in Mauritania, to consolidate its domination over the Sahara, to exploit its wealth and to secure for itself an outlet on to the Atlantic Ocean; the creation of an 'artificial state' called Mauritania against the wishes of the population and in defiance of solemn undertakings by France constitutes a violation of

treaties and international agreements; the setting up of Mauritania as a state is only a means whereby France can encircle the African countries, provide itself with support bases and add to the number of its allies.[19]

Furthermore, President Nasser recognised the danger for the Arab World arising from the appreciable progress that had been made by the state of Israel in black Africa; therefore, President Nasser, being the champion of Pan-Arabism, could not afford to remain indifferent to the southern part of the continent. Nasser linked the problem of Palestine with the general theme of defence of independence and security on the African continent. He argued that the main aim of creating the Israeli state was to make it a base for imperialist aggression. He also stressed that since Israel's main objective was to dominate the independent African states through aid, he (Nasser) had no alternative but to prevent what he recognised as a start of 'a highway for imperialist infiltration into the continent.' [20] Therefore, the problem the Mauritania and Israel presented as a common African problem was a way of urging the representatives of black Africa to take up a similar position with their colleagues on the other side of the Sahara. Finally, President Nkrumah, whose policies in the Congolese Republic were incompatible with the action of the UN there, was seriously looking for alliances to enhance his attempt to thwart the work of that international organisation. Nkrumah saw the Congo crisis as a period of great hope in fulfilling his African unity policy. Nkrumah's paramount concern was to back the winner in a power struggle in Congo. Until the eve of Congo's

independence Nkrumah's support remained with Kasavubu and not Lumumba. His support for Lumumba was strengthened after the May 1960 election whereby Lumumba emerged the strongest candidate.[21] He thought that his objective on African policy could be achieved through Lumumba whose weaknesses he understood. At the same time he wanted to involve the UN as much as possible especially since his influence alone would be minimal. A member of Nkrumah's Congo Coordination Committee, in an interview by Thompson confirmed this when he stated that:

"We felt that if we could attract the UN into the crisis, Ghana's stature would be augmented, because all the world would be focusing on us; more important, we could wield influence within the UN." [22]

When Katanga declared its secession on July 11th 1960, Ghana was a principal supplier of troops on terms of special friendship with the Congolese government. Ghana eventually became 'the diplomatic cockpit of Africa.' [23] Nkrumah thought that the Congolese conflict would be short-lived with a swift intervention. By August 8th 1960, a Ghana-Congo agreement for union was signed.[24] With the agreement signed, Nkrumah was convinced that he had gained leverage in Africa towards greater unity. There were high stakes for Nkrumah in the crisis and this gave him the opportunity to show international statesmanship as a mediator. In order to gain international recognition he saw no harm in involving both powers of East and West in the conflict.

Nkrumah's first disagreement with the US and the UK was when there was a delay on his demand for planes to move his first troops to Leopoldville. This was delayed on the ground that the first Security Council resolution authorising the formation of a UN force had not been passed, therefore both countries refused to offer such assistance until it came under a UN operation. But when the Soviet Union offered him the use of two 'Ilyushin 18's,' Nkrumah accepted without any reference to the UN Secretariat.[25] When this action was queried by the UN Secretary General, Ghana replied that the "Ghana government had seen it fit to make a direct request to the Soviet Union for planes without reference to the Secretariat." [26] By mid August 1960, there was a great concern about Ghana's unilateralism in the Congo Crisis. During the middle of August, the Ghanaian contingent acted directly on Lumumba's request for protection without any directive from the Secretariat. This action was supported by Ghana when it stated that "one of the inevitable facts of the UN administration was that it moved too slowly and often too late." Nkrumah argued that the government of Ghana considered that adequate protection of the members of the lawfully constituted central government on whose invitation the UN forces were in Congo, was a paramount duty imposed by the Security Council resolution.[27] The police contingent, which brought invaluable aid to Lumumba, was one of the few trumps Ghana had in Leopoldville, and so it did not arrange to follow the Secretariat's directive.[28] African leaders became very skeptical of Nkrumah's Congo policy, especially such states that were also in a position to play an active role. On the 12th of July, Nkrumah cabled every African

Head of State that reports from Congo were so disturbing that he had to send a special mission... to obtain first-hand information.[29] Tunisia was in favour of Nkrumah's move, its government cabled back and promised to cooperate with Ghana as well as with other African states at the UN level.[30] Liberia's Tubman publicly expressed his irritation at Ghana's unilateral action,[31] while Nigeria totally condemned intervention in the internal affairs of other African states.[32]

On August 8th, 1960, in his Guinea Communique, Nkrumah announced his intention to mobilise the remaining Ghanaian troops to Lumumba's aid if possible. He stated that, firstly, the African states had been seen to be "technically competent to tackle any problems arising on the African continent." Secondly, he argued that if the UN failed in Katanga, Ghanaian and Congolese forces would fight alone against Belgium, in which case "Ghana and other African states would not be without aid and assistance from such countries which value as a principle, the concept of African independence." [33] But in a cabinet meeting on the same day, 8th August, a Minister defended Nkrumah's announcement by stating that the "President explained that the policy of Ghana was not calculated to cause aggression anywhere on African soil." He was instead guided by the fact that unless a policy of toughness was followed, the initiative in the Congo would be lost to the Belgian and other imperialist powers.[34] Nkrumah tried hard to confine the conflict as much as possible within Africa and wished the UN force would be used to crush Katanga's secession as quickly as possible.

By October 1960, Nkrumah was actually thinking about having Algerian and Ghanaian troops alone replace the UN command in Leopoldville. (The proposals are summarised in the record of the OAU Council of Ministers, Lagos Conference, 24-29 February 1964). Nkrumah had reached his highest level of influence i.e. the presence of Ghanaian troops in Leopoldville together with his remaining influence in the UN Secretariat. But by October 16 (due to Kasavubu's demand for the withdrawal of Ghanaian troops) on the orders of the ONUC the Ghanaian troops had to leave Leopoldville.[35]

All these circumstances precipitated the Casablanca Conference which was held in Morocco. Many African countries were invited for the meeting but because of the background outlined above most of these countries including Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Somalia, Tunisia, Sudan and Ethiopia decided to abstain irrespective of the official invitation by the King of Morocco; while Asiatic states and Indonesia politely excused themselves.

As noted by Thiam, three things were observed in the Casablanca conference. Firstly, it was characterised by virulent anti-colonialism; its leaders wanted to stand to the left of other groups in Africa and to appear as representatives of a trend since known as that of revolutionary Africa. Secondly, the resolutions adopted seem to have been the result of reciprocal concessions, each representative having endeavoured to gain recognition for his particular viewpoint on his own special

problems. Thirdly, it was committed to a non-colonial African unity, as the Charter adopted at the conclusion of the conference declared:

Let us proclaim our desire to liberate the African territories still under foreign domination, to lend them aid and assistance, to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all its forms, to discourage the establishment of troops and foreign bases which endanger the liberation of Africa and to free the African continent from political intervention and economic pressure.[36]

THE MONROVIA GROUP:

The Monrovia conference grew as a reaction to the Casablanca conference which most African countries recognised as a 'radical' bloc. On one hand, this conference served as a clarification of the position of those states which were not committed to the Casablanca Group. On the other hand, the Congo crisis demanded urgent attention from such a conference. It was Senegal that suggested that the uncommitted African countries such as Togo, Nigeria and Liberia should organise a conference at which all African countries would try to reach and define a common policy towards the Congo crisis.[37] Such a call by Senegal made a very big impression, and the focus of the proposed conference became larger than the Congo problem. It was this conference which brought Nigeria's Tafawa Balewa to international attention.

Many observers credited him with saving the conference by

offering compromises for some of the differences among members.[38] The Monrovia conference of 12 May 1961 was attended by twenty African states (though all independent African states were invited – excluding South Africa and the unstable Congo) and the Casablanca Group abstained. This was the first time twenty African states had attended one meeting on the continent. Because of the good attendance the conference decided to look into other important African problems. The resolutions adopted at the end of the conference included:

The states present agreed to govern themselves on the principles of equality regardless of size, non-interferences in the internal affairs of other states, respect for the sovereignty of each state, condemnation of subversion directed from neighbouring states, cooperation throughout Africa based on tolerance and the non-acceptance of any leadership, and unity without political integration. They also resolved to set up a technical commission to work out details for cultural, scientific, and technical cooperation. They condemned colonialism, and called on African states not to take sides on the Congo crisis. They also condemned further manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and urged disarmament. Apartheid was condemned, but there was an overwhelming approval of the UN. They urged that African disputes be settled by peaceful means and that a commission should be created to promote such ends. Finally, they regretted the absence of some African states from the conference and hoped they would attend a follow-up meeting to be held in Lagos.[39]

The Monrovia conference created a conservative bloc in Africa to counteract the Casablanca bloc. It is necessary to point out that

not all Nigerian leaders approved of the line Nigeria took. Chief Awolowo, for example, charged that the Monrovia conference was inspired and completely financed by the more important countries of the Western bloc.[40] He then called on the Nigerian government to join Nigeria to the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union, a move hardly calculated to strengthen the Monrovia bloc since Nigeria was in fact the most powerful member of that group.[41] At the All-Nigerian Peoples Conference of August 1961, many delegates preferred joining Ghana than other African states. The conference passed a resolution calling on the government to make special contacts with the Casablanca bloc. This move was also supported by the radicals of the NCNC. In the November 1961 session of Parliament, the government was faced by extreme criticism from some NCNC and NPC members regarding its drifting away from friendly relations with Ghana. But the Foreign Minister in his lengthy reply, rather than deny the rift, charged that Ghana had refused to cooperate with Nigeria.[42]

However, following such criticisms from the members of the opposition party (AG) and some members of the ruling parties (NPC and NCNC), the government made a dramatic attempt to patch up the differences between the Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group before the Lagos conference which had been scheduled to begin on January 25th 1962. It was noted that on December 10th 1961, the Nigerian Prime Minister paid a visit to President Sekou Toure of Guinea to persuade him to attend the Lagos conference. It should be recalled that President Sekou Toure was a member of the Casablanca Group. The aftermath of the visit was a joint

communique issued by the two leaders indicating that they shared common views on external matters[43] though he failed to attend the Lagos conference as promised.) During the Lagos conference an official statement issued from Accra stated two reasons for abstaining:

The Casablanca Powers had not been consulted as a Group; and the Algerian Provisional Government had not been invited.[44]

The absence of the Casablanca bloc did not make the Lagos conference a failure. It was during the Lagos conference that a proposal for the Charter for the Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation was initiated. It made no reference to political integration, rather emphasising economic cooperation, and the educational and cultural, health and nutritional, political and diplomatic fields. It agreed "to explore the possibility of building up the defence of the African and Malagasy states against external aggression and in safeguarding the territorial integrity of their countries." [45] It also reaffirmed the principles of Monrovia (which Azikiwe described as the distinguishing factor between the two blocs during the conference). It proposed the establishment of three organs to give the organisation permanence and administration – an Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (to meet at least once every year); a General Secretariat (to serve as the Central Administrative Organ); a Council of Foreign Ministers (to meet at least once every year). And membership was open to any independent African state under indigenous African rule.[46] It

further proposed the creation of an Association of African and Malagasy Economic Cooperation and Development and a Permanent Conciliation Commission for the settlement of disputes, each to be effected by a separate treaty which should form an integral part of the Charter. The official languages were to be English and French, and the Charter would have come into force thirty days after two-thirds of the signatory states had deposited their ratifications.[47]

The absence of Ghana in the Lagos conference widened the gap between Nigeria and Ghana. Ghana's attitude to Nigeria on this occasion caused a narrowing of the gap between the Nigerian radicals and the moderate politicians, and Ghana was condemned for its attitude towards the Nigerian policy regarding African affairs, especially when A.K. Bardon, Chairman of the Ghana's Convention Peoples' Party's Bureau of African Affairs, charged that Dr. Azikiwe's speech was prepared in London and read at Lagos (in other words not initiated by the Nigerian government). Secondly, he pointed out, provocatively and wrongly, that not even a single country represented in Lagos conference had made any visible contribution towards the anti-colonial fight in Africa as a whole.[48]

Despite this attack on it, the Lagos conference could be regarded as a success since it eventually became the model for the African Summit Conference at Addis Ababa in 1963. Remarkably parallel to, and based on the principles of the Lagos Charter, the OAU charter indicates a victory for the Nigerian position which placed it

firmly in the moderate or conservative camp of African states.

The 1963 Addis Ababa conference witnessed a very good turn out of African states. For the first time thirty one African states were represented at the conference, including the Casablanca bloc. During this period the solidarity of the Casablanca Group had been declining because of disquiet over Nkrumah's personal policy making at the expense of the group as a whole. President Toure of Guinea was opposed to Nkrumah's plan for the pre-summit meeting of Foreign Ministers which called for "close unity, with a common foreign policy for all of Africa, a common set of diplomatic representatives, a continental economic-industrial plan, a common currency, and a central bank." [49] On this ground, Toure later announced the demise of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union.

The moderate position of the Nigerian Prime Minister was supported by Haile Selassie, Nyerere, Toure and Tubman, and also Nasser and Ben Bella, [50] whereby he condemned political unity and called for the 'practical approach' of economic, educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation, and by trying first to get the Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and sophisticated arrangement of political union. These leaders persuaded the less moderate leaders to join them, thus the conference produced the new document called the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (modelled mainly on the Lagos Charter). It was assumed therefore, at this point, that the new Charter liquidated the former Casablanca and Monrovia Camps.

Thus, the moderate position which called for caution and slowness in African unification movements, respect for all boundaries, and anti-subversion, as well as the elimination of 'blocs' was accepted in principle by all African states (except South Africa which was not invited). Bearing in mind the motivations of the two former blocs, there was the tendency of differences in the interpretation of the new Organisation's Charter. For example, Ghana interpreted II(I-d) - "to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa," to mean "active and armed support for the struggle of dependent African territories against colonialism and apartheid." [51] Whether this meant the same thing to the Nigerian leaders was not expressed but Nigeria was one of the nine African states in control of the one million pounds for aid towards various national liberation movements.

THE COMPARISON OF NIGERIA AND GHANA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS AFRICAN UNITY

Nigeria being the largest single unit in tropical Africa both in size and population, had some grounds to consider it had leadership capacity in African affairs. In contrast, Ghana is a relatively small state. Its population then was about six million people while Nigeria had about fifty million people. [52] On attainment of independence it proclaimed that:

Nigeria is an African nation, it is part and parcel of that continent of Africa and therefore, it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to that continent; that it cannot be

neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country..."[53]

In the Prime Minister's own words, he said:

We are independent in everything but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa.[54]

But irrespective of such a notion towards Africa, Nigeria still had its reservations in pursuing visionary Pan-African objectives. Nigeria made its African policy very clear, as stated by its Foreign Minister:

- (a) Policies must be clear and practicable, not sentimental or designed to soothe people's nerves or for propaganda purposes
- (b) Help would be offered to any African State to solve its problems, but the help must be solicited and unpublicised
- (c) Promotion of cultural and economic links with Africa
- (d) Territorial boundaries must be respected to avoid chaos and bloodshed.
- (e) No interference in the internal affairs of others so as to prevent unrest and harm to the overall plan for the future unity of the African continent.[55]

From Nigeria's point of view, it was not wise to embark on total isolation of Western Europe especially Britain. Nigeria, though

independent, found itself unready to stand wholly alone as a developing country with such a large population. Throughout the deliberations about unity, the Nigerian Prime Minister reiterated constantly his disapproval and maintained that there was not to be talk of political union before knowing exactly what the African problems were.[56] Instead the Nigerian government maintained a moderate position whereby it sought African unity through cooperation among independent African states and argued that "Europe did not divide Africa - it united squabbling villages and made nations of them." These may join together now if their people wish it but the Pan-African state is not for this generation.[57] On the role of Nigerian leadership in Africa, or the idea that Nigeria might attempt to force itself on African states as their leader, the Prime Minister remarked that 'Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others.' But if others wished to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear in such a union.[58]

From Ghana's point of view, one of the main objectives of Nkrumah's African unity was to make Ghana an African bastion of 'scientific socialism.' [59] The composition of Ghana's political institutions should not be overlooked when considering Ghana's political attitude towards African policy. Ghana is a small state and observed a one party system and therefore had no challenges as such to its policy formulations. Assessing Nkrumah's position in Ghana, it was said that:

Kwame Nkrumah was the Conventional Peoples Party (CPP), and the

According to Thompson, by 1962, Ghana's Foreign Policy was dominated by Nkrumah's obsession, shared in its particular form by no one else of influence in Ghana, to bring a 'continental union government' to Africa, and to align Ghana with all anti-imperialist groups and countries.[61] Due to his increasingly dictatorial powers, he was able to set about his policy virtually without regard to domestic pressure. The motive behind Nkrumah's radicalism has been observed as his "anti-Americanism," friendship with the East, and the moving of Ghana towards "scientific socialism," a belief which grew in his decade in America - though he had had such notions even before he left the Gold Coast for America in 1953. In other words, Nkrumah was trying to make his personal dream and ambition into a reality and this was not necessarily a genuine African cause.

Ghana, having gained independence before Nigeria, was able to use a position of radicalism towards African union as a means of making an impact on international affairs. Ghana wanted to play a role in African issues and wanted to garner support for its ambition. But the emergence of Nigeria as an independent country in 1960 detracted from Ghana's position. Nigeria's refusal to toe the same line with Ghana resulted in Ghanaian antagonism to Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to Ghana's claim that Nigeria was against the progress of African unity, both countries proclaimed African unity but with different approaches. Both countries had their short-comings in their pursuit of African unity. This could be attributed in part to the difference in their perceptions of the attitudes of the 'great powers.' For Nkrumah of Ghana, any interest in the Western bloc meant a continuing establishment of imperialism. But Sir Robert Jackson (Nkrumah's spokesman) described Nkrumah as a man with "two separate sealed compartments." In explaining this phrase a British diplomat described him as a "chameleon."[62] It was noted that prior to independence Nkrumah told Western statesmen that his heart was with the West and at the same time he told the Eastern envoys that they should bide their time until he was in a position to declare that his real loyalties were with their cause.[63] As Sir Robert remarked the "separate sealed" Eastern compartment of his mind in the event turned out to be bigger than the Western one.[64]

To Nigeria, the right of self-determination did not apply to the ethnic groups within member states of the OAU, but only to insurgents against colonial or white minority rule.[65] Nigeria stood for "national unity" at all times and this remained policy not only at the Nigerian level but with other African countries, especially in the insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Nigerian foreign policy makers constantly worked to ensure that irredentist and secessionist forces in Africa were contained within the existing territorial boundaries of post independence Africa especially after the Congo experience. To this end, Nigeria's political leaders played an active role in negotiating the form of Pan-African alliance that became the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In contrast to the more radical leaders of the time, Nigeria sought an alliance that would protect the territorial integrity of these fragile states and provide at least a diplomatic weapon against any attempts from within or outside the region to alter the status quo by means of wars of aggression or subversion.[66] The Soviet economic concept received practically no support in Nigeria, the overwhelming preference being for some form of mixed economy. The Nigerian policy of non-alignment under these circumstances could be regarded as a pragmatic one with no desire for any blanket identification with either bloc, but with a strong tendency nonetheless to give the Western bloc the benefit of any doubt except on questions of colonialism.

It must be concluded therefore that both Nigeria and Ghana created two distinct international images. Nigeria is a Federal State and acted in order to harmonise the various internal forces of a pluralistic nation. Ghana was a unitary government and at the same time smaller than Nigeria both in size and population, and followed a "One Party System" which was the sole voice of Ghana, and represented the country's internally unchallenged foreign policy.

CHAPTER 4

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE FIRST MILITARY GOVERNMENT GOWON, BIAFRAN SECESSION AND THE APPROACH TO WORLD OPINION:

In Balewa's government 'non-alignment' was declared as the foundations of the Nigerian Foreign Policy but what was observed was nothing more than a "facade." [1] There were, for instance, no conscious efforts to move closer to any of the communist powers to balance a predisposition to the West. [2] To Balewa, foreign policy was clear cut – either support the West and be in good and respectable company, or support the communist powers and be in the company of the devil. [3] As a conservative and devoutly religious statesman he favoured a pro-Western approach to foreign relations.

There were some factors which made it possible for the Balewa administration to maintain such a strongly pro-Western attitude from 1960–1966, irrespective of views within the coalition government, the opposition party and even the pressure groups. These included [4]

1. The inability of the radical elements in the NCNC to impose their desire for a more militant stance, so the decision of the NPC prevailed.
2. The making of the country's foreign policy was essentially an executive responsibility which was

dominant actor.

3. The Federal Parliament, which might have redressed the one-sided nature of Nigerian foreign policy, never had a chance; it played a peripheral role, constantly rubber-stamping the key decisions of the Federal Executive Council.
4. There was no powerful 'watch-dog' parliamentary committee on foreign relations, and this lack was coupled with the infrequency of parliamentary meetings. Also, the members of parliament themselves did not sufficiently understand the proper place and role of the legislature within the parliamentary democracy, nor did they effectively utilise the opportunity provided by the question period to deal with the inadequacies of the Federal government's foreign policy.

There were indeed some well-organised and powerful pressure groups during *Balewa's administration which articulated diverse* and at times contradictory views on the shape and form that Nigeria's foreign policy should take; on the whole, however, both the pressure groups and public opinion were ineffective in influencing public policy. The only major exception was the successful campaign mounted by the Action Group, the Nigerian Congress, the Labour Unions, and Student Groups against the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact.[5] The continuous campaign mounted

by these groups led to a change of heart by the Federal Government especially when it nearly became a barrier to the success of the Monrovia Group.

It can be concluded that Balewa's administration observed a pseudo-non-alignment process in its foreign relations. Following from this, this chapter will endeavour to examine the behaviour of the foreign policy formulation of the first long standing military government. Special attention will be paid on whether this first military government toed the same line as its predecessor in its foreign policy formulation or otherwise.

THE DEMISE OF A BRIEF FIRST MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

It is necessary to point out that due to the relatively short period covered by Ironsi's regime' which succeeded the Balewa administration immediately after the coup d'etat of 15th January 1966, (though it declared non-alignment as the central theme of Nigeria's foreign policy) it could not provide sufficient basis for comparison with Balewa's administration. The regime lasted for barely six months before it was overthrown by the July 1966 counter-coup which led to the nomination of Gowon as the new Head of State of the Federal Military Government. Likewise the assessment of the foreign policy behaviour during the Gowon regime would not be complete without taking into consideration the attempted secession of the Eastern part of the country,

including the impact of the civil war as a whole. These stood as the determining factors in guiding the attitude of the Federal Military Government and its foreign policy formulation.

THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION: - BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE CIVIL WAR:

This section will be assessing the impact of the civil war on Nigeria's relations with the Great Powers (and the impact on the policy of non-alignment), the African countries, and its neighbouring countries.

At the outset of the hostilities between the Federalists and the secessionists in July 1967, the general belief on both sides was that Britain had an important role to play; and its stance would influence the course of the war. This resulted in every effort put by both parties in order to explore the possibilities of getting Britain's recognition and the attendant benefits of arm supplies, technical assistance, advice, and relief aid.[6] But Britain, on one hand, was anxious to limit the scale of the conflict and at the same time to safeguard its commercial and political interests in the country.[7] This reluctance shown by the British government created some doubts on the benefits of the long-standing good relationship maintained by Balewa's

administration. Following the declaration of an independent state of Biafra on 30th May 1967, and the United States and the United Kingdom's refusal to supply Nigeria with military aircraft and weapons, Nigeria had no alternative than to turn to the Soviet Union for help.[8]

The USSR by contrast seized upon this reluctance shown by the British government as a golden opportunity. This was expressed in the Soviet diplomat's remark, "we will take advantage of mistakes the British make; it is only human." [9] The Soviet Union used all means available to secure the good relationship it had been denied by the Balewa government. It presented itself as more peace-loving than the Western Powers. Statements like the following were issued:[10]

"The Soviet Union, guided by the peace-loving principles of its foreign policy, considers foreign interference in Nigeria's internal affairs inadmissible. The Soviet Union in its relations with Nigeria will continue to render it support in its independent national development on the basis of equality and mutual respect."

From the strength of the Soviet stand at that crucial period in Nigerian history, there developed an unprecedented opinion amongst many West African countries that the Soviet concern for the protection of African independence was sincere. For example, a Radio Nigeria commentary supported this view when it said that at the beginning of the war both the UK and USA had refused to sell arms to Nigeria. But on the USSR, it noted - "to its

pleasant surprise, it was a country with which it (Nigeria) had hitherto had very little economic or political ties that proved willing to satisfy its urgent needs." [11]

Writing in 1968, Walter Schwaz said that as a result of the civil war Britain had lost ground, perhaps irretrievably, in Nigeria. [12] Though Schwarz's remarks contained some truth, it might be regarded as perhaps too harsh, and too rash because in 1968 when the book was written it was a difficult period in which to forecast accurately the future pattern of Anglo-Nigerian relations. However, during this period many Nigerian leaders did regard the British government's attitude as a betrayal by a former friend. Apart from the delay in taking sides in the civil war, there were certain issues over which Nigeria considered Britain's approach as unfriendly. These include the way in which Mr. George Thomas, then Minister of State in the Commonwealth Office, waded into the oil blockade of the former Eastern Nigerian Coast, denouncing it as being totally against international law [13] which angered the Federal Government. The anger generated by this statement was noted to be very high especially when it was observed that earlier on the 30th June 1967, the British government had informed the Federal government that the 'British oil companies - Shell-BP would make a token payment of royalties to the secessionists because they could do serious damage to the assests of the companies around Port Harcourt.' [14] This attitude portrayed by the British government at that period coupled with Mr. Thomas's statement which accused the Federal Government of violation of international law,

provoked all types of criticism. The Nigerian press was not restrained on this issue. The Morning Post stated that the attitude of Mr. Thomas showed that Britain was more interested in the flow of oil than the survival of Nigeria as a unit.[15] The New Nigeria said that his statement was clear evidence of the British government's involvement on the side of the secessionists.[16] Again, the Morning Post summed up the general impression in the country by stating that the attitude of the British government had shown the bankruptcy of the former pro-British stance of Nigerian foreign policy.[17]

The involvement of the Soviet Union in the civil war on the side of the Federal Government to a great extent motivated the British Government's belated decision to take sides with the Federal Government. Secondly, the Federalists' early military superiority, as demonstrated in their ability to overcome the Biafran secessionist forces from the mid-west, demonstrated that they were worth backing. After the British decision, Britain and the Soviet Union remained Nigeria's major allies, supplying arms and ammunition to the Federalists at a staggering pace.[18] But while there were some public outcries in Britain over the arms supplies, the USSR because of the closed nature of its political system encountered no such problems from its public. The Soviet Union, striving to redress the pro-west imbalance in Nigeria's 'non-aligned' policy, supplied massive material assistance to the Federalists.[19] At first, many in the West nervously felt that Moscow was in fact gradually edging out Western interests in Nigeria particularly in the first two years of the civil war when

the Soviet Union was prominent in cultural and economic activities in the country.[20] But by March 1969, Soviet influence had passed its peak and Western activities in Nigeria again increased steadily. Prime Minister Harold Wilson paid a well publicised official visit to the country.[21]

Admittedly, Britain supplied the bulk of Nigeria's weapons, and in spite of ministerial denials in the House of Commons, it supplied many more arms than the British people realised. The true value of the British support to the Federal Government cannot be over-estimated particularly in terms of supplies. Apart from obvious value in providing part of Nigeria's armoury, British support also implied diplomatic, political and moral backing. Britain's pro-Federal posture influenced other governments, especially those in North America and the old Commonwealth in shaping their policies. There is no doubt that Britain's role was one of the critical factors that helped the Federalists to achieve victory. Nevertheless, its support was, (in Nigeria's eyes) far from total commitment, even duplicity was sometimes suspected. The strident, parliamentary debates, the hostile mass media, the wavering attitude of some key cabinet ministers, and the British refusal to supply the Nigerian airforce with aircraft and bombs, all helped to inflict serious damage to the goodwill that Britain enjoyed in Nigeria.[22] Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was the first to support the Federal cause this did not qualify it as an alternative to Britain as an ally. However, the experience of the civil war established an increased Nigerian pragmatism in its dealings with

other countries and a greater commitment to a genuine 'non-alignment' policy. On the other hand, the Soviet commitment in the civil war created an atmosphere whereby communism was seen as a system and not an evil as had been feared by many prominent Nigerian leaders.

NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CIVIL WAR:

The United States, unlike Britain, right from the start of the civil war clearly pointed out her intention to stay aloof from the whole affair; its reason being that it had no direct role to play especially since the conflict fell within Britain's sphere of influence." Four days after the outbreak of hostilities in July 1967, Washington announced that it would neither sell nor otherwise supply arms to either side in order "not to deepen" the conflict.[23] The US decision comprised many reasons. Firstly, Washington was very wary of any deep involvement in any civil war especially with the Vietnam war already in progress, and the domestic difficulties and protests created by it. Secondly, the memory of the US involvement in the Congo crisis was still very fresh. Even when the Soviet Union became involved in the conflict by arming the Federalists, the US did not reverse its declared policy, partly because it felt that Britain's commitment to the Federal cause would check, if not neutralise Moscow's efforts; and partly because it assessed Gowon to be hardly a Bolshevik, therefore, "there were obvious limitations to the extent to which Gowon would flirt with the Russians."[24]

The Federal Military Government was angered by the US imposition of an arms ban but, with the Soviet Union on its side, Lagos was very tactful in order to avoid a cold-war confrontation. Nigeria tried as much as possible to maintain its traditional stand and friendship with the UK and the USA. This was expressed in a statement whereby it pointed out that:[25]

The recent purchases from Soviet sources have been strictly for cash on a commercial basis. The Nigerian government maintains its traditional friendship and foreign policy of non-alignment. The Federal Military Government expects its friends, particularly in the West, not to do anything to hamper its current efforts to defend the territorial integrity of the Federation of Nigeria and to guarantee justice to all communities.

As the civil war proceeded there was a slight change of policy on the US side. Washington's policy of non-intervention came under severe attack from a strong pro-Biafra lobby. This was due to continuous reports of starvation and suffering among the Biafran civilian population, coupled with well-organised and high-powered Biafran propoganda. This led to the option of a low-profile approach by Washington. It maintained the arms embargo on both sides, declared political support for the Federal government on the basis of the 'one Nigeria' concept, but in the event the US was seen as the largest contributor to the relief efforts in Biafra. In justifying the humanitarian intervention, President Johnson explained that:[26]

While we have no intention of interfering in Nigerian affairs, we

do not believe innocent persons should be made victims of political manoeuvring.

The change of administration did not affect the US policy of neutrality other than in the relief operations. Though President Nixon promised a radical change on the relief supplies to the secessionists on attainment of office, this never occurred. This was due to pro-Federal bias in the US embassy at Lagos, the Department of State in Washington, and the apparently anti-Biafran stance of Dr. Kissinger in the White House.[27] Eventually, the low profile policy led to the US falling foul of both the Federalists and the secessionists. The US relief intervention was regarded as having some distinctly political overtones. For instance, it involved direct dealings with the secessionists which indirectly strengthened the status of Biafra in striving for international recognition. It built false hopes within Biafra which intensified active Biafran resistance and helped to prolong the civil war.

However, by the autumn of 1969, many Americans were stressing their impatience with Biafran leader Ojukwu's attitude to the suffering and starvation of his own people. By this time the State Department had become more pro-Federal and Biafra failed to obtain the recognition from the US which it had hoped for. In January 1970, when Biafra finally collapsed, President Nixon was among the very first leaders to congratulate the Federalists.

NIGERIA AND FRANCE DURING THE CIVIL WAR:

The position of France in the Nigerian conflict was totally different from that of either the British or the US. Initially French assistance was implicit but by September 1968 President de Gaulle openly acknowledged that diplomatic recognition of Biafra might not be ruled out. Although this was not accorded, France remained the secessionists' principal support in the civil war. Many reasons engendered the French decision to back Biafra. These included: "The fear of a united, a successful Nigeria presenting a strong pole of attraction to the weak and fragmented Francophone states around it and so, by implication, threatening to upset the balance of power in the region to the detriment of French influence. The attraction of oil, de Gaulle's distrust of the Anglo-Saxons; his general dislike of Federations; and also the roles of President Houphouet-Biogny of Ivory Coast and Mr. Foccart, the Secretary General of African Affairs at the Elysee." [28]

Despite this, French commitment to the secessionists was far from total. This could be seen through its 'semi-recognition' and half-hearted assistance moreover, France played a double-game at a late stage in the conflict. This became necessary partly because of the unexpected solidarity and strength of the Federal supporters among western and african states, and partly due to innate caution. [29] For example, M. Schuman, the Foreign Minister, told the National Assembly on 4th November 1969, that French constant policy was to avoid an intensification of the war. The caution also extended to mediation which he said "can only come from other African countries with whom (the French)

maintain constant contact." He said that it would be at a later and decisive stage France could intervene without running the risk of interfering with other initiatives and thus making the situation even more confused.[30]

The Federal Military Government on the other hand did not take any obvious reprisals such as breaking off diplomatic relations, harassment of French nationals, or confiscating French properties in Nigeria. The maintenance of contact between Nigeria and France, and the fact that diplomatic links were not severed, paved the way for a speedy improvement in Franco-Nigerian relations after the war. Thus, whereas the Biafran policy was mainly carried out by M. Jacques Foccart, the Secretary General for African Affairs, the rapprochement was performed by the Quai d'Orsay, the French Foreign Ministry which had been, behind the scenes, sympathetic to the Federal cause throughout.[31]

NIGERIA AND CHINA DURING THE CIVIL WAR:

Just as Nigeria did not enjoy the total support of the Western powers, so it did not receive full support from all the communist powers.[32] There had been no existing cordial relationship between Lagos and Peking, and the fact that the Soviet Union backed the Nigerian Military Government prompted China to support the secessionists. It could be recalled that during this period the Soviet Union and China were no longer enjoying the cordial relationship which once existed between the two powers. Under these circumstances it would be necessary to examine China's role

and its effect in the Nigerian civil war.

The Peking backing of the secessionists during the civil war was attributed to two main reasons. Firstly it was due to Sino-Soviet rivalry. The Chinese posture also stemmed from what it saw as the bourgeois nature of the civilian administration and the pro-Western nature of its foreign policy, and Lagos made no attempt to form a working relationship with China. Above all, Lagos blindly followed the Western lead and refused to recognise Peking.[33] However, Peking did not begin to support Biafra until it was clear that Moscow was backing Lagos. The main motive for China's unwavering support of the Biafran regime throughout the war which ignored the volatile behaviour of this regime (sometimes bourgeois, sometimes apparently revolutionary, and sometimes down right reactionary)[34] was to oppose Moscow's support for the Federalists. Peking also ignored the OAU's support for Lagos. The recognition of Biafra by radical states in the African spectrum such as Tanzania and Zambia allowed China to rationalise its policy. On the other hand, the concurrent recognition by 'bourgeois' and 'neo-colonial' Ivory Coast and Gabon neutralised this effect.[35]

Nevertheless, Lagos played a pragmatic role to keep the impact of any Sino-Soviet differences in the war to a minimum. The Federal Military Government adopted a stance of playing down the Chinese involvement at the official level as much as possible meanwhile, Soviet support for the Federalists remained open and extensive.

NIGERIA AND THE AFRICAN STATES DURING THE CIVIL WAR:

Nigeria's policy towards its immediate neighbours (the states of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and Togo) and Africa as a whole has, since independence been guided by and large by the following five principles:[36]

1. The sovereign equality of all African states
2. Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African state.
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries.
4. The commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity.
5. The total eradication of racialism and colonialism from Africa.

All these five principles of Nigeria's African policy are contained in Articles II and III of the OAU Charter. Much of the achievement of these policies was due to the views of Balewa and other leaders of the Monrovia group of states.

Nigeria's foreign policy was (in the words of Dr. Okoi Arikpo, then Commissioner for External Affairs), constructed in concentric circles,[37] radiating outwards from Nigeria's immediate neighbours, to West Africa, to Africa as a whole and thereby to the world.

In reviewing the attitudes of the African states during the Nigerian civil war the role of the OAU should be considered as a principal factor. It was the Congo experience which brought the awareness and fear of disintegration within African states into perspective among the African leaders. At the birth of the OAU in 1963 a basis of foreign policy formulation was established which incorporated settlement of disputes through peaceful negotiation, non-interference in internal matters of other states, respect for the existing borders, the policy of non-alignment and also the promotion of unity and solidarity in African states, and eradication of all forms of colonialism.[38]

At the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war (bearing in mind the principles of the OAU) the Federal Military Government maintained that the conflict should remain strictly an internal affair. Under these circumstances the civil war put into test the two main principles of the OAU Charter. On the outbreak of the civil war, the federalists referred constantly to Article III, 2 i.e. the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; while Biafra held unto Art.III,3 - respect for the inalienable right to independence.[39]

The OAU's intervention in the civil war was precipitated by three major issues; the involvement of foreign powers; the attitude of the governments of Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia; and also the starvation of Biafra's population and more importantly Biafra's allegation of genocide' on its people.[40] However, the OAU's participation in the civil war did not go beyond

negotiations and its own deliberations. Such deliberations on several occasions eventually led to the OAU Summit Meeting at Algiers which established a policy of "non-recognition" of Biafra and called on all member states of the United Nations and the OAU to refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria, especially since it upheld the principle of African unity.[41] This call had an effect within the UN as was demonstrated by the UN refusal to give audience to Biafran leaders when they called for UN intervention. This action in turn promoted the OAU's credibility. Loyalty to the call was maintained by the African states too with the exception of the governments of Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia which gave their reasons for their preference of Art.III, 3 to Art.III, 2. They declared their reasons for their actions (irrespective of the views of the other African states) during their different speeches on their recognition of Biafra as an independent state. Briefly speaking these four states seem to have had the same opinion on Biafra's right to secede. They all condemned the massacres of the Ibos in the Northern part of Nigeria, and also the Federal government's refusal to abide by the Aburi conference recommendations which they claimed led to the declaration of Biafra as an independent country. They argued that in the light of the actions against the Ibos, the secessionists had no other option than to segregate themselves from the other parts of Nigeria which they no longer trusted.

The actions of these four states did not radically change the OAU's stand on the conflict but rather it strengthened its

African policy as enunciated by the Balewa government, and the five principles of its African affairs stand as a policy. But its policy towards the eradication of racialism, colonialism and imperialism took new dimensions as a result of the assistance of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal for the secessionists. In 1968, the Nigerian government took upon itself the policy of direct assistance to the various nationalist groups of South Africa. This policy came into existence following allegations that the fund meant for the OAU liberation Committee was being used by the Tanzanian government to back the secessionists.[42] Irrespective of the attitudes of the four African states concerned, Nigeria tried as much as possible to maintain a working atmosphere with them construing their actions as emotional. To Nigeria what mattered most at that critical period was the OAU's stand.

NIGERIA AND GHANA DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Relations between Nigeria and Ghana since Nigerian independence had not been cordial. At a certain stage during Balewa's administration, it was so bad as to degenerate to the level of name-calling especially during the period of late 1961 and early 1963.[43] But when the army took over in both countries in 1966 a good relationship between the two countries was anticipated. Though there were the beginnings of a close working relationship between them during Ironsi's regime it was shortlived. On the contrary, during the period of mid 1966 up to 1970, the relationship between them was marked with mutual antagonism,

suspicion and abuse. Ghana's attitude to Nigeria stemmed partly from the failure of its role or imagined role in the Nigerian conflict. Ghana was the first African country to intervene in the Nigerian crisis in late December 1966. On General Ankrah's personal initiative both sides of the conflict were able to meet for the first time at Aburi on the 4th and 5th of January 1967 to resolve the constitutional crisis.[44] The OAU presumed an agreement would be reached at the Aburi conference. It was not until it was realised that the Aburi conference would not resolve the conflict that the OAU intervened. The OAU did not discuss any event concerning the civil war during the meeting of its Council of Ministers after Aburi. However, the Federal Military Government allowed the discussion of the crisis by the OAU at its subsequent summit. During this conference Ghana was one of the seven African countries that sponsored an eight-point draft resolution on the crisis adopted by the summit.[45] The main features of the resolution were condemnation of secession, the acceptance of the crisis as the internal affair of Nigeria, and the decision to dispatch a consultative mission of six heads of state to Nigeria to assure Gowon of the OAU Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria.[46] Also Ghana was a member of the consultative committee set up by the OAU.[47]

The Ghanaian government welcomed the move but General Ankrah had doubts as to whether General Gowon could stand firm by his conditions for peace which were – the renunciation of secession and the acceptance of a twelve states structure for Nigeria.[48]

General Ankrah showed a great deal of disappointment towards the non-success of the Aburi accord and this was expressed in his reaction to the crisis. It was the Ghanaian government's reference to the civil war at the General Assembly of the UN on the 25th September 1967 (before the OAU mission to Lagos later in the year in November 1967), which brought further complications to Nigerian-Ghanaian relations.[49] Although the Ghanaian representative explained that his country was for the unity of Nigeria, the Nigerian press held Ghana's reference to the civil war at the UN floor as a further evidence of Ghana's support for the rebels. On the 28th September 1967, through a commentary on Radio Nigeria, Ghana was accused of its concealed support for the secessionists. This was denied by the Ghanaian government which expressed disappointment at the commentary and confirmed its sincere support for the Nigerian Federal Military Government.[50] The whole incident at this stage reflected lack of trust and confidence on both sides. In fact, the Ghanaian delegate who read Ghana's address to the UN General Assembly only mentioned in passing, 'that the OAU was doing its best to end this most regretably fratricidal war in Nigeria.' Whether this type of comment should have been offensive if made by a friendly African state remains open to question.

At the first peace meeting of the consultative committee in Lagos on 22nd and 23rd November 1967, General Ankrah was mandated by the committee to convey to the secessionist leaders the text of the OAU Kinshasa resolution on Nigeria and the conclusion and discussions of its first meeting in Lagos which reaffirmed OAU

support for the territorial integrity of Nigeria. In turn he was expected to report back after the completion of the assignment. The OAU Secretary General, Diallo Telli, also added that the main task of General Ankrah was "to convince the secessionists to abandon secession and to return to take part with the other Nigerians in the building of their nation." [51] But it seems such a role did not appeal to him nor did he appreciate the outcome of the Lagos summit. He signified this when on returning to Accra he merely told newsmen at the airport that if the proposals of the Lagos peace meeting were accepted by the Ojukwu government considerable progress would be made towards restoring peace to Nigeria. [52]

General Ankrah for several months failed to report back to the OAU on his telephone contacts with Ojukwu. On the strength of that, General Mobutu, (one of the six heads of state forming the OAU Consultative Committee, anxious to know the outcome of Ankrah's role, as enunciated by the Secretary General) flew to Accra in late April 1968. Mobutu's reaction to the press (on his way home) at Accra airport, signified lack of agreement between the two leaders. He condemned secession in Africa and warned that it should not be encouraged nor should it be seen as a matter of high principle. [53]

During this period the pro-Biafra campaign continued unabated in Ghana. Advertisements in memory of the 30,000 civilians said to have been murdered during the program of 1966 in Northern Nigeria were carried by the government owned Ghanaian Times and Daily

Graphic on the 29th May 1968.[54]

During the following Consultative Committee Meeting held in Niamey, (Niger) in mid July 1968, General Ankrah eventually reported back to the OAU (after nearly eight months), the details of his report were not published but he made a press statement on the 16th July 1968 claiming that his assignment was "only" partially successful since he had not succeeded in speaking to Ojukwu personally (whom he referred to as Head of State).[55] This reference together with his proposal for relief supplies to the rebels which resembled those put forward by Ojukwu earlier in Aba,[56] infuriated the Nigerian delegates. The effect of the Niamey peace conference on Nigerian-Ghanaian relations was "damaging." By this time the Nigerian government became very vocal in criticising Ghana's role in the crisis. This resulted in a total stop being put to the Nigerian government's previous practice of informing Ghana of its peace proposals and about the progress of the war.[57]

When the OAU consultative committee met in Monrovia between 18th and 20th April 1969, Ghana was unable to take any active role in the work of the committee. The Ghanaian delegate, Mr. J.W.K Harlley did not take an active part in the committee discussions nor did he take part in the series of private talks between the leaders of the consultative committee and the representatives of both sides in the war.[58] It was this virtual withdrawal of Ghana that made it easy for the conference to blame the secessionist leaders for the first time for the failure of all

peace efforts, while it praised the Nigerian government for its cooperation and conciliatory attitude.[59] Ghana's inability to take any active role was due to three main reasons. Firstly, there was no Nigerian support for, or cooperation with Ghana's peace efforts. Secondly, Ghana was faced with a major government crisis when the meeting was held. There was a leadership crisis which led to the dismissal of General Ankrah on 2nd April 1969 from the chairmanship of the NLC and his successor Brigadier A.A. Afrifa was unable to lead the Ghana delegation to the conference and his place was taken by the vice-chairman of the NLC, Mr. J.W. Harlley. Also Victor Owusu, who had visited Lagos a few days earlier resigned his post as Commissioner for External Affairs three days before the meeting. Thirdly, the involvement of Mr. Francis Nzeribe, a powerful Biafran propagandist working in Ghana for a foreign firm, the Jeaffan Company Limited, in the episode that led to the removal of General Ankrah, weakened Ghana's moral standing at the peace meeting.[60]

However, the Ghanaian newspapers still maintained their hostile attitude to the Federal cause. On 31st May 1969, the report of an inquiry claimed to have been conducted under the auspices of the so-called International Committee for the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide, by a Ghanaian Dr. Mensah, and financed by the Ojukwu regime, was published in London. It concluded that there was "prima facie evidence" that genocidal intention against the Biafrans existed among the Nigerians.[61] The Ghanaian press and radio maintained this hostile attitude towards Nigeria up till the end of the war. Three days before the formal surrender of the

rebels the Evening Standard, owned by the opposition, National Alliance of Liberals Party, criticised the UN's Secretary General (U. Thant), then visiting Ghana, for calling on the rebel leaders to give up secession. The paper called on the Secretary General to reconsider the situation properly and take steps to stop genocide against Biafrans.[62]

There was not much difference in the attitude of Ghana's government party from that of the opposition even when Dr. Busia's government came to office on the 1st October 1969. During Dr. Busia's first major interview on assuming office (at Guinea-Bissau while attending its independence celebration), he declined to mention anything about the basic issue of secession in Nigeria, but merely stressed the urgency of getting a cease fire at all costs.[63] On his return to Ghana he did launch his country into participating in the peace efforts led by Emperor Haile Selassie since the end of September. He sent his Foreign Minister, Mr. Victor Owosu, to Lagos with a message to General Gowon on the 10th October, and at the same time to Emperor Haile Salassie. On arrival at Lagos airport, Mr. Owusu confirmed to the newsmen that his government was in support of the Federal government but Nigerian leaders were not convinced by his claim and they remained skeptical of Ghana's stand on the Nigerian conflict.

AN EXPLANATION BY THE LEGON OBSERVER ON GHANA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

Ghana, unlike the other four African countries (Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Zambia and Gabon which recognised Biafra openly), did not give any formal recognition to Biafra. Right from the start of the crisis Ghana maintained that it was on the Federal Government's side. Despite its claim, after the unsuccessful Aburi accord, there was a great deal of speculation amongst the Nigerian people as to Ghana's true role. The Lagon Observer which was the most consistent and outspoken advocate of the Biafran cause in Ghana, gave four reasons for Ghana's stand in the crisis. The first was the involvement of the Soviet Union in the crisis. Ghana assumed that as a result of Soviet military and moral support for the Federal Government Nigeria would soon become a bridge head for Soviet penetration of Africa, and for launching an attack on Ghana for the restoration of Nkrumah.[65] The second reason was the view of many Ghanaians that "in the light of Africa's concern for progress," the Ojukwu regime was more impressive than the Gowon government in Lagos which they described as representing the interests of the "feudal North." [66] The third reason was what the Legon Observer called "the Federal Government's clumsiness over the Aburi agreement." Many Ghanaians genuinely felt that the Federal Government's failure to implement the Aburi agreements made secession inevitable.[67] The fourth reason was centered on the effectiveness of the rebel propaganda. The partisan account of events leading to the war was passionately believed by many Ghanaians who eventually concluded that events in Nigeria had to a large extent destroyed the basis of a federation.[68]

Though there was no formal diplomatic break between Nigeria and Ghana, relations between the two countries deteriorated considerably. This was due to lack of mutual trust and understanding on both sides. The Nigerian government found it difficult to accommodate Ghana's role during the civil war on the ground that not only did Ghana want to use this opportunity to further its traditional desire of leading Africa but also its friendly relationship and close cooperation with both Ivory Coast and France which were pro-Biafra seemed to prejudice Ghanaian objectivity. Indeed most Nigerians feared that its relationship with the two pro-Biafran countries might have helped in influencing Ghana's attitude towards the federal government. It was recorded that the Nigerian-Ghanaian relationship sunk to its lowest point as a result of Ghana's role during the crisis.

THE CIVIL WAR AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The civil war had some important effects on Nigeria's foreign policy behaviour. It reinforced and also balanced the policy of non-alignment and the country's earlier policy of commitment to the principles of the OAU Charter. Since some South African help had been accorded Biafra it also brought into perspective the urgency of the liberation of Southern Africa; and it served to focus Nigeria's attention on developments within its immediate neighbours.[69] The experience of the civil war brought into perspective two developments mainly responsible for the new emphasis and direction of its policy in Africa. The first was a keener perception of overall alignments, derived from the support

of white dominated African states for Biafra. The second was a greater appreciation of the positive role that might be played in African affairs by the OAU.[70]

Since the formation of the OAU Nigeria has been formally committed to the task of assisting the liberation movements in Africa, but its commitment had not been very strong in practice until the civil war experience. For example, up to the time of the January 1966 coup in Nigeria, Portugal had continued to maintain a diplomatic post in Lagos and white Africans from the Portugese colonies were allowed in the country.[71] At the Accra Summit Meeting of the OAU in October 1965, Balewa declared that the most important subject before the meeting was how to defeat and eliminate subversive forces emanating from neighbouring countries.[72] In other words the Balewa government did not visualise white minority rule as the major threat to Africa and its progress (unlike Nkrumah who saw unity and African economic progress only up on total elimination of white minority rule). From late 1968, the Nigerian government's view changed. It maintained that the main concern of the OAU should be how to eliminate colonianism, racism and apartheid in Africa. This action by the Federal Government emerged from the moral and material assistance given to the Biafran regime by Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia during the civil war. This in turn brought home to the Nigerian leaders that the continuing existence of these colonial and racist minority regimes in Southern Africa was not only a slur on the dignity of all black people, but also a security threat to the independence,

sovereignty and territorial integrity of all African states.[73] During the OAU Summit Meeting in September 1969, Gowon referred to those foreign countries supporting the Biafran regime as "the evils and the plots of forces of colonialism, racism and oppression to us," and that Nigeria had no other choice but to commit itself wholly to struggle against racial oppression.[74] His address to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 21 June 1971 was remarkable because it echoed Nkrumah's approach. It was during this address he declared that until the whole of Africa was completely liberated no real economic development would take place in the continent. He emphasised that:[75]

The forces which impede the freedom and independence of Africa and which at the same time seek to undermine our achievements remain very formidable... They will never leave us alone to develop our natural and human resources to our advantage. They will forever want us to waste our time and energy in negative pursuits.

From Gowon's speech, it seems the Nigerian government had made a shift in its former policy under the Balewa government which doubted the possibility of the development of the African nation without some Western assistance or involvement on important African issues.

The civil war experience also brought some changes in Nigeria's activities with the OAU. After the civil war the Nigerian leaders seemed to have greater faith in the OAU. As early as 1965, Balewa had expressed misgivings about the survival of the

organisation,[76] as a result of its handling of the Congo conflict. However, after convincing the Nigerian government to accept its deliberation on the Biafran conflict, the OAU dismantled such fears by standing strongly for the Federal Government's cause in its Kinshasa resolutions. The solidarity behind the Nigerian government by all the African states (with the exception of the four and Ghana) not only provided it with moral encouragement but also gave it an important diplomatic edge over the Biafrans. The OAU support for the Federal Government was cited on several occasions by Harold Wilson (then British Prime Minister) for the federal government.[77] The Secretary General of the UN (U Thant), also constantly referred to the OAU's stand in the conflict in justifying the UN's support for the Federal Government. The Nigerian leaders in turn recognised the OAU as a forum of resolution to any major African problem. As a result one of their greatest commitments after the war was to make the OAU fitter for such tasks. In order to achieve this Nigeria took the initiative of seeking to persuade those African states whose commitments to the OAU were minimal to change their attitudes. All the communiques issued at the end of General Gowon's visits to various African countries immediately after the war in January 1970, contained some commitment towards the strengthening of the OAU.[78]

The Gowon government also took bold steps to rekindle enthusiasm for a West African Economic Community though only a few West African states were enthusiastic for such a proposal.[79] Nigeria demonstrated its interest by announcing it would enter into

economic association with any state or group of states in West Africa which was willing to enter into such an association with it. This resulted in the Nigeria/Togo treaty of April 1972 which President Nyadema referred to as the 'embryo' of a Western African Economic Community.[80]

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES FOR THE FORMATION OF ECOWAS

There was a series of controversies in Nigeria about the economic justification of pursuing the formation of a West African Economic Community. As early as 1962, Dr. Gerald Helleiner argued that Nigeria would gain little or nothing economically from a West African Common Market.[81] In April 1973, Dr. Dotun Phillips expressed a similar view. He argued that Nigeria stood to gain little from a West African Economic Community, and that Nigeria's crusade for the formation of such a community was "an exercise in futility."[82] Despite all these expressed fears by the experts the Gowon regime was not deterred from such an initiative.

ECOWAS AS POLICY OUTCOME OF THE CIVIL WAR

The ideas behind Nigeria's stand on the formation of ECOWAS during Gowon's regime was due to three main factors – political, security and economic. For political reasons Nigeria's aim was to pursue such an association which would put an end to colonial divisions in West Africa and create a stronger support for the

OAU. According to Dr. Arikpo, the Federal Military Government held a firm belief that in order to strengthen the bargaining position of African states with the EEC there must be a West African economic community through which all the states in the region could speak with one voice.[83]

For security reasons Nigeria did not want to be surrounded by small countries that were heavily dependent on extra-African powers, especially France, for their military, political and economic survival. It believed that as long as there were client West African states closely tied to European powers its own security could not be assured. It feared that such states could be either manipulated against Nigeria or used as a staging ground by foreign powers as was the experience of the civil war when Dahomy (now Republic of Benin) was used briefly in 1969 for airlifting arms and relief supplies to Biafra.[84] This idea in particular brought about a significant change in the attitude of the Nigerian leaders and helped to clarify issues more clearly than ever. The overwhelming campaign by Nigeria for the formation of a West African Economic Community was for the reduction of dependence on extra-African countries.

For economic reasons, the Federal Government argued that the formation of ECOWAS would give Nigeria access to some raw materials which were either not available in the country or not available in quantity.[85] It demonstrated its commitment in ECOWAS when it decided to sell crude oil at concessionary prices to African countries which had their own refineries. This gesture

was welcomed by many African countries especially Ivory Coast and Senegal whose support was crucial to the formation of the pan-West African Economic Community. This move by Nigeria and the successful negotiation of the ACP agreement with the EEC in February 1975 made it possible for the formation of the ECOWAS.

There had been several attempts to create a common market for all West African countries before the 1970 revival of the idea by the Gowon regime, but until then Nigeria had never taken such a concrete step towards its progress. It was the experience of the civil war which made it seem necessary for Nigeria to play such a regional role. From the economic point of view, it was observed that Nigeria had not much to gain from such a unity. Notwithstanding, a good neighbour policy and a reliable regional security would not be guaranteed without a common goal which involved all. This course stood as the theme of Nigeria's stand on its ECOWAS policy which the Gowon regime pursued as a principal factor in its foreign policy formulation.

CHAPTER 5:

ACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION: THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA

This chapter largely represents the views and experiences of various Nigerians who at one time or the other have been involved in Nigerian foreign policy formulation. My experience during the course of interviewing some of the personalities involved established that most of them wanted to share their views and feelings about the general behaviour of the Nigerian foreign policy and its formulation, and the attitudes of the principal actors in particular.

When I confronted Professor Oshuntokun, current Nigerian Ambassador to Germany, with the question of the "principal actors" in the formulation of the Nigerian Foreign Policy and the process of formulation, he was able to cover many areas. He said:[1]

From my own experience, it is almost a small group of people who work directly with the President and look at issues and say this is the direction we are going to take and these are the issues we are pursuing. After they have decided, there is what we call "crisis committee" which tries to balance these policies you want to follow and

see their reaction. They may support what you want to do or criticise them, and then as a result of that you get a consensus opinion. You then write a memo and present it to the President. Mind you, the foreign policy of a country is the foreign policy thought of the incumbent President himself, his chief adviser or his foreign policy adviser. No Foreign Minister can take a decision in a normal situation and implement it without getting clearance first from the President. So, in essence, the Nigerian foreign policy is determined by a small group of inner circle small senior career people in the foreign office. Then in the Presidency, the President also has his own advisers. So, whatever you suggest with the President, he discusses with his own inner circle because eventually he will have to take the joy of success. In foreign policy formulation, the ball stops at the feet of the President. The process of formulation starts from the Foreign Office but sometimes the President also does some things without even bothering to inform Foreign Office. So, you have a situation where you have sometimes higher level movement in the country. In Banbagida's regime he has always had what you call Minister for Special Duties. We used to joke that he was the third Foreign Minister because you did not only have Minister for Foreign Affairs you also have Minister of State in the Foreign Office. Then you have in the Presidency, Minister for Special Duties, sometimes the President sends this Minister for Special Duties with special notes to his colleagues and counterparts in various parts of the world. Sometimes it is liberally funded to do some specific assignments apart from that of the Foreign Office.

It is not as clear cut as this for sometimes if you have a dynamic Foreign Minister who enjoys the confidence of the President, he may be given virtually a carte-blanche to do whatever he thinks is for the best interest of the country. But during our own time, it is a mixture of general people who are a coterie of small advisers deciding that this is where to move, getting the support of the President. Even so, some speeches by the President on foreign policy, after we would have

drafted this speech, it then goes to the President and he then calls his own people to look at it again, and sometimes they remove or put in something and unfortunately their own interventions are not usually the wisest but that demonstrates that they are in control. People in the Presidency will try to force it to happen and it is not new. If you are a Foreign Minister who is sensitive, you really get angry because after having knocked heads together and you thought that you have reached a very good idea on a particular issue, you just found out that the President had done something completely different.

Having spoken on the largely subordinate role of the Foreign Ministry to the President's own office, he continued to talk on the formulation of foreign policy and the extent of rationality in decision making using a startling example:[2]

Even in the military, there are certain pressures which one has to be aware of. For example, for almost four years we have been talking of restoring diplomatic ties with Israel. It seems to me that the President was prepared for it but there is no doubt that Israelis were involved with our security. He would have wanted restoration of the ties but we in the Foreign Office, at least the key players, i.e. the Minister and the advisers were also keen. So, here you are, the President, the Foreign Minister interested but couldn't carry it through because there are internal considerations.

The question of Israel in Nigeria is a very touchy thing. The Israeli issue is perceived in the South by the Christians and those Christians in the North as something to counter balance the Islamic factor in Nigeria. Nigerian Christians always assume erroneously as Israel was a Christian country. So, the Palestinian issue was seen in Nigerian politics and foreign policy not only as a foreign policy issue but as an internal policy issue. If we are to recognise restoring ties with

Israel, there should be crisis in Nigeria. The muslims will go on rampage and say that it is anti-muslim even though Israel is not a christian country. But in the South, it was generally percieved as a christian country. What I am saying in the essence is, yes, rational considerations do determine foreign policy but while pursuing the rational consideration you must be aware of the fact that there is certain internal dynamic in your country that you must take care of before you embark on certain foreign policy, in case of Israel, it is on that type of category. If you use Israel to focus on foreign policy decisions in Nigeria, you will be forced to listen to the people.

General Ike Nwachukwu went there cladestinely one or two times only on his own. It was myself and one Ambassador who was his close friend based in Belgrade who were aware of this. His wife did not even know because she was not supposed to know, and this went on for about two times before the official visit he made. Despite all these, we could not go on with the restoration of ties with Israel due to the type of outcome envisaged, and nobody would want to make Israeli problem Nigeria's problem to the extent of disintegrating our country. So, it was a very interesting innovation especially with the President. Virtually all African countries have now restored ties with Israel, it became no longer a strong thing because even now Arabs are talking to the Israelis, the Palestinians are also talking to the Israelis. So, when we eventually restored ties with Israel it was no longer news. Our Ambassador went there recently to open a mission, it came up from CNN, it was really no longer an issue. Most of the African countries have been there, whereas, if we have restored ties at the time when every African country was looking unto us, the dividends from that restoration would have been really great in terms of our country's diplomacy because whether you like it or not, Israel and America coordinate their policies. But we wanted it as a basis of economic diplomacy and practical politics for the internal consideration on

Nigeria, which is the whole question of rationalisation not permitting.

This previously unpublished account of foreign policy formulation towards Israel was of great interest. It suggested the link between domestic opinion and foreign policy and how this constrained the otherwise independent rationality in the foreign policy sector.

Another example which was used by Ambassador Oshuntokun to express the position of Nigerian foreign policy formulation was the issue of the intervention in Liberia.[3] He said:

I am of the opinion that if there was a debate on whether Nigeria should be involved in the Liberia issue or not, Nigeria should not have intervened, bearing in mind the cost of such operation. The public should not have supported it because they will think it will be a drain on the resources. It is true that the military government had always had the advantage in terms of their foreign policy even in terms of the domestic policy. Since nobody elected them they are free to do whatever they consider right to be on national interest by them. The point is that there are the enduring interests of Nigeria which should be protected whether military or civilian government.

Under the military regime as far as I can see, we have had a sharper focus on foreign policy than under civilian regimes. Of course, in a situation where in thirty three years of independence, we have had almost twenty three years of Military regime in which case the civilian regime is a rarity. If you are talking about Nigerian foreign policy, in conclusion, it will be the military since it has sharper focus and because it does not have constituencies as such it is able to focus on its goals and aims in terms of its foreign policy considerations. Our

achievements in the decolonisation of Southern Africa, our support on Zimbabwean decolonisation, Namibian decolonisation, would never have happened if we are debating in a parliamentary situation. People would not have supported the kind of expenses we were about to incur, some of them clandestine. When you are working on foreign policy operations, some of the issues you will not want to debate among large group of people.

The sharper focus of military foreign policy expressed here has been applied also outside Africa. The Ambassador continued his surprising and again hitherto unpublished account:

There are areas of Nigerian foreign policy many people will be surprised when they find out how much commitment in the past we have made not only in Africa but in some part of West Indies. I can tell you that in the last years we have been responsible not through coups or whatever to changing some governments in some key West Indian states but through financing particular parties. If you have to open this up for a debate nobody of course will support you because there is what is called foreign policy "elite." It is only the elite who will understand. What does an average man know about Jamaica, Trinidad or Cuba or even Zimbabwe and Namibia? They cannot be bothered, they are interested in water, electricity, food etc. So, the foreign policy of the country has to be determined by the foreign policy elite. In the military, it tend to use the foreign policy elite better than the civilian regime which is unfortunate because I have said before that we were talking of the Nigerian foreign policy, it is really the Military foreign policy. So, the question of democratic behaviour on foreign policy is a mute question. Of course a newspaper is an organ of democracy. Many of our newspapers cover issues on foreign policy, sometimes the newspapers are more militant than the government is prepared to be.

He continued with an enigmatic account of South Africa involvement in Equatorial Guinea, something unknown to me and all Africanists I spoke to, but he used this account to illustrate the foreign policy input of newspapers.

I can give you an example from my own experience when we had South African personnel, troops, students meddling in the affairs of Equatorial Guinea. Obviously Nigeria was made uncomfortable by this country and we felt that we could exert pressure on the people and government of Equatorial Guinea. Many of them claimed to be farmers but we know that they were security people. To send them back to South Africa would bring a lot of pressure on them. We even made a threat of using military force on them. Eventually some of those people were withdrawn but not all of them, but then we entered the period of rapprochement between ourselves and Equatorial Guinea. The point I was trying to make is that many of the Nigerians in 1986/87 were in fact more interested in military intervention on the Equatorial Guinea than the government was prepared to do. So you can see, in a way, that the newspapers sometimes were very militant.

Our newspapers during our period were also very militantly against the British for their policies on Southern Africa. But the government of Banbaginda as a government has somehow had a close rapport with Mrs Thatcher, and there was an unwritten directive in the Foreign Office "don't attack Mrs Thatcher." It was an unwritten directive. And to me, coming from the University, it was very difficult for me to comply with that kind of thing, so, most statements when I wrote them and gave them to my Minister, they were usually toned down when it came to condemning Britain on Southern Africa. So, you see a situation which the newspapers were very very militant but the government was more moderate. Of course, it is understandable, government was in possession of several facts that the newspapers didn't have. If we invaded Equatorial Guinea, who knows what Gabon or what even France would have done. One cannot go into a war situation you do not know how to cover.

As for Liberia, I believe if we had succeeded quickly, it could have been very popular because that is the first time in the history of Nigeria where Nigeria had gone into another country without being invited. Nigeria has been involved in the Pacific, in Tanzania, in 1960s when there was a military up-rising against the government of Nyerere. He invited us and we were there but there has been no case on Nigeria going to another country without being invited.

As a Nigerian, I am proud of Nigerians actually in Liberia with combined military and air force operations mounted on African soil. If you see the operation you will be proud of Nigeria. I think this is something to be proud of but it has lasted so long, the public didn't support it, but we had not tried to carry the public along with us in that particular incident.

To sum it up, generally, the military has been more than dynamic in terms of its foreign policy. If you look through the period of General Murtala Mohammed, General Joe Garba, General Nwachukwu, General Adefope, you will see that the military has been more dynamic, but if you look at the civilian counterpart they are not as dynamic as the military but this is because of the concerns of the democratic control.

Also revealing new information on previously unknown or little known foreign policy initiatives, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi contributed a great deal on the subject of who formulates policy, especially when he was asked by Newswatch of how he handled the diplomatic fall-out of the wheat ban from America?[4] (This particular question was referring to the period when the Federal Government of Nigeria banned all importation of wheat into Nigeria in 1986 due to certain malpractices whereby a great deal

of amount of money was transferred out of the country through wrong invoicing or over invoicing, deliberate refusal to specify the quality of grain that was being imported while quoting price for the best, over-loading of the Free On Board, FOB charges, the abuse of a plus or minus 10 percent charge allowed on proforma invoice and over-loading of auxiliary and freight charges.[5] These malpractices resulted in a loss of up to N15 billion on the Nigerian side during the Shagari era[6] as was announced by Mr. Olu Falae, Secretary to the Federal Government on 2 September 1986. America, being the chief exporter of wheat to Nigeria was very bitter about this action by Nigeria though it did not sever relationship between the two countries). Professor Akinyemi stated that:

Surprisingly, it never became an issue. I suppose the American ambassador was dealing with maybe the Ministry of Agriculture or dealing with Dodan Barracks. Now let me use this opportunity to say what is wrong with our set-up and why I also had problems with even some of my ministerial colleagues, and why every Nigerian foreign minister still has problems with ministerial colleagues. And thirdly, why the Nigerian foreign minister then becomes a scapegoat for things which he doesn't really know anything about. You have assumed that as Minister of External Affairs, the diplomatic fall-outs of the wheat issue should have been my responsibility to handle because the American Secretary of State or the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handles the totality of either American relationship with foreign countries or the totality of British relationship with foreign countries. In Nigeria we don't. Right now, they are about to appoint technology attaches to Nigerian missions abroad to scout around for appropriate technology. There are information attaches attached to our

embassies abroad. Then what is the external affairs officer supposed to do? Does the Ministry of External Affairs have an agenda of its own that is different from the totality of the agenda of the different ministries in Nigeria? The whole foreign affairs is the sum totality of your interests abroad that you're trying to advance. There's nothing called foreign affairs that is distinct from the interest of the Nigerian wheat grower, when it comes to Australian wheat growers. The moment it escapes the borders it becomes foreign affairs. I had this almighty row with Tony Momoh about whether we should send information attaches abroad. I said, as Minister of External Affairs, I had the home number and office number of Sir Geoffrey Howe, I didn't have the home number of the American Secretary of State. A foreign journalist lands in Nigeria, he would get my home number, he will get your home number, if the President is not careful he will get the home number of the President. And because of that you think you will send a Nigerian Information Officer abroad and he will have access where it matters? He will not. It even pays you more, left to me, to hire Saatchi and Saatchi. Because the chances are that the MD of Satchi and Satchi plays golf with whoever it is you want to talk to on the British side or where you want to get the information across. So they know what buttons to press to get the Nigerian message across. Who does the Nigerian Information Officer in Washington have access to? But the President allowed him. He opened offices for Information Attaches which within six months ran into financial problems. Some of them had to be bailed out by External Affairs. The Minister of External Affairs, whoever he is, is supposed to represent the totality of Nigerian inteseests abroad. At home you feed him with all the information he needs. I was on a mission to Yugoslavia, when the Yugoslavians raised with me something involving an air force agreement with Nigeria, I had never heard about it. Nobody told me anything about it. They assumed that as the Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria, coming on an official mission, that I knew, and that they should raise it with me. Then they said, but we raised it with your ambassador and he too said he didn't know. But the

air force had never briefed us. They just handled it as the Nigerian air force with Yugoslavia. Now the man who was raising it with me on the Yugoslavia side was not a Yugoslavian defence attache or air force officer but their Foreign Minister. That is the way to do things. That is the way we don't do it.

Having discussed on the often limited if not marginal role of the Foreign Ministry, Professor Akinyemi was then asked if he found this type of experience frustrating.[7] He responded, and I quote extensively because it is an illuminating statement not widely circulated in the West:

I found it terribly disturbing and terribly devastating. Let me give an example. There was a time I was coming back from a trip abroad on the British Caledonian. On the same plane with me - I didn't even know he was there but obviously he had seen me, it was only when the plane landed in Lagos and I was about to exit that I then saw - the American ambassador. Somebody from State House Protocol was there to meet Chester Crocker, the American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. External Affairs didn't know. He had seen me on the plane, he had ignored me and he had appointment to see the President the following day. And it had been set up for him not using External Affairs. So they went to the meeting. And there he told the President that the US was going to make an announcement about Angola; that they had secured the concurrence of the MPLA government and he mentioned a few other key actors. And that he didn't want Nigeria to criticise the policy when they made the announcement. I understand that he was given the understanding. The following day, the BBC carried the American announcement. And thirty minutes later the MPLA released a statement devastating the American position. And I think it was the United Nations that issued a caution release, distancing themselves from what the Americans had said. So, I authorised a statement to be released by

the Ministry of External Affairs, attacking the American position. That statement was carried by radio and seven o'clock NTA news. It was pulled out of the nine o'clock NTA news. Of course, all the newspapers carried it. Then I was summoned. I was asked why had I embarrassed the government? I said, embarrassed the government or saved the government from embarrassment? I said, are you aware that the MPLA that was supposed to be a part of this agreement criticised that statement thirty minutes after? Are you aware of the statement of the United Nations that was supposed to take it under its umbrella saying that it was not aware of this arrangement? So, if I hadn't released that statement, we would have been seen as conniving with the Americans on Angola much to the detriment of our MPLA allies. At that point, the President saw that he had been sold a dead horse from which he had been rescued. And he said, "Alright." And that was the way it ended. But if you go back to Nigerian newspapers, you will find out that Chester Crocker told Nigerian pressmen when he came here with the Secretary of State at that time, George Shultz, that Professor Akinyemi does not represent Nigerian foreign policy. And no Nigerian pressmen asked him, "And then who does?" He said it. I have the clippings. I could give a dozen examples like that, where a different pipeline was being used to make alternative policies.

On the issue of whether or not the Minister of External Affairs is really in charge of Foreign Affairs in Nigeria[8] He responded by saying:

Let me modify that. The President is in charge of Nigerian foreign policy, because he is the chief executive. The Minister of External Affairs is supposed to be his principal assistant on foreign affairs. The President holds and has the power to over-rule his Foreign Minister. But decisions should not be taken behind that foreign minister.

Let me give you another example. When Shultz came to Nigeria and we made an appointment for him to see the President, somebody who is still in public life then said to me in Dodan Barracks while we were waiting for Shultz to come in that the Americans have requested a one-to-one meeting between Shultz and the President, without anybody being present. I objected. "I said this is not right. One-to-one meetings take place between presidents. He's just another Foreign Minister. Of course Super Power Foreign Minister. But protocol does not have to be placed under the table." I said, in any case, why didn't the Americans make this request to me as the Minister of External Affairs. Why are you the one bearing this message? Anyway the decision was for the President to take. Then Shultz came and we all sat around the table for the photographs-taking ceremony and so on. Then the President said to Shultz, "Well, I understand we have things to talk about." He said "Yes, Mr. President." So they both got up and then Shultz said to the President: "I hope you have no objection to my ambassador sitting?" The President said, "of course not." By this time, I had been so angry that I had told one or two other people around what had just taken place I won't mention names. So one then said to me, "Go on." And I went. The Americans never raised any objection, they didn't even bat an eyelid that I was there. So, one, I wondered whether the request came from the Americans. But of course, when I heard what Shultz then discussed, which was Angola, - on the opening of the line to Savimbi and UNITA and what they wanted Nigeria to do - I understood then why there was this attempt to keep me out of the meeting. So the Nigerian Foreign Minister was going to be kept out of the meeting but the American Ambassador could sit in on that meeting. And yet this was a Dodan Barracks aide who was being used against the Nigerian Foreign Minister.

When asked if he had brought all these incidents to the knowledge of the President, bearing in mind how he felt on these issues at different occasions, and what efforts the President or

the government made to ensure that the Minister of External Affairs was not left out of important foreign policy decisions[9] he replied:

These issues were raised with the President. I think the President believed in running a two-parallel policy on foreign affairs. Because he never over-ruled me. And this used to infuriate the Americans.

But you have to understand that the President himself is a product of the Nigerian system. That was the system he inherited and that is the system that is still there even up-till today.

Professor Gambari, the Nigerian Foreign Minister during Buhari's regime, contributed to this issue by sharing his direct experience with the present author while he was in the foreign office.[10] He said:

Although it would be generally assumed that it is the responsibility of the External Affairs to deal with all matters regarding other countries, but this is not the case in most cases. In the case of the expulsion of the so-called aliens from Nigeria, unfortunately, the Ministry of External Affairs was not really consulted in the decision to close the border and it was also not fully involved in the decision to expel illegal aliens on a mass scale. The decision to close the border, made by the Supreme Military Council, took effect concurrently with the coming into power of the new military government under Buhari. That was understandable. However, in the expulsion of illegal aliens, the Ministry of External Affairs involvement was peripheral and its input was made as a less than enthusiastic junior partner to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, out of the 21 or so participants in the two meetings between Nigerian officials and

ambassadors of some of the neighbouring countries convened to discuss the expulsion issue, which took place on the 2nd and 15th May 1985, presided over by the Minister of Internal Affairs, only one was from the External Affairs Ministry.


From the author's point of view, what emerges from the comments of these three senior participants in Nigerian foreign policy formulation is the following list of points:-

1. The Ministry of External Affairs does not possess the power to make or implement foreign policy issues without clearance from the President.
2. Irrespective of the creation of what was assumed as a **proper** Ministry of External Affairs as against the **pseudo** one which existed even before the Nigerian independence, and the series of modernization which it has undergone since 1972 (Diagrams enclosed) for effective functioning, the style of both the formulation and implementation seem not to have experienced significant changes.
3. It was recognised from the point of view of my interviewees that in many cases certain issues including very sensitive foreign policy issues, might be tackled without the involvement of the Ministry of External Affairs.

Nigeria's Ministry of External Affairs

Chart 1

ORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MACHINERY, 1959




Source: Federation of Nigeria, *Office Directory, 1 July, 1959*, (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1959), p. 7

Federation of Nigeria: *House of Representatives Debates*, 15 August, 1959, p. 285.

Chart 2

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
1961




Source: Federation of Nigeria, *Office Directory, 1 January, 1961*, (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1961), PP. 8-9.

Nigeria's Ministry of External Affairs

Chart 3

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS,
1963**



Source: *Office Directory, 1 January, 1962*, (Lagos: Federal Printing Division 1962), pp.10-13.

Chart 4
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, LAGOS,
AS APPROVED BY THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ON 26 JUNE, 1972




Chart 5

1981 RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS





Chart 6

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1988



4. There were certain offices which were involved in the process of foreign policy formulation that ought not to have been created in the first instance especially since there are provisions in the Ministry of External Affairs to carry out such functions; so rival or parallel offices exist to the Ministry of External Affairs.
5. The vivid account of these contributions stress that the President as the chief executive is in charge of foreign affairs since he holds the power to over-rule any decision reached by his Foreign Minister if he is not in agreement with it. As stipulated in the Executive Powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria's Constitution[11] which stated as follows:
 - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of the Federation -
 - (a) shall be vested in the President, and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation; and...

In order words, **the ball is in the President's court** to ascertain when to involve his Foreign Minister and at what level of the decision making. Throughout the Ministry of External Affairs remains a consultative body at least on foreign affairs issues, but not always a policy-making one. Perhaps, bearing in mind the contents of the constitution, it might be appropriate to conclude that this procedure could be regarded as a common approach in dealing with different organs of the government by the President within the Presidential system. Therefore, the problems encountered by the Ministry of External Affairs might have been a common issue in the system of operation within different Ministries at the Federal level. The question, in this sense, is to do with presidentialism and the concentration of powers. It is still unsettling, however, to find it applied to issues affecting Nigeria's reputation overseas.

THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Nigeria's foreign policy objectives as defined in chapter 2 paragraph 19 of the 1979 constitution state inter-alia: "The state shall promote African Unity as well as total political,

economic and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international co-operation, conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its ramifications (manifestations)."

Implicit in this is Africa's pre-eminence in Nigeria's foreign policy and the fact that Nigeria's national interests and those of African nations are inextricably interwoven. By virtue of its size, population and economic potentials, Nigeria is indispensable factor in the geo-political composition of the African continent and this it is very much conscious of.

Against this background therefore, the formulation of policy guide-lines of successive Federal administrations since independence in 1960, has been reflective of these objectives.

Since independence, Nigeria has regarded the abolition of colonialism and white minority regimes in Southern Africa as in its interest. Nigeria does not have substantial numbers of its nationals in any of the Southern African territories whose interests it feels compelled to protect. Although Nigeria's leaders may not have made contributions to the literature on negritude to rival those of President Senghor of Senegal, the same sort of ideas underlay Nigeria's initial interests in Southern Africa. In a statement made in his capacity as Nigeria's first Minister of External Affairs, Jaja Nwachukwu explained that the reason Nigeria felt "so strongly" about racial discrimination

was that "for centuries people of African descent have been humiliated. They have been treated as anthropoid apes rather than members of the human community." [12]

The civil war of 1967-1970 had a far-reaching effect on Nigeria's view about the geo-political nature of Southern Africa and gave a more concrete dimension to its perceived interests in decolonisation in Southern Africa. One of the "lessons" of the war was "the fact that the existence of the minority regimes in Southern Africa poses a direct threat to Nigeria's security. At the end of the war, it had become absolutely clear, from the type of hostility inherent in some of the industrialised Western world, that it was compelled to announce in an unequivocal term its non-readiness to accept relief assistance from any country which had been studiously hostile to the Federal Military Government during the war, specifically mentioning South Africa, Portugal, Rhodesia and France." [13]

After the civil war, it was reasonable for Nigeria to see the white minority and colonial regimes in Southern Africa as direct threats to the territorial integrity of Nigeria itself and not only as oppressors of Nigeria's black brothers and sisters. The post civil war and contemporary Nigerian perception of its interest in Southern Africa was well summarised in a statement made by General Gowon in 1971 with regard to African territories still under colonial rule:

Besides the vivid affront which they constitute to our conscience, the



threat they pose to our political independence and security is as real as it is intolerable.[14]

The announcement of the results of the third military regime's first ever review of Nigerian foreign policy said that "Nigeria is committed to the total liberation of all oppressed black people in Africa and indeed anywhere else in the world." In practice, however, Nigeria's concern for African liberation has centred on the liberation of black people from oppression by white colonialists and white minority regimes.

The brutality with which apartheid was identified and the dignity suffered by Africans under the system made for perfect agreement among the main political parties on a militant and dynamic policy against South Africa. The leadership role which Nigeria sought to play in Africa was conceived by most members of parliament in terms of a militant anti-colonialist policy. This was sometimes, particularly at first, alarmist. In a short address delivered by Dr Kaly Ezera in 1960 on Pan Africanism, he expressed a grave concern over the danger the South African government posed to Nigeria's security. He alleged, in an unequivocal terms, that he had information about an impending South African attack on Nigeria scheduled for early 1961.[15]

Despite this, the twin problems of the total emancipation of the entire African continent from the last vestiges of colonialism, racism and apartheid have remained one of the most important diplomatic issues of the Nigerian government. Central to these

issues was the problem of racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa. At the very first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference to be attended by the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa opened his speech (maiden) with a two-point condemnation of South Africa's continued participation in the Commonwealth. He said:

There are two points which I wish to make clear at the start: the first concerns the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth, and I want to say that in my considered opinion this will greatly strengthen the Commonwealth. So long as one member openly advocated racial discrimination it was impossible to accept that the Commonwealth was indeed an association of free and equal nations." [16]

The gradualist or moderate approach to African unity and decolonisation which ran through Nigeria's policy from 1960-66, generated a heated debate among foreign policy analysts of whether Nigeria had any clear-cut policy on decolonisation in the years immediately following its independence. It was by some asserted that Nigeria needed no foreign policy, since its neighbours were relatively weak and possessed neither the desire nor the capacity to threaten it in any serious way. [17] In spite of a general recognition it might one day lead Africa, Nigeria was unable to provide the wherewithal in terms of ideology to back up its stake. [18]

Although the hope of definite, firm, and resolute policy on decolonisation remained unfulfilled during the Balewa regime

(1960-66), successive administration in Nigeria have helped to further the process of decolonisation and the eradication of apartheid and racism in Southern Africa through the increase in the financial, diplomatic, material and moral support for nationalist movements and the enlargement of Nigeria's subscription to the OAU Liberation Committee.

The attitude of Gowon's administration did a lot to improve the old image of the country. The bold and uncompromising nature of Nigeria's attitude towards South Africa is reflected in the stern warnings its spokesmen often issued to the Western powers about apartheid. In an address to the United Nations, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Dr Okoi Arikpo made it clear that Western powers had a choice between fighting apartheid and remaining friends of Africa and staining "their hands with the precious blood of our people until we can tolerate them no longer." [19] In the same vein, Mr. Edwin Ogbu, then Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations dismissed Western powers that traded with South Africa as "accomplices in the crime of apartheid."

Although Gowon raised the profile of South Africa in foreign policy, and this policy has enunciated more fiercely, it took few risks.

The governments of General Murtala Mohammed and General Olusegun Obasanjo came to being through a coup that could be said to be a reaction against the past or what the past governments stood for. In terms of foreign policy, this could be described as the

non-militancy in the prosecution as opposed to the enunciation of Nigerian on foreign policy. Since much emphasis was laid on the conservatism of the Gowon regime, the government of Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo endeavoured to establish its radicalism on foreign policy issues. Africa was proclaimed as the "Centre-piece" of the new Nigerian foreign policy and African problems took precedence over other problems in Nigeria's reactions to world issues. Nigeria's reaction to South Africa's involvement in the Angolan civil war on the side of the FNLA and UNITA is perhaps the best indication of the new twist which the nation's foreign policy was taking. Departing radically from the Gowon regime's reluctance to rock-the-boat of African Unity, Nigeria mounted a strong opposition within the OAU against UNITA and the FNLA.

The strategies adopted by both Murtala Muhammed's and Obasanjo's governments were that of radical support for the liberation cause. One of the first steps taken by Murtala Mohammed when he assumed office was the permission he gave to some of the liberation groups to open up offices in Nigeria. The government also adopted an open-door policy for African exiles from areas in which the liberation wars were being fought. The South African Relief Fund (SARF) was established in an effort to encourage public donations to the fund, and all civil servants in Nigeria were particularly encouraged to give up to 2% of their monthly income to the fund.

The intensification of Nigeria's support for liberation movements

became more conspicuous. Recognition of the MPLA as the *de jure* government of an independent African state, was followed by a grant of \$20,000,000[20] in December 1975 and active diplomatic support which contributed to the acceptance of the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola by most African and extra African states.

In September 1975, the Nigerian Federal Military Government gave \$32,750 to the Zimbabwe African National Congress "for appropriate use in the interest of all the people of Zimbabwe." [21] The money was placed in the hands of Bishop Abel Muzorewa who had just announced the expulsion of Joshua Nkomo from the ANC. In receiving the money he referred to past Nigerian assistance through the OAU and Nigeria's provision of many places in the universities and schools for Zimbabwe students, but left the impression that it was the first time the ANC had received funds directly from Nigeria. In October, the Nigerian Federal Commissioner confirmed that Nigeria recognised and supported the ANC under the leadership of Muzorewa. [22] In April 1976 however, Joe Garba the then External Affairs Commissioner said that "because we are getting disenchanted with the leadership of the African National Congress, requests from both Muzorewa and Nkomo for permission to visit Lagos had been turned down." [23] For the same reasons of disenchantment, the OAU adopted a policy in July 1976, of cutting direct aid to the various movements and factions in Zimbabwe and channelling all assistance through the Liberation Committee and the government of Mozambique in the hope that this would provide a degree of leverage for the promotion of unity.

Nigeria's compliance with such policy was demonstrated in July 5 when Garba presented \$250,000 to Mozambique and said:

In normal conditions, the cheque would have been sent to the unchallenged leader of Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, this person does not exist, the two liberation movements being busy fighting each other.[24]

He called for a united front, a theme to which he returned in October:

Almost daily we hear that somebody has shot into prominence from virtually nowhere and the next day you hear that another person has gone down into obscurity. It is our hope that the nationalists will be able, even at this late hour, to forge a united front for the purpose of effective bargaining.[25]

These examples demonstrate a new cutting edge and leadership activism to policy. The succeeding governments of Shagari, Buhari and Babangida continued such policy towards South Africa and the Southern Africa Liberation Movements.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CO-OPERATION AND INTERCHANGE IN POLICY FORMULATION

Professor Gambari elucidated to me the machinery of policy formulation within the Ministry of External Affairs. There is a Directorate of African Affairs separate from the main body which

deals with other geographic regions of the world.[26] There are, however, specialist inputs from other institutions and organisations towards the foreign policy formulation of Nigeria. Such institutions, include the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (which is fashioned after the British Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) and the various universities in the country. Nigeria's foreign policy has never though been directly related to the needs of the masses of the people but unfortunately implemented in highly elitist circles. This has created a situation whereby the needs and aspirations of a national elitist group which comprises - businessmen, bureaucrats, high ranking military men and high ranking traditional rulers has increased,[27] and which academic or intellectual opinion can not fully ameliorate. Even radical policy is not always 'pure' policy. Nor is there an absolute distinction between military input and civilian input.

In the discharge of its duties, the Ministry of External Affairs has an organisational (structural) set-up which is headed by a Permanent Secretary and he/she is directly responsible to the office of the Minister. On substantive policy matters several special task forces are appointed to examine, review and make recommendations on almost all aspects of Nigeria's external relations.[28] The task forces are normally headed by young turks.[29] Their reports or recommendations are normally used in the production of a comprehensive policy paper for the Federal Executive Council for a conceptual framework on foreign policy. It would be necessary to note that this system became

operational during the Buhari regime under the supervision of my interviewee, Professor Gambari, who was the External Affairs Minister and a former scholar and director of the NIIA.

One other major intellectual effort involving the input of able and younger External Affairs Officers and later the Director General and the Permanent Secretary, is the preparation of an annual foreign policy agenda for the head of government's consideration and approval.[30] This sort of report or agenda endeavours to set out the major issues of concern, to rationalise the country's impact in the external realm and to identify priorities and options for the head of government on an annual basis and in advance of the year of operation.

Since Buhari, External Affairs has been making use of an informal consultative committee on foreign policy. This committee whose membership is flexible and in varied composition, depending on the issues to be discussed, normally has a general inclusion of lecturers from the universities, senior research officers from NIIA and Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, leaders of the Nigerian Labour Congress, representatives of the business community, and senior External Affairs Officers.[31]

Although External Affairs could not be said to have a monopoly of advice to the head of government, it sees itself constantly making efforts to be the primary source of advice and major instrument of foreign policy. Other Ministries, agencies of government and national institutes whose subject matter impinge

on foreign affairs have never made this easily possible. These other ministries, agencies and institutes are: The NIIA, NIPSS, National Security Organisations, Ministry of National Planning and the Ministry of Internal Affairs according to Gambari.[32]

Professor Agboola Gambari in his book "Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making," noted these transitional factor in the history of Nigerian foreign policy formulation. These factors he noted as comprising:[33]

- (a) The role of the military in redressing the balance of power in favour of the central government in relation to the regions and states;
- (b) the aftermath of the civil war in relations to Nigeria's view about the role played by some Western countries; and
- (b) the increasing wealth from oil revenue, which improved its financial and general economic standing.

He also states, importantly, that the dichotomization of Nigerian rulership between civilians on one hand and the military on the other is a false one. In his book, Professor Gambari noted that there has never been a "pure" military rule in post independent Nigeria, but rather the military has often used civilians as political heads of the various state bureaucracies and organisations. It was his further observation that the longer the

military men stay in power, the more they tend to behave like civilians in order to retain office.[34] On the other hand, and with respect to civilian administration, the potentiality of military intervention in the political order of the country was a daily ghost in the background, awaiting its new moment. The former President, Shehu Shagari, said that "in reality, there were only two major parties during the second republic; the first being all the five registered political parties on one hand and the military on the other." [35]

Whether civilian or military, the governance of Nigeria has been conducted with the active involvement or guidance of alliance of the different strata of the elite community. This elite community could however be referred to as the permanent power base while the installed public officers change from time to time. The contribution of the Ministry of External Affairs, however, while made more effective, can still be marginalised; and elite effectiveness can often boil down to the President alone. This chapter has sought to show how a Ministry can have its functions improved, can involve sectors of society in its work, can blur the distinction between military and civilian, but still not count on its own impact and contribution. Even so, the advent of South Africa as the foreign policy issue meant the Ministry could at least stake a claim to participation in something very important, in foreign policy of considerable consequence.

PART II:

**THE ARTICULATION OF FOREIGN
POLICY - THREE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION EXAMPLES**

CHAPTER 6

NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UNITED NATIONS INTRODUCTION

Over the last three decades, Nigeria has sought to contribute towards the liberation of Africa from colonialism as well as the elimination of racial discrimination and apartheid in Southern Africa. Much of this has been attempted through international organisations, Nigeria being conscious of its individual limits but realising also that leadership and influence can be accomplished in a multilateral setting.

From the earliest times of Nigeria's diplomatic history, the Nigerian government attached great importance to international organisations. They were seen as the foremost instruments for the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy. The Nigerian government, under Balewa led Nigeria into the United Nations Organisation[1] as the 99th member. The UN has remained immune from hostile official reaction and pressure from the Nigerian public, as compared with other organisations to which Nigeria belongs such as the Commonwealth. There has been no time that any Nigerian leader threatened to boycott or actually kept representatives away from any meeting of the main organs of the UN. Successive Nigerian regimes have placed a high premium on the efficacy of the organisation as a forum in which it can press

overriding concerns of Africa's diverse problems. Nigeria's principal source of hope was the benevolent provisions in the United Nations Charter for dependent territories. The Charter appeared to reflect an abiding concern regarding 'non-self governing Territories' stating that:

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end: to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying degrees of advancement.[2]

This provision was an implicit recognition of the rights of colonies to self-determination, reinforcing the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter of 1941.[3] The distinctive nature of Nigeria's identification and belief in the efficacy of the UN is explained by the United Nations policy enunciated by Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, at independence. The aims of Nigeria's United Nations diplomacy, he proclaimed, were:[4]

- (i) Respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all states;

- (ii) Total liquidation of all forms of colonialism and imperialism including white minority regimes in Southern Africa;
- (iii) Respect for fundamental human rights;
- (iv) Promotion of international peace and security as well as measures aimed at reducing world tensions;
- (v) Reunification of all divided lands through peaceful negotiations;
- (vi) General and complete disarmament and
- (vii) The establishment and strengthening of the UN agencies concerned with multilateral economic aid and equitable trade terms.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA'S POSITION ON THE ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM AND APARTHEID

I shall endeavour to examine Nigeria's positions at different stages of her involvement on the issues of decolonisation and elimination of apartheid. This will concern evolution of government policies and be based upon the history of governmental policy statements.

Studies of Nigeria's involvement in the UN for the elimination

of colonialism and apartheid embody two contradictory positions. On the one hand, it is contended that since 1960 every Nigerian government has been strongly committed to the eradication of colonialism and apartheid. It is asserted that these twin problems have always occupied a centre-stage in Nigeria's diplomacy. Differences in the policies of the various regimes have been in their approaches and styles. While there has been a tendency for some Nigerian governments to over-dramatise their concern on these issues, others have tended to shun 'adventurism' in order to avoid noise in pursuit of the same goal.[5] On the other hand, it is argued that over the years, Nigeria's policy on these issues has changed. It has moved from being passive to being active, from being middle-of-the-road to being militant.[6] As reflected earlier in this thesis, this is the position of the present author. The explanation for this shift has however varied. While some attribute it to external pressure, in particular Nigeria's being swept by OAU consensus, others insist that it is the product of domestic pressure. According to the latter's point of view, a small group of people who are aggressive and militant have been able to influence policy or, at least, the direction of policy beyond the extent the merits of their case deserve-through sheer and constant psychological on successive governments. They have successfully influenced the direction of Nigeria's policy - both in its content and its execution.[7] More specifically, they have succeeded in getting all Nigerian governments since Balewa and before Babangida, to embrace African liberation, to a greater or less degree, as if it were a national philosophy and cause.[8]

In contrast with this prevailing orthodoxy, I have already shown but will reiterate in the context of the UN, that the Nigerian government's pre-occupation with the issues of colonialism and apartheid did not start at independence. It developed gradually over the years. The process of the evolution in Nigeria's official attitudes and policies on these issues has been a complex rather than a simple one. From an initial neglect of the problems in 1960, the Nigerian government came to pay increasing attention to these problems in the late 1960s but remained ambivalent in relation to the strategies for their elimination.[9] In the early 1970s she became unequivocal about the appropriate strategy but maintained the same level of commitment to the solution of the problems as in the late 1960s. During the mid 1970s her official commitment or devotion to the eradication of the problems reached a peak, but this began to taper off in the early 1980s. The latter 1980s witnessed a low point due to an increasing demand by most Nigerian leaders for a redressing of the imbalance between what are regarded as Nigeria's 'national' or 'core' interests.[10]

Secondly this chapter will offer some explanation as to why, in general, Nigeria has been pre-occupied over the years with the issues of colonialism and apartheid. Thirdly, it will explain why the UN has been seen by Nigeria as the most important diplomatic instrument for tackling these issues and the processes and strategies by which the task of reaching a solution has been pursued by various Nigerian governments at the UN.

THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE AND POLICIES ON APARTHEID, 1960-1965

The evolution of Nigerian governmental policies on this issue was sparked in the first place by the 'Sharpsville massacre' of 21 March 1960 in which about one hundred people were killed and about two hundred wounded.[11] The position adopted by Nigerian representatives in the various organs, committees and agencies of the UN in 1961 and 1962 reflected the reactions of the government and people of Nigeria towards the 1960 massacre. Thus, in 1961, Nigerian delegates to the UN co-sponsored a resolution against racism/apartheid calling for the total condemnation of the obnoxious practice.[12] The same year, at the UN, the Nigerian delegation supported a draft resolution proposing the severance of diplomatic relations by all member states of the UN with South Africa.[13] In 1961, a Nigerian Minister, J.M. Johnson, tabled a resolution demanding that South Africa should quit the International Labour Organisation, and the resolution was passed. The Minister of Education, Jaja Nwachukwu made a similar move in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation; and the Prime Minister demanded that South Africa should not be retained as a member of the Commonwealth. Clearly, without making any elaborated public policy declaration, the Nigerian government had begun to pursue a policy of diplomatic isolation of South Africa.

It was, however, also in 1961 that the Nigerian Foreign Minister

issued a formal statement on Nigeria's policy concerning racial discrimination. As he put it:[14]

The total eradication of all forms of racial discrimination... is one of the pillars of Nigeria's foreign policy. We will never regard racial discrimination as an internal affair in any state. Nowhere in the world, in no state, however powerful, however wealthy, will Nigeria countenance humiliations to people of African descent; and we will not consider any action on our part as interference in the internal affairs of another state. This includes South Africa.

In 1962, the Nigerian government took a step which represented both redefinition of the nature of racial discrimination and rethinking on the strategy for eradicating it. At a meeting of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the representatives of Nigeria and other states requested the ECA to declare racial discrimination a threat to the development of African states.[15] They also urged the ECA to proclaim that the practice of racial discrimination was contrary to ECA's terms of reference, to condemn South Africa for refusing to allow the Commission's sub-committee to conduct an investigation in its territory, and to recommend to the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that South Africa should be deprived of the membership of the Commission.[16] In the same year, the Nigerian Permanent Representative at the United Nations was appointed Chairman of the African Group's sub-committee on apartheid, a position he held for five years. The group recorded two significant achievements that year. It sponsored a resolution calling for a

break in diplomatic relations with South Africa, the closure of African ports to South African shipping and the boycott of South African goods, as well as refusing landing and passage facilities to South African planes.[17]

The special committee on apartheid, of which Nigeria was from the beginning a member, submitted three reports in quick succession between May and September 1963[18]. In the report of September, it identified Britain as the main supplier of arms to South Africa. It also urged the Council to impose an arms-embargo against South Africa. It urged the Council to suspend the right and privileges of South Africa as a member state and to its expel from the UN and its specialised agencies.[19] In making recommendations in 1963, the special committee on apartheid was, no doubt, influenced by the views of members of the African Group, and its special sub-committee on apartheid which was headed by Simeon Adebó, Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the UN. The Nigerian Foreign Minister noted in 1964 at the UN General Assembly that the government of South Africa, the perpetrator of the "obnoxious policy of apartheid" was being steadily isolated from the mainstream of international life.[20] He praised the British government for placing an embargo on most of the arms supplied to South Africa, and stressed that Nigeria was irrevocably committed to fighting the regime of apartheid to the finish.[21]

By 1965, the Nigerian government was, in collaboration with other African states, engaged in a vigorous diplomatic offensive

against racial discrimination and apartheid. The offensive was spearheaded at the UN by the Nigerian Permanent Representative who remained the chairman of the UN African Group's sub-committee on apartheid. There were two major objectives of this diplomatic offensive. The first was to convince members of the UN that the situation in South Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security.[22] This was for the purpose of persuading the UN member states to invoke the provisions under Chapter VII the UN Charter.[23] This would have made for actions ranging from economic blockade to collective military enforcement measures by UN forces. The second was aimed at pushing South Africa into isolation and eventual expulsion from the UN and all other international organisations.[24]

A CLEARER FOREIGN POLICY BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID 1966-1974

In discussing the government's consolidation of its position within this period, it will be worthwhile examining the view propounded by a senior official of the Federal Ministry of External Affairs. In 1979, Orobola Fasehun put across the following suggestions: "If Nigerian decision makers saw colonial rule as morally repugnant, diplomatic and economic sanctions would be the only preferred anti-colonial strategy. If, on the other hand, the leaders of Nigeria saw colonial rule as a threat to the security of Nigeria and Africa, we could expect the leaders to advocate the use of force." [25] He tried to explain

the major differences between the policies of Balewa's government (1960-1966) and Gowon's after the civil war (1970-1975) and judged Balewa's pursuance as 'passive' policy on African liberation. In contrast, he thought that Nigeria became an 'active' liberation supporter especially from 1971.

There is, however, a line of demarcation within the period under review. Considering the circumstances in Nigeria between 1966 and early 1970, there was an emphasis on diplomacy alone for as long as the Nigerian civil war raged on and there were neither resources nor time to develop other approaches. The period immediately after the civil war (1970-1974) marked another phase in her foreign policies as compared with the civil war period.

For example, in the period between 1966-1969, the Nigerian government under Gowon placed African liberation high on its priority list (especially due to South Africa's support of Biafra).

The resurgence of Nigeria's active role in the UN towards the solution of the problem of colonialism and apartheid could be attributed also to the high price of crude oil in the world market. This activism was identified in two ways.

1. The amount of space devoted to the problem as evidenced in the speeches of representatives at the UN; and
2. Nigeria's voting pattern at the UN on the issue.

For example, the speech by Gowon at the UN in 1973, is of importance. Of the fifty-one-paragraph speech, twelve paragraphs were completely devoted to the problem of decolonisation and apartheid.[26] And Nigeria's voting pattern during this period clearly demonstrated her strong interest. Between 1970 and 1974, she voted affirmatively on 74 out of 76 resolutions condemning racism and colonialism. There were neither the abstentions or absences when votes were cast on issues as sometimes occurred during the 1966-1969 civil war period.[27]

In 1971, as a way of expressing his discontent and that of his administration with regards to Southern Africa, Gowon stated:[28]

Let no one be deceived that South Africa is spending over £180 million for defence purposes and seeking to acquire nuclear capability only to come to terms with independent Africa and grant the right of self-determination to her African population. South Africa is growing into an octopus. It is being used by the imperialist powers to regain their foothold in Africa.

Throughout this period, Nigeria discouraged dialogue between members of the UN and the white minority regimes but rather showed an increasing commitment to the imposition of sanctions against these white minority regimes. It was the view of the Nigerian government that the South African government was neither genuinely interested in dialogue nor in any way serious about the desire to introduce meaningful change. If it were, it was felt that it would have begun the process of dialogue with the black citizens of South Africa instead of spending a large amount of

money for defence and attempted acquisition of nuclear capability.[29]

The Nigerian government at the UN seized every available opportunity to either sponsor or co-sponsor resolutions aimed at the total isolation of South Africa from the international scene[30]. For example in May 1966, acting on behalf of thirty-two African states, Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the UN, Adebo, introduced a draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia at the Security Council. The draft called on Britain to blockade Rhodesia fully - by land, sea and air, and to take all measures including force to abolish the racist minority regime.[31] In 1968, Nigerian representatives together with thirty eight other states sponsored a draft resolution meant to alter the membership of UNCTAD in a manner that would exclude South Africa until it had terminated its policy of racial discrimination to the satisfaction of the General Assembly.[32] In 1970, Nigeria's Foreign Minister Arikpo, speaking at the UN General Assembly passionately appealed to Britain not to resume the sale of arms to South Africa.[33] And in 1974, the Nigerian delegates to the UN strongly supported a move at the Security Council to expel South Africa from the UN. Upon the failure of this attempt, due to a triple veto cast by the United States of America, Britain and France, Arikpo became resentful and strongly deplored the behaviour of the three.[34] Though during this period the Nigerian government made several attempts to discourage the Western powers from supporting the South African regime but this was not sufficient enough when compared with its successor.

These actions reflected Nigeria's official view on how the problem of apartheid and racial discrimination could best be solved. In view of this, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Arikpo, had earlier presented a proposal at the UN General Assembly, arguing that the UN should support the efforts of the liberation movements in Southern Africa in waging an "armed struggle for the attainment of their liberty".[35] Nigeria not only made proposals and co-sponsored resolutions but equally made good all her financial obligations towards the annual UN Trust Fund on South Africa as well as making regular contribution to the Education and Training Fund for South Africa.[36]

In May 1976, a programme of action against apartheid was formulated by the committee. The programme which was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly led to a World Conference for Action Against Apartheid in Lagos on August 22, 1977. Underlining the significance of the conference to Nigeria, Lt. General Obasanjo, the Head of the then Federal Military Government asserted:[37]

We in Nigeria do not regard this Conference as just another United Nations meeting taking place in Lagos. For us this is a gathering of men and women of conscience from all corners of the globe who have come to Lagos to harmonise views and work out a programme of action of all nations and peoples of the world to effect complete liberation of Southern Africa without delay and without undue suffering and to bring about the eradication of the inhuman policy of apartheid in South Africa.

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON THE PROBLEMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID 1975-1979

There was a change in the Nigerian government's policies during this period because of a change of government in the country. At the initial stage of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, it accepted as correct the existing policy as it began to relate itself to these and other international issues.[38] Nevertheless, as time went on, the strength of its determination to cut a clear and distinct image for itself and Nigeria in the international system became increasingly clear. The first acid test for the regime on its foreign policy came during the Angolan crisis of 1975 and 1976. Its eventual recognition of the MPLA despite opposing pressures both internally and particularly externally and the subsequent extension of a major grant to the Angolan government, coupled with its launching of a diplomatic campaign towards other African states on the Angolan issue, served as a pointer of the regime's new and activist policy.

The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Joseph Garba, said that "the present government is probably going to be more aggressive... this government will come out firmly and state its stand on any issue..."[39]

It is pertinent to mention here that one major distinguishing factor in the foreign policy of Nigeria under Murtala/Obasanjo was the volume of time and attention devoted to the problems of

colonialism and apartheid. This was the greatest percentage by any Nigeria leadership. Every available opportunity at the UN was utilised by Nigeria's representative to consolidate the country's stand on these problems. In a speech made at the 10th special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, Nigeria's Foreign Minister devoted two paragraphs to the problem of racism, stating that racism "breeds war," that it has been a prime source of conflict in the modern world.[40] The Nigerian government sought at the UN to achieve three objectives - freedom for Rhodesia, decolonisation of South West Africa, and the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. Of the three main objectives, the issue of Rhodesia's majority rule took precedence in Nigeria's diplomacy at the UN. Between 1977 and 1978, as Garba testified, Nigerian representatives sought every opportunity to raise the issue of Zimbabwean independence at the General Assembly and the Security Council.[41] The issue of eradication of apartheid came closely in a second place with the decolonisation of South West Africa third.

It was during this same period that Nigeria successfully hosted the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid in August 1977. Even though the conference was not organised at the initiative of the Nigerian government, the Nigerian Permanent Representative at the UN coincidentally was then working on General Assembly Resolution 31/6.6 section 4 which proposed the holding of such a conference. The conference provided an opportunity for the Nigerian government to publicly articulate its policy on apartheid. In a pre-conference seminar it proposed a series of

strategic recommendations seeking the imposition of sanctions on such multinational corporations and companies maintaining economic links with both South Africa and Nigeria or even seeking business with South Africa.

While addressing the conference, Obasanjo, by this time the Nigerian Head of State after Murtala's death, made it clear that he was speaking not only on behalf of the government and people of Nigeria but equally in the name of the "black and African people" throughout the world.[42] Like Gowon's regime, Obasanjo's acknowledged the threat to Nigeria's national security posed by the Pretoria-Salisbury axis.[43] Obasanjo went on to accuse the OECD countries of being the main beneficiaries and sustainers of the apartheid system and thereby set the stage for the campaign for economic sanctions against both South Africa and its collaborators as an alternative to military strategy. He asserted that unless apartheid is dismantled, it might be the cause of the greatest human conflict and tragedy in the world.[44]

If the previous regime of Gowon believed in the UN, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime increased this emphasis. Consequently, the Nigerian Foreign Minister recommended in a memorandum to the Nigerian Head of State that Nigeria should continue to maintain the momentum for a settlement in Rhodesia by encouraging the Front Line States and the Patriotic Front to take the matter to the United Nations Security Council.[45] All this was related to the fact that Nigeria was then, in early 1978, occupying the

Presidency of the Security Council. During this period, according to Garba, Nigeria used the United Nations to tackle a number of African issues.[46] He however claimed that the Nigerian government's faith in its membership of the Security Council at the time was productive and claimed that it was Nigeria's persistence, made possible by her continuous presence in the Security Council, that prodded the British and Americans on Zimbabwe and the Western contact group of Five on Namibia toward serious results.[47]

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime made a very large financial contribution towards the South African liberation struggle. (Details will be given in chapter 9) In pursuance of its aggressive policy on South Africa and in furtherance of its application of sanctions the Nigeria government, in 1978, took controlling shares in Barclays Bank, and renamed it Union Bank, after the president of Barclays International, Anthony Turke, had publicly declared that the Bank had no intention of closing down its branches in South Africa in response to Nigeria's request.[48] In 1979, it also nationalised British Petroleum in retaliation for Britain's decision to sell crude oil to South Africa and, as will be seen in the next chapter, to put pressure on Britain on the eve of the crucial Commonwealth summit on Rhodesia in Lusaka. As if these actions were not enough, the Nigerian government also supported and co-sponsored numerous resolutions aimed at imposing mandatory arms as well as oil embargos on South Africa, while it joined international declaration against apartheid in sports such as the Gleneagles

Agreement. It led other African nations in boycotting the 1978 Montreal Olympics.

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON COLONIALISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID 1980-1988

The period under review was characterised by changes in the leadership of the government apparatus. The country was first under civil rule and then two other successive military regimes. The Shagari civilian administration which succeeded the Murtala/Obasanjo regime on the 1st of October 1979 was overthrown by the military regime of Muhammadu Buhari on the 31st of December 1983, and subsequently, this regime was toppled on the 27th of August 1985 by the regime of Ibrahim Babaginda.

The period 1980–1988 witnessed cohesion and adherence to the country's policy towards the elimination of racial discrimination and apartheid in Southern Africa. None of the three regimes, civilian as well as military, deviated significantly from Murtala/Obasanjo's approach towards these issues. The three regimes were equally strong in their criticism of those western powers like USA, UK, France and West Germany for what was seen as their attitude towards the sustenance of apartheid in South Africa. The Vice President of Nigeria, Alex I. Ekwueme, condemned the triple veto which was cast at the Security Council on 30th April 1981 by France, the United Kingdom and the United States against the cluster of sanctions for which there was otherwise a global consensus.[49] He accused the Western governments of

being out of step with the decent opinion of the vast majority of mankind.[50]

At the 38th session of the UN General Assembly (1983), the leader of the Nigerian delegation, the late Ambassador Mohammed Bello also attacked the Western powers. He accused them of not only failing to take actions under the UN charter, but also, directly and convertly, assuring the apartheid regime of its survival and prosperity through vastly improved economic cooperation.[51] He also made an attack on US policy towards Southern Africa. He declared that the so-called policy of 'constructive engagement' was deeply offensive and repugnant to Africa, and completely unacceptable to Nigeria.

Irrespective of all the three Nigerian regimes adherence to the roles of their predecessors and particularly Murtala/Obasanjo's during the period 1980-1988 several new developments emerged in Nigeria's UN diplomacy on Southern Africa. One development was the attempt to restore a balance on the two major components of Nigeria's foreign policy. Under the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, the country's foreign policy had an over-riding preoccupation with the issues of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid, while other issues occupied a secondary place. From the period beginning from 1980 under the civilian administration of Shagari, attempts were made to strike a balance between the issues of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid on one hand, and the bad economic state of the nation on the other, as well as that of other African states as a whole. These attempts were

reflected in the speeches of Nigerian leaders.

In 1980, at the UN General Assembly, President Shehu Shagari in his speech placed specific emphasis on economic issues. He declared that the termination of apartheid and racism in South Africa was the challenge of the new decade...[52] Nevertheless, he drew the attention of the world community to the new emphasis which African states were placing on economic development after decades when their overriding preoccupation was to secure the independence of their territories and peoples.[53] The need for this balance was recognised by Babangida's regime. In June 1988, the Minister for External Affairs, Ike Nwachukwu, described it as a new direction in Nigeria's foreign policy and therefore proposed that Nigeria's commitment towards the liberation of the entire continent of Africa should go hand-in-hand with the fight for the total economic liberation of Africa.[54] In the course, however, of making such attempts to redress the imbalance between the political and economic components of Nigeria's foreign policy, the usefulness of the UN began to be seen in a somewhat different perspective. There was an increasing concern for economic issues as represented in the speeches and address of Nigeria's Representatives at the UN, and eventually it gained a real equality in Nigeria's UN agenda.

The whole situation becomes clearer when one puts into a tabular form paragraphs of speeches in their totality, then the sectional allocation of these paragraphs of speeches at the UN General Assembly plenary sessions. The table below, as obtained from

GAOR, plenary 1973-1989, makes for a simplified representation of Nigeria's changing policy.

Table: Distribution of Reference To Issues in the speeches of Nigerian Heads of State, Foreign Ministers or their Representatives at the General Assembly Plenary Session, 1973-1988 according % of paragraphs.

Year	Total No. of paragra- phs in speeches	Colonia- lism No.of paragra- phs	Apar- theid %	Economic No. of para- graphs	Aid/Dev. %
1973	51	12	23.53	4	7.84
1977	24	10	41.67	1	4.17
1980	38	6	15.79	5	13.16
1983	33	10	30.30	9	27.27
1986	38	11	28.95	8	21.05
1989	39	15	38.46	12	30.77

Source: General Assembly Official Report, 1973-1989

It will be noted from the table that with each subsequent year after the 1977 more and more attention was being focused on economic issues. From the table, it is evident that the Nigerian government's commitment to the elimination of colonialism and apartheid suffered a general decline after the height of 1977. In fairness to other succeeding regimes after Murtala/Obasanjo's, as expressed by Professor Gambari, the present Nigerian Permanent Representative to UN, there is the tendency at the inception of any regime to itemise a principal policy which remains high in its agenda.[55] He stressed though that making policy (as was Murtala/Obasanjo's regime) towards the liberation of Southern Africa, two important interrelated factors should be taken into consideration. These included the country's economy and her financial strength. He pointed out that Murtala/Obasanjo's regime was able to go as far as it went on that issue because both the Nigerian economy and financial position then was not in a bad position in comparison with other African countries.[56] While Buhari's regime, in which he served as the Foreign Minister, had as its main objective to sustain the economy and the foreign currency reserves of Nigeria; hence the strategy of imposing an embargo on the movement of Naira which included the regime's cessation of support for private students overseas except where such courses were not available in Nigeria.[57]

Buhari's regime did make efforts to meet its financial obligations to the liberation movements. Not only did it clear

the arrears accumulated by Shagari's administration between 1979 and 1983 but it also gave a grant of N3 million to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. It was, however, the Babangida administration that significantly increased Nigeria's financial contribution to the liberation movements. Available information shows that between 1986 and 1988, the federal government paid out the sum of N10 million to the Front Line States and \$20 million in fulfilment of the pledge made in 1986 to contribute \$50 million over five years to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.[58]

The financial crisis of the country which became conspicuous in 1982 contributed a great deal to the country's problems in meeting fully its financial obligations. This was principally a result of dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Such was the depth of the crisis that, in 1986, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, gave notice that henceforth Nigeria should not be expected to extend financial aid as readily as it had. He warned that, in future, Nigeria's assistance would be tailored to promote Nigerian employment and exports because Nigeria had neither the means nor the desire any longer to become an "African Father Christmas."[59]

A further evidence of the declining emphasis on anti-colonialism and anti-racism as key issues in Nigeria's foreign policy was a set of signs of the weakening of the will of the Nigerian government to impose and implement sanctions against the allies of, and collaborators with the racist regimes in Southern Africa.

significantly, no notable new sets of measures concerning the duplication and enforcement of sanctions were announced either during or in the wake of the International Conference on Apartheid organised in 1988; yet the theme of the conference was "strategies for dismantling apartheid."

Two other inter-related new development in Nigeria's diplomacy on Southern Africa are very important because they have far-reaching implications for Nigeria's future attitude towards the UN. One of such developments puts into questions the rationale behind the country's preoccupation with anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid. There is underway a re-examination of the relevance of some of the existing international organisations, the UN included, as central instruments of Nigeria's diplomacy. The whole process of re-evaluation of the country's policy on colonialism and apartheid started in a rather direct and spontaneous manner but as time went on, it became a little more subtle and sophisticated.

On his return from a tour of the Front Line States in 1978, Adeyemi Lawson, President of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, called for the establishment of economic links between Nigeria and Southern Africa. His argument was that a refusal to do that would amount to government neglect of the economic interests of Nigerian citizens and organisations. He buttressed his arguments by pointing to the fact that, unlike Nigeria, the Front Line states were doing roaring business with South Africa. The public reaction to Adeyemi's points was somewhat hostile; as for the

government it bluntly replied that it took the economic welfare of Nigerians into consideration in the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy.[60]

And in 1980, Jaja Nwachukwu, Nigeria's former Foreign Minister (1961-1964), who was then both the Senate Leader of the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-opened the debate. In a television interview, he proposed that Nigeria should establish diplomatic relations with South Africa and also renew diplomatic relations with Israel.[61] The Senators were appalled. It eventually led to Nwachukwu's removal from the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee.[62]

Also in 1984, a Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, S.T. Tarka, introduced a new dimension to the debate. He introduced his own arguments by asking whether Nigeria had a South Africa policy without apartheid. And to that question, he answered negatively. His central argument was that while Nigeria should continue to support, morally and financially, the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the government must find ways of ensuring that Nigerians derive some economic benefits from such support especially after the territories had been liberated.[63]

In a public lecture delivered in 1986, Akinyemi called for the development of two additional principles for Nigeria's foreign policy. One of these new principles he referred to as the need

to define and articulate Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-apartheid era.[64] His first fear in this, was that the anti-apartheid principle, as a basis of Nigeria's foreign policy, would become irrelevant as soon as South Africa was free of white racist domination and had come under black majority rule. Second, the new free South Africa would be industrialised, militarily strong and therefore powerful. Indeed, it would easily overshadow Nigeria unless she took immediate steps restructuring her economy and reordering her priorities. Third, in the twenty first century, issues of international economic cooperation as well as peace and security would be the problems rather than colonialism and apartheid. Therefore, presumably, Nigeria should begin to pay more attention to the issues that were acquiring a new urgency.[65]

Similarly, writing a little earlier in 1986/87, the former Nigerian Foreign Minister (1975-1987), and at present (1990) the President to the UN General Assembly, Joseph Nanven Garba, asserted rather confidently, as follows:[66]

The rhetoric of African liberation will wear increasingly thin as South Africa becomes the only target for the struggle. The problems of economic development and the provision of a better standard of living for our people will become the preoccupation of foreign policy.

Such were the feelings broaching into the 1990s, both in public and government circles about Nigeria's foreign policy towards Southern Africa with regards to colonialism and racism. In other

words, the hitherto much neglected economic concerns are leading to government re-appraisal of policy at the UN towards Southern Africa. The critical question is how this racist or anti-racist sentiment will be translated into specific policies of economic well-being for the country.

CHAPTER 7:

NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE COMMONWEALTH:

Nigeria's participation in the Commonwealth organisation was heavily influenced by its British Colonial heritage. A number of similarities mark membership of the Commonwealth, among them, language, history and a shared legacy of colonial rule.[1]

Nigeria became a member of the Commonwealth on the attainment of independence and appeared to incline toward the organisation as a strategic forum for advancing its national interests while pursuing general goals in multilateral activities. The then Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, elaborated on this point:

While benefiting greatly from the free interchange of ideas and consultation between members of the Commonwealth and from their experience within the framework of the United Nations, we would have a free hand to select those policies which are considered to be most advantageous to Nigeria.[2]

This was demonstrated in Nigeria's unflinching stance against South Africa at the Commonwealth Summit in 1961. When the issue of apartheid came up Nigeria not only protested vehemently against the evils of apartheid and violations of human rights in South Africa, but also demanded the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth organisation. This action increased Nigeria's international image and many observers concede that Nigeria was, alongside other African states, instrumental in

forcing South Africa out of the Commonwealth as well as from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

This chapter will concentrate on three major decisions Nigeria took as a member of the Commonwealth in order to demonstrate its objection to South African apartheid policy. These include: Nigeria's request for an extraordinary Commonwealth summit in 1966, Nigeria's nationalisation of BP before the Lusaka CHOGM, and Nigeria's boycott of the 1986 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games.

THE 1966 LAGOS COMMONWEALTH

HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

In January 1966 an important shift was witnessed in the general attitude of the Commonwealth organisation. This was when an extraordinary Commonwealth summit was convened in Lagos on Nigerian and Commonwealth Secretariat initiative. This meeting was the first of its kind, and also the first to be convened outside London after fourteen previous meetings. It was the first to deal with a single issue (Rhodesia); and the first to be organised and serviced by a non-British body – the Commonwealth Secretariat.[3] It was during this meeting that the Heads of Government confirmed the need to assemble from time to time in different Commonwealth capitals in order to underline the essential character of the Commonwealth as a free association of equal nations.

Since this was a single agenda meeting, it wholly concentrated

on the issue of Rhodesia. The Heads of Government discussed in particular the ending of the rebellion, the need for cooperation with assistance to Zambia, and the future of Rhodesia under constitutional rule. A Working Party of officials discussed in greater detail the nature and efficacy of economic measures against the illegal regime in Rhodesia; ways in which Zambia could be helped in its cooperation with these measures. Also the question of assistance in training Africans in Rhodesia was discussed. Their conclusion on these issues was reported to the meeting.[4]

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed that the authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence rested with Britain, but acknowledged that the problem was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and the world as a whole.[5]

That Britain was in agreement with this proposal, and this formula eventually formed the basis of all future Commonwealth intervention on this issue. At the meeting, the Prime Ministers statement first made in 1964 was recalled. This stated that for all Commonwealth governments, it should be an objective of policy to build in each country a structure of society which offers equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people, irrespective of race, colour or creed. They also referred to their 1965 communique whereby they stated that the principle of one-man-one-vote was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this should be applied to Rhodesia.

They expressed their concern at the danger to all multi-racial communities in the Commonwealth, particularly in East and Central Africa, and also at the danger to the future of the multi-racial Commonwealth itself if the situation in Rhodesia was to continue.

According to Patsy Robertson, the Lagos summit was unable to propose a programme of actions but it laid down a declaration of interest on how Britain conducted its bilateralism. She pointed out that it was recognised by all member states in the meeting that Rhodesia was an African as well as a Commonwealth concern. The success of the Lagos summit established the need for the rotation of Commonwealth Heads of Government within all Commonwealth member nations. The maintenance of this would uphold the principle of equality for all member nations. She added that the Lagos summit also brought to light the importance and the role of the newly created organ of the Commonwealth Secretariat. The success of the Secretariat in organising and serving the Lagos summit on the critical subject of Rhodesia gave it a very good image as an organ of the Commonwealth organisation.[6] It also of course established Nigeria, as host, in the centre of Commonwealth efforts over Rhodesia. Still conservative in its foreign policy, as discussed in earlier chapters, the

Nigerian government acted against Britain within a body first founded by Britain. Within the same organisation, by 1979, all traces of Nigerian reticence and conservatism had disappeared.

THE 1979 NATIONALISATION OF BRITISH PETROLEUM BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH HEAD OF GOVERNMENTS MEETING IN LUSAKA

On 31st July 1979 the Federal Cabinet Office in Lagos announced that the Supreme Military Council had decided to take over all the assets of the British Petroleum Company (BP) in Nigeria with effect from 1st August 1979. It added that the government would pay compensation for BP's assets. The Federal government gave its reason for such a move as a reaction to the British government's permission to BP to start exporting North Sea oil to South Africa. It added that the whole arrangement was a "mere subterfuge" to make Nigerian oil available to the apartheid regime in Pretoria.[7] It argued that the most effective way to stop Nigerian oil from reaching the South Africa was to cut BP off from Nigeria's crude oil supply.[8] This was supported by the Bingham Report which expressed how BP in particular had managed to get around the sanctions on trade with Zimbabwe and supplied the rebels with oil.[9] Nigeria's announcement of its decision on BP's assets looked more of a calculated effort particularly to put pressure on the British government not to recognise the Muzorewa government in Rhodesia or lift sanctions. This noticed by the British government and, as Lord Carrington, the

British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, put it to Major-General Henry Adefope, leader of the Nigerian delegation to the Lusaka Commonwealth summit early in August 1979, it would appear designed "to scotch Mrs Thatcher's hopes of returning Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to legality in the way she wants." [10]

The decision to nationalise BP was, however, generally received with dismay, anger and fury in Britain; it rapidly provoked acerbic arguments between the two countries and eventually became the biggest single setback to the cordial Anglo-Nigerian relations which had existed since the end of the Nigerian civil war in January 1970. The British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, denounced the action as "sudden and arbitrary." [11] Lord Carrington publicly condemned it and added that "the seizure had badly strained (Anglo-Nigerian) relations" and that Lagos would "regret the timing of the decision," that it was unhelpful and would be "counter-productive." [12] Many British newspapers and magazines condemned the nationalisation. The Guardian described it as "crude bullying" and wondered where General Olusegun Obasanjo, then Head of the Federal Military Government, stood on "the rational scale of demon kings." [13] While the Economist in an editorial entitled "Nigerian growls" criticized the take-over, saying that in the end it would not achieve its primary objectives. [14]

On the Nigerian side, there were sharp reactions. In Lusaka, General Adefope, the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, replied to Lord Carrington's public comments on the

nationalisation decision by the Federal Government. He defended his government's decision on BP, claiming that a tanker chartered by BP to ship crude oil to South Africa was caught red-handed; therefore the Federal Government's measures against BP were appropriate and within the rules of international law.[15] The Nigerian newspapers were even harsher in their reactions. The New Nigeria described the Federal takeover in an editorial entitled "The right decision" as correct and courageous and urged the Federal Government to widen its expropriation of British economic and financial interests in Nigeria.[16]

The pressures from interest groups were intense. For instance, some associations supported a tougher action against the British Conservative government's policy on Zimbabwe and Southern Africa in general. By May 1979, the Nigerian Society of International Affairs had called on the Federal Military Government to take some drastic action against Britain if it went ahead and recognised the Muzorewa government. Among the measures suggested were the withdrawal of Nigeria from the *Commonwealth*, the suspension of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, and a review of all British investments in Nigeria with a view to nationalising them. The progressive boycott of British goods and services and the withdrawal of Nigeria's foreign reserves from sterling were also suggested.[17] In July 1979, the Dock Workers' Union of Nigeria threatened to boycott all British ships in Nigerian ports if Mrs Thatcher proceeded to recognise the Muzorewa government. It also declared in a press statement that it would spearhead a resolution at the "All West Africa Transport

Workers" Union Conference in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in October 1979, that all dock workers on all West African ports should boycott British ships should Mrs Thatcher recognise the Muzorewa government. Making reference to the British government's lifting of the oil embargo on South Africa it argued that such an attitude showed "the Conservative government was bent on befriending apartheid... and on recognising the puppet regime in Salisbury at the expense of the Zimbabwean people." [18]

Despite the tough stand by the Federal Government on its dealings with the British government, and the enormous encouragement it enjoyed from public support, a division of opinion was witnessed among Ministerial officials on the adoption of such policy. For example, the Nigerian National Petroleum officials showed little or no enthusiasm. They argued that nationalisation would result in a decline in production especially since it coincided with the time when the Federal Government was contemplating stepping up production of crude oil to gain more revenue for the country. [19] They were also concerned with the loss of expertise from British expatriates. On the other hand, some officials from the home ministries like the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Federal Ministry of Finance argued that, although some short-term problems might arise, they could be overcome without a serious disruption to the economy. [20]

THE REPERCUSSION OF THE NATIONALISATION POLICY OF BP

The immediate decision of the takeover of BP brought about strained relations between Britain and Nigeria. The cutoff of BP from access to Nigerian crude oil brought about a fall of 6.5 per cent in sterling in the world stock markets.[21] This claim might be properly illustrated by taking into consideration the size and range of BP interests in Nigeria.

SIZE AND RANGE OF BP INTERESTS.

It was estimated that BP's investments in the area of production, marketing and lifting of crude oil in Nigeria amounted to about 1 billion pounds (or about N1.5 billion) by July 1979.[22] The Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited had oil concessions covering an area of 31,801.9 square miles expiring on 30 November, 2000, more than 80% of all the concessions granted to oil companies in the country.[23] Furthermore, in terms of production, Shell-BP had been responsible for an average of 60% of total production in Nigeria. In April 1979, the two giant oil companies were responsible for producing about 1.373 million out of a total of 2.422 million barrels a day.

BP had a contract to lift oil from Nigeria and through this was getting 240,000 barrels a day which represented about 10% of its global oil requirements. Removing this source would hit BP hard at a time when it was finding it extremely difficult to get

alternative sources and when the Islamic revolution in Iran had virtually cut off Iranian crude. Indeed, it has been estimated that cutting the Nigerian supply would have left BP with a mere 160,000 barrels a day which was said to be too little for its operation.[24]

Apart from all this, BP had petroleum retail marketing stations in Nigeria, as shown in the table below:

OIL COMPANIES WITH PETROLEUM RETAIL MARKETING STATIONS IN NIGERIA

Companies	Number of Marketing Outlets of Petroleum products		
	1975	1976	1977
1. Mobil Oil Nigeria Ltd	257	257	258
2. <i>Texaco Nigeria Ltd</i>	165	165	167
3. BP Nigeria Ltd	182	182	158
4. Total Nigeria Ltd	230	230	215
5. Agip Nigeria Ltd	119	119	131
6. National Oil Company	240	240	212
7. Unipetrol	167	167	211

Source: 'Petroleum products retail outlets in Nigeria,' in Progress of Public Sector Participation in the Nigeria Oil Industry (Lagos: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,

September 1978).

Indeed, the position of some British newspapers and magazines did not help the situation. For instance, The Economist in its editorial of 25 May 1979, called on the British government to recognize the Muzorewa government; and predicted that Nigeria would "only bark and not bite." Since the Conservative victory of 3 May 1979, the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Telegraph had been calling on the Conservative government to recognize Muzorewa and lift sanctions. In one of its editorials, the Daily Telegraph not only bitterly criticized President Carter's press statement on the Zimbabwe elections of April 1979 and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian constitution, but also demanded that London should go ahead and recognize the Muzorewa government and present the Commonwealth summit in Lusaka with a *fait accompli*. [25] While it might be argued that these newspapers and magazines were independent organisations and that they were not expressing the British government's views, it is suggested that the Daily Telegraph sometimes reflects government thinking and that, with the Sunday Telegraph and The Economist, often expresses weighty views that cannot easily be brushed aside by any government in the United Kingdom, least of all a Conservative government.

It is against this background that the Obasanjo government issued a number of statements from early May 1979 onwards on its position towards the "sham elections in Zimbabwe" and warned that any attempt to recognize the puppet regime of Muzorewa and/or to lift sanctions would be met with hostility from Nigeria. [26] In

an official statement on 1st May 1979, the Nigerian government warned against some elements in the UK and other Western countries "for whom the glitter and lure of share dividends and the multinational corporate profits are irresistible and more precious than buckets full of black Zimbabwean blood" and added that the road to peace and stability in Salisbury lay in the dismissal of the puppet Muzorewa government and the holding of free and fair elections in that territory under UN supervision with all the major parties actively participating. The Obasanjo government sent a series of special notes to Mrs Thatcher. On 5th June 1979, General Obasanjo insisted that any attempt to recognize the Salisbury government would amount to "provocation and a calculated and deliberate spite, constituting a wanton disregard for African opinion and well-being and deserving of an appropriate response." [27]

Though the nationalisation of BP brought about some hostilities between the countries, the outcome of such antagonism was not in the end very grave. Mrs Thatcher drew back from recognising the Muzorewa government because of new directions agreed at the Lusaka summit. However, the Nigerian government claimed that the nationalisation policy softened her attitude, despite the fact that the nationalisation policy was seen as only one factor among others by most observers.

NIGERIA'S BOYCOTT OF THE 1986

EDINBURGH COMMONWEALTH GAMES

Sport has always been an important instrument of Nigeria's foreign policy since the country attained independence in October 1960. It was first used for the purpose of attaining a specific foreign policy objective in 1976 when the country, along with the other members of the OAU, boycotted the Montreal Olympic Games to protest against the tour of South Africa by New Zealand rugby players and the failure of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the rest of the world to exclude the New Zealand team from the games.[29] This same method was used again in 1978 when Nigeria decided, along with Commonwealth African countries, to boycott the Edmonton Commonwealth Games in protest against further New Zealand sporting links with South Africa in defiance of a United Nations ban on such links and in breach of the Gleneagles agreement.[30]

Bearing in mind that there will always be difference of opinions as far as sports issues are concerned, this type of decision becomes very difficult and complex to make. It becomes more difficult in the specific case of the Commonwealth Games, one important factor being the historical fact that Nigeria is a creation of British colonialism and, as such, there exists in the country a powerful pro-British lobby that often makes the case against whatever is perceived to be detrimental to Anglo-Nigerian relations. On the other hand, there is an articulate body of opinion in the country which has historically made the case for a more activist and progressive foreign policy and which has, on occasions, succeeded in pushing the state into what Gambari describes as its "radical impulses" in the arena of international

affairs.[31]

The decision to boycott the 1986 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games was a very difficult one. According to Professor Akinyemi, then Minister of External Affairs, Nigeria as a leading member of the Commonwealth, ought to play a frontline role in the organisation.[32] It was on this ground that the Babangida administration justified its decision to boycott the Edinburgh Games. Akinyemi felt that it was necessary to stay away from Edinburgh in order to leave no doubt about the commitment of Nigeria to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.[33] He also believed that such an action was necessary in order to strengthen Nigeria's credentials as an important actor in African international affairs.[34]

The Babangida administration came to power in August 1985 at a time when Anglo-Nigerian relations were probably at their worst. The deterioration in relations arose out of the controversy over Britain's decision to grant refuge to prominent politicians of the Second Republic wanted in Lagos to answer charges of large-scale corruption and fraud. The Buhari administration insisted that the British had no basis for shielding the wanted men from justice while the British argued that they were not convinced that fair trials would be extended to the politicians if they were extradited to their country. The so-called 'Dikko affair' was prominent development of this episode.

After Buhari, at the inception of Babangida's administration, one

of its ambitions was to improve relations between Nigeria and Britain. The road to the restoration of improved ties between Nigeria and Britain was, however, hindered by the British attitude to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit held in Nassau, Bahamas, in October 1985. That meeting was the first direct, face-to-face high level contact between officials from Lagos and London since the Dikko affair, but it was not at all a pleasant affair. Whereas Nigeria, along with other Commonwealth countries, wanted a strong stand on sanctions against South Africa, the British sought to block any such move. Mrs Thatcher argued that the South African government should be given more time to carry out reforms to the apartheid system, a position which was criticized by the rest of the Commonwealth.

To avert the result of a disastrous summit, it was agreed that a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) be established to study the South African situation closely and report back, with specific recommendations to members. The Nigerian External Affairs Minister at the time, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, saw the EPG as little more than a ploy by the British to delay concerted Commonwealth action on the South African question and, accordingly voiced the country's strong objections to such a move. It took the combined pressure of other Commonwealth countries and members of the Frontline States to persuade the Nigerian government to participate in the EPG and nominate the former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, to serve as co-Chair of the Group with the former Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser.[35] There was an implicit understanding at Nassau

that Mrs Thatcher was willing to accept and implement, along with other Commonwealth countries, the recommendations of the EPG.[36]

The irritation felt in Lagos over the British attitude to the sanctions question receded into the background as the Nigerian government decided to await for the outcome of the EPG's mission and as the regime began to address seriously the worsening economic crisis in the country. Upon its return to London, the EPG recommended mandatory economic sanctions against the Pretoria regime, thereby putting Mrs Thatcher on the spot. The British Prime Minister had reached an implicit understanding with the other delegates at Nassau to accept the outcome of the EPG's mission. Faced with a report calling for sanctions, a report that was unanimously reached and to which the British government's nominee on the Group, Lord Barber, whose nomination was much criticized in Britain on account of his extensive economic interests in South Africa, was signatory, Mrs Thatcher abandoned her earlier pledge in Nassau and rejected the EPG's sanctions proposals.[37]

Mrs Thatcher's statements over the sanctions question and her decision to dishonour the Nassau accord on the EPG infuriated much of the Commonwealth and threatened a major split in the 49-nation organisation with members suggesting the expulsion of Britain, which threat led to a rift between Queen Elizabeth II and Mrs Thatcher.[38] Apart from her disagreement with the EPG findings, Mrs Thatcher also disagreed openly with the Canadian Prime Minister who was trying to soften her position on the

sanctions issue. It was at this point she made her position clear that, as far as sanctions are concerned, "...if I were the odd one out and I were right it wouldn't matter, would it? '[39] On the threat of countries such as Nigeria, India, Zimbabwe and others that they were reviewing their membership of the Commonwealth in view of the obduracy of the British, Mrs Thatcher wasted no time in saying publicly that "... it does not matter who pulls out of the Commonwealth." [40] At the same time, Mrs Thatcher's government had permitted a violation of the spirit of Nassau by permitting British companies to sponsor a trade fair with South Africa, the pretext being that the fair had been planned well before the Nassau Summit whose decisions precluded such contacts. [41]

Nigeria was not in any way impressed by the British argument that sanctions would hurt black Africans more than they would the white racists against whom they were meant. There was a deep sense of betrayal at the rejection of the EPG's report by London. Comparisons were made between the UK government's prevarications and hypocrisy on the sanctions issue and the swiftness with which it decided to suspend its membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in solidarity with the United States. [42]

The feeling was so strong that the only appropriate response seemed increasingly to be a radical one. The British made that task easier when they released the official list of their athletes for the impending Commonwealth Games scheduled for July 1986 in Edinburgh, Scotland. The list contained the names of two

South African-born athletes – the controversial long distance runner, Zola Budd, who had been the subject of a sustained anti-apartheid campaign in Britain and beyond, and the swimmer, Annette Cowley, also a South African-born sportswoman.[43]

On the strength of this, the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs, Bolaji Akinyemi, had no doubt in his mind what Nigeria had to do. He recommended the boycott of the Edinburgh Games as the first of a package of measures to protest against Britain's South Africa policy.[44] Akinyemi's recommendation was accepted by President Ibrahim Babangida and the Nigerian decision was soon followed by many other Commonwealth countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

CONCLUSION:

The commonwealth became an arena for action over Southern Africa by successive Nigerian governments, conservative and radical. Although having Britain as its founding member meant at list some deference towards her in summit meetings. This gradually changed and the Commonwealth became a forum of complains and protest against the British. Unlike the UN, the Commonwealth carried economic weight. Nigerian policy never highlighted the Commonwealth as an economic forum or major development agency. Here, Nigeria was free to emphasise only its liberation agenda – with Britain as the organisation's built-in target for Nigerian policy.

CHAPTER 8:

NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE OAU

The position taken by Nigeria on the Southern African political situation, as well as its stand on anti-colonialism and racism in any form, is a reflection of its foreign policy which emphasises Africa as its corner-stone. Commonwealth Secretary-General, Chief Anyaoku, told the author, "this is an area of foreign policy where the peoples wish prevails. There is no question of rational actor model or otherwise on this issue. It is a situation which is very close to peoples' hearts especially the Nigerian people." [1]

Various approaches have been pursued in the analysis of Nigerian foreign policy towards South Africa, out there is one central issue which has remained consistent in the foreign policy pronouncements of the successive administrations since Nigerian Independence in 1960. There has been a condemnation of colonialism, racism and racial discrimination. Also, there has been continuous efforts by different Nigerian governments toward their eradication. [2] Having helped create the OAU, as discussed earlier in this thesis, this chapter will study Nigerian efforts against racism under the umbrella of the OAU. Having already documented the history of the Nigerian civil war and the effect of the OAU on that issue, this chapter will take up Nigeria's posture in the OAU from the time of Murtala/Obasanjo.

MURTALA MOHAMMED/OBASANJO'S ADMINISTRATION

The Murtala Mohammed government brought a dramatic shift to Nigerian foreign policy. It was Murtala Mohammed's government in 1975 which recognised the MPLA government in Angola thereby ending the political stalemate between the three major liberation movements – MPLA led by Dr. Agostino Neto, UNITA led by Dr. Jonas Samvimbi and FNLA led by Mr. Holden Roberto. Nigeria took this decision on the basis that MPLA was effectively in control of a large part of Angolan territory and was also widely perceived as having been more successful in prosecuting the liberation war. The MPLA was also seen as more truly nationalistic and 'African,' a view reinforced by the intervention of South Africa on the side of forces ranged against the MPLA.

On the other hand, many other African countries were in favour of according recognition to a Government of National Unity composed of all three Angolan liberation movements. Coincidentally, the administration of President Gerald Ford of the United States, canvassed vigorously for the same position during and after the extraordinary summit conference of the OAU held in Addis Ababa in January 1976 which was wholly devoted to the Angolan crisis.[3]

The Nigerian government's stance on the Angolan question was

lucidly stated by General Murtala Mohammed, in his address delivered on 11 January 1976, at the extraordinary summit conference of the OAU. This speech has not been widely available and I have reproduced it in full below; it contains a very clear statement of Nigerian policy, unequivocal, and marks a significant change in Nigerian foreign policy as well as support for the OAU, and gratitude for its past help to Nigeria.[4]

It is in consideration of the unedifying role which the United States has played in the African liberation struggle that the Nigerian Federal Military Government took very strong objection to the patronising interest which President Ford suddenly developed in the Angolan situation. It should be made clear that African memory is not as short as the American government thinks; we are intelligent enough to draw a distinction between foreign advisers from friendly countries invited by patriotic forces to assist in maintaining national sovereignty and defend territorial integrity and those racist adventurers who take it upon themselves to invade African countries in order to undermine their independence and exercise neo-colonialist influence.

This is the crux of the Angolan question. On the one hand is the MPLA whose record in the struggle against Portuguese imperialism is impeccable and whose government in Luanda has been recognised by 23 African countries. The Nigerian Federal Military Government being deeply convinced that the MPLA is the most dynamic, most nationalistic of all the movements representing the interests of the Angolan people, and convinced that it possesses the attributes of an effective government, joined other African countries in according it recognition. It is the duty of this

summit session to complete the process undertaken so far by individual governments by unanimously according the recognition of our organisation to the Government of the MPLA.

On the other hand are the FNLA and UNITA, two movements which no doubt played their part in the liberation struggle but which have forfeited their right to leadership of the Angolan people by joining hands with neo-colonialist adventurers and racist soldiers of fortune including the apostles of apartheid, in a determined effort to destroy the sovereignty of Angola. After the moral and material support which Nigeria gave to the Angolan liberation struggle, the Federal Military Government cannot support any movement that seeks to hand the fruit of Angolan, indeed African labour, to the enemies of Angola and Africa. It is a mark of the disrepute in which the FNLA/UNITA front has thrown themselves by their unpatriotic association with the notorious subverters of African independence and the band of racists in Pretoria, that no African country has accorded them recognition.

Mr. Chairman, the Angolan situation is not unique in the stormy history of our continent – a history which is mostly the making of outsiders. There is hardly any of our countries which, having emerged from colonialism to independence, has not been subjected to subversion and other covert activities to promote instability. Such a situation of political chaos helps to keep our countries weak and underdeveloped, to the delight of the neo-colonialist who can always point to the inability of the Africans to rule themselves much less rule the white minorities in Southern Africa. Yet we know that peace is the most vital prerequisite for orderly development. As long as the neo-colonists who pretend to be friends succeed to set one section of our people against

another, they ensure thereby our continued dependence on them. We spend our meagre resources in maintaining law and order often to the advantage of the military industrial complexes in the so-called developed world. The gap between them and us thereby grows even wider, we become ever weaker and create greater conditions for the interference of the developed countries in our domestic affairs.

In the circumstance, Mr. Chairman, this assembly has before it a clear choice. It should endorse the MPLA as the only government of Angola and invite its President, Dr. Agostino Neto, to take his place of honour among us. The Assembly should call upon the FNLA and UNITA to dissociate themselves from South Africa and lay down their arms and the OAU should use its good offices in consultation with the Angolan government to effect national reconciliation of all the people of the country. This is not without precedent. Nigeria recalls with tremendous pride and satisfaction the noble role which this organisation played during our crisis. The effectiveness of the role of the OAU rested on three key factors:

First, the insistence on non-interference by foreign powers;

Secondly, the firm recognition of the Nigerian Federal Government as the only Government in the country;

Thirdly, the close collaboration between the OAU Commission and the Nigerian Federal Government.

The easy and unprecedented reconciliation which has marked

developments in Nigeria since 1970 is as much a tribute to the enlightened policy of the Nigerian Federal Military Government as it is a justification of the sensible approach of the OAU to the crisis. It is worth recalling that those who are now seeking to dictate a solution on Angola to the OAU were the same do-gooders and self-appointed keepers of the moral conscience of the world who condemned the OAU. Mr. Chairman, Africa has come of age. It is no longer under the orbit of any extra continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar. For too long have we been kicked around; for too long have we been treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interests and act accordingly. For too long has it been presumed that the African needs outside "experts" to tell him who are his friends and who are his enemies. The time has come when we should make it clear that we can decide for ourselves; that we know our own interests and how to protect those interests; that we are capable of resolving African problems without presumptuous lessons in ideological dangers, which more often than not have no relevance for us, nor for the problem at hand.

General Murtala's speech is evidence of the arguments I put forward earlier concerning the role the OAU played in the Nigerian Civil War. In the Angolan case, General Murtala's statement was regarded as significant and bold and was significant for tilting the balance among OAU states in favour of the MPLA government in Luanda. The statement marked the divide between the foreign policy of the Gowon administration, which was largely seen as low-key execution, and the more dynamic foreign

policy of the Murtala administration.

On the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed, General Obasanjo's administration continued this active support for the MPLA government in Angola.

COMMITMENT BY NIGERIA AND THE OAU OVER SOUTHERN AFRICA

In an interview on 17th January 1977 Oliver Tambo said:[5]

In Mauritius, we discussed with Nigeria's External Affairs Commissioner, Brigadier Joe Garba, about the possibility of a delegation of the African National Congress visiting Nigeria to discuss the whole of the situation in southern Africa; the problems and the prospects.

We are aware that the Federal Government of Nigeria is concerned about the struggle in southern Africa. We have discussed with the Nigerian authorities some areas where Nigeria could play an effective role in the liberation struggle in southern Africa. These areas include our main strategy for the attainment of the objective of taking power from the white minority regime. We discussed all the problems related to the carrying out of armed struggle in southern Africa. We made quite clear, the kind of assistance which Nigeria could render in order to achieve these objectives. Alongside other African countries, Nigeria has a vital role to play in advancing the struggle for total liberation

in southern Africa. We see the situation in Namibia and in Zimbabwe as aspects of our own struggle in South Africa.

The frontline states require all kinds of assistance, but there are other areas which require assistance as well. I am thinking of Lesotho and Swaziland for example. These are countries which share common borders with South Africa. In fact, the whole of the southern Africa sub-region can now be seen as a composite theatre of revolutionary struggle. As the struggle develops in South Africa, it is inescapable that the border States will be involved. For example, in the recent past, the military forces of rebel Ian Smith in Zimbabwe had launched unprovoked attacks on an independent African country - Mozambique.

The African National Congress is concerned that all the OAU member states, individually and collectively should evolve methods for more immediate and practical participation in the unfolding struggle in Southern Africa. The OAU Liberation Committee is active, it is involved in the struggle and it is carrying out its mandate in a commendable manner. But it is the IMMEDIATE involvement of each individual African country which is important. The problem is that a struggle which is most likely to escalate to international dimensions should not be regarded as the main concern of the frontline States in southern Africa and of the OAU Liberation Committee.

It is necessary for African States which are not one of the Frontline States to be involved in the southern Africa situation on a PERMANENT basis. Nigeria for example, is not a Frontline State, but the country is actively involved. Other African countries should adopt an attitude similar to Nigeria's to the

situation in southern Africa. The reaction of the Nigerian authorities during our conversations have been positive and very encouraging.

Tambo's statement reflected how well-received the new Nigerian activism was. Generally speaking, the onus was heavier on Murtala/Obasanjo's regime than on its predecessors. This was due to the regime's practice of declaring Nigeria's position openly without any hesitation irrespective of poor consequences. This administration dealt with most of the issues that concerned Southern Africa openly including its assistance to the MPLA government. It was politically astute as well as idealistic. For example, in 1976, Nigeria played a key role in getting the Gulf Oil Corporation, to resume operations in Angola. This was the type of recognition the MPLA government needed. One of its important objectives in the early days of its struggle was to secure recognition from the Ford administration. When this was not forthcoming, the next option towards recognition from the United States was the operation of Gulf oil in Cabinda the Angolan enclave. The MPLA government recognised Nigerian influence in the oil-producing community and sought its assistance.[6]

The account of what transpired, as related to the present author, is fascinating. In response to this request, the Nigerian

government made a proposition to Gulf Oil for it to resume operations in Angola. As well as seeing the political implications of such a move, Nigeria made its proposition with political and economic muscle. Gulf was asked to reopen Cabinda or have its operations in Nigeria closed. The president of Gulf Oil came to Nigeria to determine whether the threat was a serious one. General Obasanjo confirmed to him that it was "dead serious" and offered him an escort to proceed to Angola to negotiate with the authorities there. With Nigeria's help, an agreement was reached. Shortly thereafter, a statement was issued simultaneously from Luanda and Pittsburgh (the location of headquarters of Gulf Oil) announcing Gulf Oil's resumption of operations in Angola. Likewise, net royalties due to Angola were paid the next day.[7]

The resumption of operations by a major United States corporation brought additional credibility and more recognition to the MPLA government; and this was the type of influence Nigeria wanted to have in the international arena especially over Southern African. Nigeria was very pleased with the outcome of its assistance. Even the continuation of Cuban troops in Angola a hackle that irritated the US, could be used ingeniously against the US. Angola maintained that the troops were used to protect the installations of multi-national companies in Angola, including those of Gulf Oil. Having said that, Nigeria recorded few other significant triumphs through the OAU. As discussed earlier,

pressure on Britain over Zimbabwe was accomplished through the Commonwealth. By the mid-to-late 1980s emphasis on Southern Africa was increasingly balanced by economic concerns. With the advent of the early 1990s, and changes in South African policy, Nigerian policy was articulated through the OAU but also in other fora, especially the UN, and in concert with the emerging regional organisation of Southern Africans themselves.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

There have been some significant developments since 1990. These include the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. As changes began, they were welcomed but conditionally. Diplomatic pressure, it was felt, still had a role to play against South Africa. The Frontline States adopted the Harare Declaration on 20th August 1989, specifying the changes that had to be made by the racist South African regime in order to allow a negotiated solution to the crisis. These included the abrogation of the pillars of apartheid such as the Group Areas Act, and the Population Registration Act, among others. The Harare Declaration subsequently formed the basis for the United Nations Consensus Declaration on Apartheid adopted by the Special Session of the General Assembly in December 1989. It is significant that the Nigerian Permanent Representative to the United Nations and President of the 44th Regular Session of the General Assembly,

Major General Joe Garba (rtd), presided over the Special Session on Apartheid; Nigeria is a member of both the OAU Committee on Southern Africa as well as the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.[8]

When the February 1, 1991 declaration in the South African Parliament by President de Klerk failed to address the issues of the release of political prisoners, ending of political trials and the safe return of exiles, Nigeria joined other OAU member-states in demanding that profound and irreversible changes in South Africa take place before the lifting or relaxation of sanctions. Nigeria's position was fully articulated in a speech given by Foreign Minister Major-General Ike Nwachukwu at the meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers.[9]

Let it be made clear at the outset: the Nigerian government welcomes, in the most positive terms, the declaration made by President de Klerk before the South African Parliament on the 1st of February. The group Areas Act, the Land Acts and the Population Registration Act, are among the most obnoxious and intractable of the pillars of the apartheid legal system. President de Klerk has shown great courage in tabling a promise to repudiate them. In addition, parts of his vision for a new South Africa give evidence of a new realism on the part of the manifesto for a new South Africa, give evidence of a new realism on the part of the South African government in their recognition that the intransigence of outmoded policies cannot promote the cause of peace and democracy. Thus far we salute Mr. de Klerk's sagacity.

But a promise is not a programme, and glimpses of a vision however rosy, do not amount to a blueprint. What we need now, above all, in South Africa, indeed what the Commonwealth as a body has demanded are specific constitutional actions, agreed in a democratic manner and implemented with just and equitable modalities.

Those of us who are anxious for change in South Africa have learned, in the past, to meet South African declarations with growing skepticism. This as a result of a series of promises that went unfulfilled and false dawns that did not break.

Another development was Namibia's independence on 21st March 1990, and its accession to the Charter of the OAU as the 52nd member in July 1990. Nigeria's moral, political, diplomatic, material and financial support contributed immensely to the success of the Namibian people's struggle for independence, under their liberation organisation, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). The SWAPO leader, Mr. Sam Nujoma, became independent Namibia's first president. During his inaugural address at independence, and in several other speeches, President Nujoma paid tribute to Nigeria for its pivotal support.

Apart from the overall massive material and financial assistance which Nigeria extended to SWAPO throughout the prosecution of the war of liberation, some specific assistance given by Nigeria immediately before and after the independence are worth noting:[10] The following figures obtained by the

author have not been previously published.

The launching of the Namibia Solidarity Fund by President Ibrahim Babangida on 16 June 1989. This Fund which was made up of entirely voluntary contributions by Nigerians worldwide, helped raise N100 million (11 million US dollars) for Namibia;

payment of US \$400,000.00 to the OAU as assessed contribution in aid of SWAPO, to enable the latter to finance its electoral campaign in the period leading to the United Nations supervised election in November 1989;

the voluntary contribution of US \$1,000,000.00 to the United Nations for the repatriation of Namibian refugees and exiles to enable them to participate in the UN-sponsored decolonization process. This pledge was made in January 1989 and subsequently redeemed;

the payment of US \$162,674.00 as its assessed contribution to the budget of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which was emplaced in Namibia to supervise Namibia's decolonization, in keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);

the contribution of a 182-man police contingent, the single largest, to UNTAG. In fact, a Nigerian Police Commissioner, Mr. Ezedinma Ifejika, was appointed the Deputy Police Adviser on the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia;

contribution of 40 electoral personnel to UNTAG;

the release of a retired Nigerian senior Ambassador, Ambassador O. Jolaoso to head the OAU Observer Mission in Namibia, during the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978);

the pledge of US \$1 million, at the Namibia Pledging Conference held at UN Headquarters, New York, in July 1990. The money is meant to finance specific economic and technical projects in Namibia, during the immediate post-independence period. Nigeria has repeatedly expressed its readiness to extend economic, technical and financial support for newly independent Namibia.

In addition to its generosity towards Namibia and the honoring of its international pledges, Nigeria has been giving political, financial and material assistance to the other Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,

Zambia and Zimbabwe) both multilaterally, through the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), and bilaterally, by giving soft loans to the tune of US \$45,207,018.00 to SADCC member-States through the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) administered by the African Development Bank (ADB). It has equally provided the sum of US \$109,783,109.45 to individual member states of the Frontline States between 1975 and 1989.[11]

CONCLUSION

There is now the clear evidence that the "singular policy" which has earned Nigeria prominence in the international arena is evaporating. The question now is, "what next?" Professor Oshuntokun's response to this question when I put it to him was:[12]

In fact, many people including scholars, have often wondered whether Nigeria's foreign policy was not in danger of becoming one 'single issue' policy, sometimes they do not stop wondering what will happen to the Nigerian foreign policy if apartheid was fully eradicated in Southern Africa. But as the apartheid is being won, Nigeria is also preparing itself for a changed Southern Africa. There have been series of both formal and

informal discussions between the government of Nigeria and other governments which Nigeria feels it could do business with. President Babangida's administration has introduced two additional guiding principles of Nigeria's foreign policy – the principle of reciprocity based on mutual respect, and economic diplomacy.

Economic diplomacy, aggressively pursued by the Minister of External Affairs, Major General Ike Nwachukwu, consists of active pursuit of foreign policy objectives that are designed to promote trade and investments and to complement domestic economic reforms such as trade liberalisation and commercialization of public enterprises.

The fact that Nigeria now emphasises the economic element of its policy is a logical sequence and offers incentive to the development of trade possibilities yet untapped. Peace in Angola helped by the consolidation of the independence of Namibia, which among other factors would speed up the end of racism and apartheid in South Africa. In the final analysis this would create new markets and economic blocs and make trade and economic cooperation between Nigeria and Southern Africa much more practicable.

A short market survey of Southern Africa trade area otherwise known as SADCC, in particular Zimbabwe, shows a great deal of decline of commercial exchange between Nigeria and Zimbabwe from what obtained before. But strong possibilities exist for market or sources of trade in semi-manufacturers of petro-chemicals.

Some of the countries of the SADCC have no refineries and import whole-sale refined petroleum outside Africa. This is trade diverted from Nigeria against threats of destabilisation and infrastructural constraints. Nigeria cannot only enlarge its political cooperation with countries of Southern Africa but also economic and commercial exchange.

From the stage of the liberation struggle to the negotiating table, Nigeria has been firm and effective supporter of the nationalist movements in Southern Africa, using both the international platform of the UN and the continental forum of the OAU. Nigeria has ranked among the Frontline States in the struggle against colonialism and racial domination especially apartheid in South Africa.

This is the clear articulation of change. It is also an articulation of the OAU's limits. Without South Africa as an 'organising principle,' the OAU cannot continue as before in a continental political role. It has no substantial economic influence which is what Nigeria now seeks. Having helped create the OAU as a conservative political body, Nigeria now looks to groups such as SADCC (now SADC) for economic exchange, and may in time look to South Africa itself.

PART III:

**THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONTINUITY
OF FOREIGN POLICY**

CHAPTER 9:

MILITARY GOVERNMENTS AND CONTINUITY OF POLICY

The coup d'état of July 1975 which toppled Gowon's regime ushered in an entirely new character to the Nigerian political scene in matters of style and approach. From the official pronouncements of the Balewa, Ironsi and Gowon administrations, it was possible to discern the embryonic stages of what was later to develop as Nigeria's 'assertive African policy' under Murtala and Obasanjo. Akinyemi and Vogt pointed out that the Southern African problem has been one of the continuing preoccupations of Nigerian governments since the attainment of independence. Successive Nigerian administrations have inherited the problem of Southern Africa and they have to varying degrees pursued policies designed to solve the problem.[1] Since Murtala, however, there has been until 1990 at least, and the beginnings of change in South Africa, certain continuities of policy across both civilian and military regimes. There can be said as a result to be a national foreign policy.

MURTALA MOHAMMED/OBASANJO'S REGIME 1975-1979

Murtala Mohammed without any previous experience in government or foreign affairs pursued a policy which has been recognised by many as adventurous, activist, yet pragmatic and realistic in

nature. Through his own personal view of the world he decided to initiate a policy based on the conviction that Africans, particularly Nigerians, would simply not tolerate South African designs in Southern Africa.[2] His first step was the swift recognition and support to the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. This was not a favoured decision in the eyes of western countries. However, it elevated Nigeria's foreign policy profile. Davidson stated that "this event was the onset of a new development of African independence."[3]

After the assassination of Murtala, General Obasanjo took over the leadership of Nigeria with the commitment to carry out the policies already laid down by his predecessor, but this was pursued with a different style. Obasanjo was seen as both calculating and reflective. It was certainly not ideological. He did not view the involvement of communist countries in Southern Africa as immoral or threatening to Africa. On the Cuban involvement in Angola, he said:[4]

In every case where Cuba's intervention was established, they intervened as a consequence of the failure of western policies and on behalf of legitimate African interests... We have no right to condemn the Cubans nor the countries which felt they needed Cuban assistance to consolidate their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

But he also stated that Nigeria was unwilling to be identified

with either of the two great ideological camps and that its goal was to minimise the influence of both. He admonished the Cubans not to "overstay their welcome." [5]

The most remarkable point is that Obasanjo's regime also made a continuous use of its position on the United Nations Committee on Apartheid, Non-aligned Movement and other Afro-Asian groups to isolate South Africa and Rhodesia, and support the liberation movements in tangible terms. Nigeria also persistently attempted during this regime to bring pressure to bear on the great powers that sustained the minority regimes with infusions of armaments and above all capital. It also employed the use of threat to pressurise Britain on its stand and role in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This threat was translated into action when Nigeria nationalised Barclays Bank for doing business with South Africa and British Petroleum in Nigeria for selling Nigeria's oil illegally to South Africa. [6]

SHAGARI'S ADMINISTRATION - 1979-1982

This administration came to power in October 1979 after a successful election which was won by the Nigerian National Party headed by Shagari. It therefore became the second civilian government since the Nigerian independence, after the successful transfer of power back to civilian hands by Obasanjo.

The question to be addressed in this part of the chapter is

whether there has been a continuity of radicalism in policy since the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. In this matter economic factors cannot be overlooked. Nnoli, in his analysis of Nigeria's Southern African policy stated that Nigeria's inability to implement the 1965 OAU Ministerial Council's resolution to sever diplomatic relations with Britain for a perceived lack of action over Ian Smith's rebellion in Rhodesia was due to its incapability of paying the political and economic costs of such an action.[7] Nigeria in 1965 relied on the industrialised countries of the west for the supply of technology and capital for development. This had led to a conservative foreign policy in the first decade of independence. But the second decade of Nigeria's independence showed a greater economic potential which paved the way for more confidence and greater political will. By the end of the civil war, Nigeria had acquired a new economic strength. The boom in the oil industry not only accelerated the economic growth rate but also greatly enhanced its standing in the international arena.[8] According to Aluko, dependence is incompatible with an assertive foreign policy. Aluko stated that the phenomenal growth of the economy, largely as a result of the oil boom, had strengthened Nigeria's position in relations with the superpowers. "Neither of the superpowers can now use foreign aid as a means of political leverage on Nigeria... Heavy American dependence on Nigeria's oil means that Nigeria is free not only to criticise the United States but also to put pressure on it." [9] This observation describes the conditions influencing Nigeria's subsequent foreign policy decisions and its external behaviour which included Murtala's rebuff of United States

President, Gerald Ford, over the issue of Angola and the subsequent recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. The first step now is to examine how far the Shagari's administration was able to carry on with this type of assertiveness in its foreign policy.

The Shagari administration became heir to the strong economic position and confidence of its predecessors. It maintained the tempo by Nigeria's active participation in the Lancaster House proceedings which led to the independence of Zimbabwe. Reminiscent of the Murtala/Obasanjo era was a protest by President Shagari to the British government on the issue of Zimbabwe. He warned that unless agreement was reached on the transitional arrangements, no agreement should have been deemed to be reached on the constitution.[10] President Shagari also gave renewed emphasis to the liberation of Namibia and the eradication of apartheid in South Africa.

The attainment of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 did not prevent Nigeria from having concern over Zimbabwe's domestic political, social and economic needs. For example, President Shagari's offer of ten million Naira towards Zimbabwe's independence celebration[11] inaugurated a marked interest in the survival of Zimbabwe. Up to 1991, Nigeria's contribution to Namibia's independence fund, according to the present author's sources, amounted to about \$666.6 million.[12] Nigeria's interest in the long-range stability of Southern Africa with the decolonisation of Namibia remained part of the Shagari policy. It was involved

in drawing up long-range plans with the front-line states of Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe in pursuing the liberation policy. Nigeria's concern for the future of Southern Africa was identified by its firm position on the status of Walvis Bay as Namibian territory and on the conduct of free and fair elections in Namibia. Shagari in his foreign policy pronouncement reiterated Nigeria's commitment in Southern Africa. He stated:[13]

We are supporting and we will continue to support the liberation fighters... we will not sacrifice this commitment to any other course.

The linkage between the security of the Nigerian people and the liberation struggle served to establish an anti-apartheid Nigerian public opinion which provided invaluable moral support for successive Nigerian governments in their involvement in Southern Africa.[14]

OBSTACLES

By the end of 1980 Nigerian public opinion was that Nigeria's oil revenue would grow and that the new administration would be able to manage the domestic economy and use it to project a firm foreign policy.[15] But in reality this was not the case. The aftermath of the sudden passing of oil prosperity presented a major economic constraint on Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria's

earnings from the middle of 1980 to the beginning of 1982 failed to match its commitments. The President's response to the economic crisis underlined the vulnerability of the Nigerian economy. For example, strict remedial measures were announced including the reduction of travel allowance for all categories of citizens, and a reduction of imports.[16]

Nigeria was faced with the problem of a chronic trade account deficit, inflation, a rising foreign debt and particularly an umbilical dependence on one source of revenue for expenditures.[17] President Shagari identified the problem as the global economic and geopolitical calculations of the major industrial nations to break OPEC. "The major and lesser industrial nations depend on petroleum for a substantial proportion of their energy needs. It is naturally in their interest to protect the economic growth of their nations from being endangered by a seeming impenetrable OPEC solidarity." [18] As the states maintained the squeeze on OPEC, Nigeria's import bills continued to rise because the domestic economy could no longer be sustained without capital imports. At the same time the foreign exchange reserves maintained a steady decline. Under these circumstances, the government had no alternative but to borrow from the western banks.

The government continued to impose more stringent austerity measures on the domestic budget and also reduced its spending. But the unemployment created by austerity and the burden of economic measures created discontent and social imbalance -

destabilising influences. The situation in Nigeria during this period was reminiscent of the fragile domestic environment of the first years. This not only undermined Nigeria's ability to act assertively in its external interactions but also compelled it to divert attention to the domestic arena.[19]

It could be argued that what brought about the end of Shagari's administration was its abandonment of the 'zoning' arrangement which involved different regions and ethnic groups. These groups were allocated leading governmental offices and party responsibilities which made the National Party of Nigeria stronger than any of the other four parties. Most importantly was the failure of the office of the President to rotate among the zones of the National Party, as agreed by its members, following the renomination of Shagari for the 1983 general election. The NPN was therefore seen by its opponents as a tool for Hausa-Fulani domination of Nigeria. As a party which controlled the central government but not a majority of the state governments, it began to experience stiff opposition from a united front of the state governments that the other political parties controlled. In other words, the first Republic's pattern of ethnic and regionally based political parties, and confrontational politics emerged in the second Republic. By the time the second round of the national and state elections took place in 1983, the political establishment in Nigeria had developed serious credibility problems.[20]

The economic problems which the Shagari administration failed to

address exacerbated social tensions and domestic unrest. This was a result of an almost total dependence of the Nigerian economy on oil revenue alone. This type of dependence on one source of revenue meant that the position of the oil market determined Nigeria's ability to manage its economy. For example, by 1979/80, Federal collected revenue for that year was estimated at N12,272 billion.[21] The result was that Nigeria at this time found it extremely difficult to finance its import bills for consumer goods, food, raw materials as well as machinery for domestic production.

BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATION - 1983-1985

Shagari's administration came to an end by a coup d'etat on the 31st of December 1983. The Buhari regime declared that the intervention by the military and the overthrow of the civilian administration was a political act designed, in the words of his supporters, "essentially to prevent the country from imminent collapse, since all indications pointed that the former civilian administration (at federal and state levels) has exhausted its capacity and legitimacy to withstand the reaction of the people." [22] Buhari's regime did not hesitate to point out the enormous debt burden which it inherited. It was proclaimed that on the domestic level, the last civilian administration converted the budget surplus of N1,461 million inherited from its predecessor in 1979 into a deficit of N1,975 million by the

following year.[23] Between 1980 and 1983, there seemed to be a competition between federal and state governments in recording huge budget deficits. While the federal budget deficit came to between N4,000 million and N6,000 million, the combined budget deficits of the states rose from N3,295 million in 1980 to about N6,000 million in 1983.[24] On the external front, it was understood that the civilian administration exhausted the credit balance of N2.5 billion inherited from its predecessor. There was also an outstanding trade arrears on letters of credit of \$1.88 billion and accumulated short term trade arrears on the open accounts of about \$5 billion.[25]

It is pertinent to make mention of the above points in some of Buhari's speeches because of the effect this type of inheritance had on the regime itself. With all these economic and financial problems, the regime's attitude might well have deviated sharply from the pattern existing before it took over.

The Buhari regime addressed itself to two major issues. On the domestic sector, it proclaimed a better management of the economy and the establishment of greater discipline by the rulers and the ruled which culminated in the 'War Against Indiscipline' (WAI) campaign.[26] On the external sector, the regime was poised to use foreign policy as an instrument for rebuilding the shattered economy and internal security. This led to two major decisions by the regime. These included the closure of the land borders and the expulsion of what it regarded as "aliens." [27] These people were mainly citizens of other African countries. The Nigerian

stand on these issues was proclaimed in one of the early speeches of Buhari where he stated that "where the national interest of Nigeria conflicted with those of its neighbouring states and African countries in general, the national interest of Nigeria will take priority." [28]

The regime claimed that the collapse of the previous administration was due to leadership inability or unwillingness to take tough decisions to manage the economy especially in the face of declining oil revenue; this prompted the regime to reach its decision to take what it called corrective measures.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUE:

On the issue of the liberation of Southern Africa, the regime took on board the belief that South Africa constitutes one of the greatest threats to its national interest. Even under this regime, irrespective of the critical period Nigeria was undergoing both economically and financially, it sought to maximize the advantages inherent in holding the chairmanship of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and sought to expose the moral poverty of apartheid before world opinion. As a result, according to Nigerian diplomatic opinion even the friends of South Africa in Western world were persuaded to denounce apartheid in various international fora. [29] The main foreign policy concern of the Nigerian government during this period, however, was the economic position of most of the third

world countries resulting from the oil glut which adversely affected earnings from oil exports, alongside other ailments such as drought, famine, and flood. The Nigerian government was of the opinion that the inability of most African countries to meet their financial contributions towards the liberation of Southern Africa made it a 'necessity' for Mozambique to sign a non-aggression pact with Pretoria in 1984 and not a 'choice.' Secondly, the regime observed that the Reagan administration had gained the upper hand in promoting the idea of the so-called 'constructive engagement' with South Africa. The Buhari regime sought to redress some of these setbacks. *On the strength of* this, Nigeria proclaimed that it would maintain support of the liberation movements through strategies such as:[30]

- (a) making substantial financial and other materials contributions to ANC and SWAPO, and to a much lesser extent to PAC...
- (b) encouraging the ANC to rethink new strategies of operations within South Africa itself...
- (c) increasing consultations with Eastern bloc countries with a view to improving their assistance to the liberation movements;
- (d) on the wider international scene, identifying and working actively with influential groups such as religious organisations and anti-apartheid groups

to increase world attention directed at the evils of apartheid;

- (e) obtaining international support for the frontline states through the Non-Aligned Movement, the UNO, and OPEC, so as to strengthen their economies and reduce their dependence on South Africa.

The regime was quite aware of the sharp limitations in its capability to make the US government change its policies. It realised that the era of use of oil as a diplomatic instrument was over. The economy was in such a poor state it meant more dependence on the western world than before. Nigeria's diplomatic opinion shared the view that the main reason for maintaining the pressure on the Reagan administration in particular was to get the US public well-informed and this made the Reagan administration particularly careful not to veto a Security Council resolution passed with wide support.[31]

The Nigerian press felt that, in the Buhari administration, the country's leadership on issues affecting apartheid in South Africa or independence in Namibia remained unchallenged and positively in tune with the world in general and Africa in particular.[32] Nigeria's participation in the work of the 20th summit of the OAU at Addis Ababa was considered very positive. The National Concord's comment on this was that it showed that

the regime could articulate a credible stand on African policy issues and also give necessary leadership.[33] The regime's decision to honour its pledge at the summit to contribute \$5 million to Africa's famine problems irrespective of its economic state at home was also applauded.[34]

Generally speaking, public opinion considered that the regime gave all possible diplomatic support and moral encouragement to the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Notwithstanding, it has been suggested that the regime should probably have allocated more financial resources than it did through increasing private and governmental contributions to the Nigerian Fund for South African relief which should have been re-named the fund for the liberation of Southern Africa.[35] This will be clarified below from the table of contributions by different administrations.

The Buhari regime proclaimed that the defence of Nigeria's national security and the welfare of its citizens would be the axes around which foreign policy would revolve as long as it stayed in power. The regime's main foreign policy objective therefore was to project the country's national interests along the lines of concentric circles of policy priorities, an orientation of foreign policy which would be assumed to be conceptually sound and consistent especially with the recognition of reduced national financial resources and power, starting close to home before spreading outwards. Unfortunately, the decisions to close the borders and to expel the so-called illegal aliens

were out of order with the declared policy of concentric circles, which ought to have given priority to relations with neighbours.[36] There were mixed feelings shown by the Nigerian newspapers. Some openly commended such decisions while some did so implicitly. However, many of these decisions might have served only the short-term national interests. The length of time the borders remained closed and the mass nature of the expulsion exercise did more harm to Nigeria's long-term affairs, and especially its commitments to ECOWAS and the OAU. Nigeria's attitude during this period would have created a basis for retaliation, except for the patience exercised by most African countries, even bearing in mind that Nigeria had broken the ECOWAS treaty of free movement. Burkina Faso for one, made an attempt to give Nigeria a taste of its own coin by rounding up its citizens resident in Ouagadougou, with the intention of expelling them in sympathy with Ghana. This attempt came to a halt due to the Nigerian government's protest that at no time did it ever expel all the aliens working in Nigeria but rather it expelled only the illegal ones.[37] It was also pointed out that the Ministry of External Affairs was not really consulted in the decision to close the border and also not fully involved in the decision to expel illegal aliens on a mass scale.[38]

Nevertheless, as 1985 progressed and the full effects of the administration's efforts to revamp the economy and instill public accountability and national discipline began to be felt, public alienation grew. There were reports of a widening split among senior members of the Supreme Military Council and rumours about

an impending military coup. Under these circumstances, public interest in foreign policy issues diminished and the administration's efforts were consigned to the back stage.[39]

The Buhari regime was overthrown on 27th August 1985. Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida succeeded as the President and the Commander-in-chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

BABANGIDA'S REGIME - 1985 TO THE EARLY 1990S

When Babangida's regime took office on 27th August 1985 he made a direct statement to the nation - "Events today indicate that most of the reasons which justified the military take over of government from civilians still persist... A phenomenon of constant insecurity and overbearing uncertainty have become characteristic of our existence. My colleagues and I are determined to change the course of history." [40] This very statement has been quoted because it would assist in determining whether the regime eventually measured up to its promise or not. I will attempt to compare the achievements of the present regime with the previous administrations after Murtala/Obasanjo and examine whether there has been refinement of policy since then.

The first move by the administration was to repair relations with Nigeria's West African neighbours left frosty by Buhari's expulsion of Africans from Nigeria and the closure of the land borders. Also, high-powered solidarity visits were paid to the

Frontline states such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. The liberation movements – SWAPO fighting for the independence of Namibia, the ANC and the PAC then in exile, got renewed pledges of financial support from Nigeria.[41] Professor Akinyemi made Nigeria's position with other African countries clear during his maiden speech as the Minister of External Affairs. He said that there was no disputing the fact that Nigeria had responsibilities to Africa and that also Africa owed responsibilities to Nigeria.[42] When it is said that Africa is the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy, it means that Nigeria should identify and defend the legitimate interests of Africa collectively, and each African state individually. This he explained to mean that Africa and African states should identify with and defend Nigerian interests. If Nigeria owes a responsibility to stand up for and respond to Africa, it was owed an obligation to be consulted when the situation allows for consultations.[43] He also added that "Nigeria must not and cannot allow states which of their own free-will adopt policies that lead to crisis." [44] Akinyemi's position on African issues generally was received with mixed feelings by most Nigerians. After the loss of an aeroplane by Libya in its dispute with the United States of America over the Gulf of Sirte Nigeria kept mute over the development; this attitude angered the Nigerian radicals. Again, days later, the bombing of the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Bergazi led to angry attacks on the Minister. Though the federal government condemned what it recognised as American terrorism in a fellow African country, Professor Akinyemi justified his line of foreign policy formulation during the

author's interview with him. He stressed that the fact that Nigeria has the interest of Africa at heart does not indicate that it should be dragged into other countries decision to carry out certain obligation for which it was not originally consulted.[45] He cited the Libyan issue as an example.

Akinyemi's ministership in Babangida's administration was nevertheless noted as a remarkable period in Nigeria's foreign policy pursuits, remarkable for the **symmetry in vision** between the national leader who wanted to re-enact the activism of the second half of the 1970's and the External Affairs Minister who envisioned his country discovering its power potential, its regional supremacy and its causing other countries to respect its primacy. He was almost seen as being a Nigerian equivalent of Henry Kissinger, the widely acclaimed U.S. Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford. The conceptions of his ministerial role underpinned policy ideas such as the All Nigeria Conference of Foreign Policy, Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TAC), the proposed but stalled Pan Africanist Congress, the call for the development of a "black" atom bomb (never presented as a formal policy proposal), and the Concert of Medium Powers. This presumed that the Ministry of External Affairs was determined to play a dynamic vanguard role as a force both for implementation and support of policy, not to mention the academic origin and impetus of the External Affairs Minister himself. Akinyemi, justifies his moves on these issues when, during the author's interview with him, he pointed out that the Soviet Union rose

from one of the poorest countries in the world to a power to be reckoned with due to its efforts towards its military capability.[46] He added that no country becomes totally well-to-do internally before embarking on policies which would elevate its position in the international circle.[47] He argued that both in US and the USSR poverty still exists but it did not stop them from either pursuing their military capabilities or giving aid to such countries as they wish to assist.[48] Therefore, African states have no reason to hesitate in increasing their military capabilities he said. However, the Ministry of External Affairs, was ill-suited for Akinyemi's bold initiatives. This was explained by Francis Ogene when he stated that "The foreign service was created and moulded in 1957 by the colonial government in Nigeria and the foreign office in London as a force to moderate Nigerian foreign policy after independence. The training of the first corps of the foreign service officers between 1956 and 1960 stressed traditional diplomatic values and necessity to foster peace and stability in inter-state relations. This first group of diplomats have moulded the foreign service and imposed their values on the organisation... Apart from its inability to innovate or create new and revolutionary ideas in foreign policy, the foreign service at times constitutes itself into formidable force opposing or frustrating radical ideas and advocating the more traditional approaches."[49]

In any case, the idea of the Concert of Medium Powers did not last as the economic realities and Nigeria's 'leaner purse' kept hammering the point home which indicated that a shift in

diplomacy from a political to economic emphasis was essential. Coincidentally, the shift was observed through the departure of Akinyemi from the Ministry of External Affairs.

THE LINKAGE ISSUE

Babangida's regime did not lose sight of the linkage between the domestic and the foreign policy behaviour. It recognised that in order to build a sound domestic environment which would eventually influence Nigeria's foreign policy behaviour there was the prior need to seek accommodation and compromise with important segments of the Nigerian public. In order to achieve this, there were established Directorate for Social Mobilisation, the Armed Forces Consultative Assembly, the Directorate for Employment, the Directorate for Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure, the Centre for Democratic Studies, the National Commission for Women and the Peoples Bank.[50]

Babangida's most radical programme, however, was the Structural Adjustment Programme which came to encompass every economic policy programme and measure of the regime. A reading of the one-year old South Commission Report, shows that what is happening Nigeria is taking place in most of the developing world.[51] While it is true that the SAP has given rise to efficient utilisation of resources, particularly local one, it could be argued that the quality of life of many Nigerians who should be both the means and end of all economic activities is yet to

appreciate.

NIGERIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

The early stage of Babangida's administration witnessed difficulties with the British government over South Africa. issue. This period includes Mrs. Thatcher's abandonment of her earlier pledge in Nassau and her launch of a tirade against the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and its sanctions proposals.[52] Mrs Thatcher's intemperate statements over the sanctions issue and her decision to dishonour the Nassau accord on the EPG infuriated much of the Commonwealth and threatened a major split in the 49-nation organisation with some members calling openly for the expulsion of Britain.[53]

On the issue of aid towards liberation of South Africa it was confirmed by most of the author's interviewees that Babangida's administration has contributed enormously both militarily and financially. During one of the author's interviews, it was stressed that this assistance cannot be quantified.[54] For instance, most of the liberation movements were based in Lagos and Nigeria was fully responsible for them and there was also a 'Special Committee' which was headed by the President himself.[55] This was also confirmed by Professor Akinyemi who stressed that he would give as equally high marks to Babangida's regime as that of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime in terms of content

of policy.[56] He pointed out differences from Murtala/Obasanjo's regime since there has been no Head of State who could bring the type of flair of Murtala's government; but in terms of the resources disbursed as in the case of SWAPO, ANC and PAC, the number of confrontations, and the boycott of Commonwealth games in Scotland in 1986/87, Babangida's government performed well.

The most interesting observation made during the course of this search is that in spite of Nigeria's strong stand on the elimination of apartheid, it seems Babangida's administration began a shift in international behaviour generally towards apartheid and South Africa in particular. This observation was pointed out by one of the government ministers during the author's interview with him. He stressed that the issue of South Africa presently is 'fluid' and it was being "reconsidered everyday" by the Babangida administration, on the ground that it is not only Nigeria's interest that should be taken into consideration but also that of black South Africans as well as the attitude of other nations of the world.[57]

When General Ike Nwachukwu took over from Akinyemi as External Affairs Minister, the approach to Nigeria's foreign policy management changed dramatically. General Nwachukwu pointed to a new direction quite early when he declared that "the new realities and challenges demand that we embark on a new era of dynamic and functional diplomacy to enhance our economic and technological well-being."[58] Stated simply, this was the time for economic diplomacy. It was not that Nigeria changed its

foreign policy focus from Africa or that it abandoned any of its commitments to the international community, but the Ministry appeared to be operating with an over-bearing consciousness of the economic demands in its brief.[59] In pursuance of this strategy many seminars and conferences have been held. The most important one was the seminar on Southern Africa in Transition held in Lagos between 10th-12th April 1990.[60] The text of this forms an appendix to this thesis, as it forms a fairly comprehensive foreign policy document which all the same keep an economic consciousness. Economic cooperation with a future free South Africa should be explored immediately, it concluded.

AID TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Because of the bureaucratic culture of secrecy precise data on Nigeria's aid to liberation movements are difficult to come by. Accordingly the figures that follow have been obtained by the author and have not been previously published. They allow, however, only a rough comparison though a useful one. It is clear, however, that Nigeria's aid, (both bilateral and multilateral) to all African Liberation Movements in general began as far back as 1963 when Nigeria became a member of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. Nigeria's election to the Committee was due to recognition of her potential importance in any joint African endeavour rather than that of past performances.

In 1990 Nigeria hosted three Southern African Liberation Movements namely, the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO). The Nigerian Government provided both residential and office accommodations to the Chief Representatives of these freedom fighters in Lagos and in addition made statutory allocation for their upkeep and maintenance. The Chief Representatives of these movements were accredited to the Honourable Minister of External Affairs and enjoyed diplomatic status and courtesies in the performance of their functions in Nigeria.[61]

Apart from the provision of financial assistance for the smooth running of their offices in Lagos, Nigeria's aid to the above-mentioned Southern African Liberation Movements takes the form of bilateral and multilateral assistance. In the bilateral sphere, Government gives direct financial assistance, outright grants and at other times cash gifts to the Frontline states' headquarters of these movements for use in meeting their immediate requirements.[62] Government's multilateral assistance to these movements is usually channelled through the OAU Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam, the Special Committee Against Apartheid and other International Organisations like the Non-Aligned Movements.[63] Solidarity Organisations in Nigeria like the National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAP) also receive subvention from the government in furtherance of their objectives.[64]

Nigeria's aid and assistance to Liberation Movements in Southern Africa are predicated upon the following criteria:

- (a) The Organisation of these movements
- (b) Their effectiveness in prosecuting the armed struggle
- (c) The support they enjoy within the countries they intend to liberate and
- (d) The facilities offered to these movements by the neighbouring countries.

This chapter in the light of the foregoing background information, will attempt a general overview and critical assessment of Nigeria's commitment in aid to the Southern African Liberation Movements with the hope of bringing into focus the consistency or otherwise of successive Nigerian administrations in their proclaimed commitment to the cause of decolonisation and eradication of apartheid in the Southern African region.

AID POLICY UNDER BALEWA REGIME, 1960-1966

Under Balewa, Nigeria was known to have exhibited considerable diffidence in its relations with all Liberation Movements and tended to keep them at a distance. The channelling of aid or all assistance to the Liberation Movements through the Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa offered a highly satisfactory means of assisting the movements. The Committee was

a branch of the OAU but it had its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, where Tanzania kept it under fairly close supervision. In 1968 when Tanzania was the first of the five states to recognise Biafra, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria ceased making its contribution to the Liberation Movements through the Committee on the grounds that Tanzania was diverting Liberation funds to Biafra.[65] After the war, Nigeria resumed its payment through the Committee and other contacts with the Liberation Movements.

Under the Balewa administration, Nigeria made substantial contributions to the Special Fund of the OAU Liberation Committee as follows:[66]

- (a) N200,000 in 1963/64
- (b) N140,000 in 1964/65
- (c) N168,000 in 1965/66

In spite of the above financial grants to the liberation movements via the OAU Liberation Committee Fund, the Balewa regime rejected the idea of supplying arms directly to the Liberation Movements despite calls to this effect by some members of Parliament in 1965. Balewa's rejection of armed struggle against South Africa and the refusal to supply arms to the freedom fighters is said to be on the ground of his personal moral and view that it would lead to brothers killing brothers.[67]

(ii) THE IRONSI REGIME, JANUARY 1966 - JULY 1966

There was no record of Nigeria's aid to Southern African Liberation Movements under the short-lived regime of Ironsi. His administration was however known to have inherited the anti-apartheid policy of the preceding Balewa administration, and in fact operated the same strategy.

(iii) THE GOWON REGIME, 1966-1975

Aid to Liberation Movements under Gowon's administration was as follows:[68]

- (a) Making financial contribution via the OAU Liberation Fund. This contribution had been suspended due to Nigeria's suspicion that Tanzania might be diverting part of the fund to assist Biafra but Nigeria's contribution was reinstated in 1970 after the civil war. Consequently Nigeria's contribution to the Fund was raised from N168,000 to N252,000 in 1973.
- (b) Commencement of direct bilateral assistance to the Liberation Movements in 1968 mainly arms, trucks, food, clothing, medicines, etc, contrary to Balewa's policy (though the Gowon regime initially rejected supporting armed struggle).

- (c) Provision of training facilities to liberation movements.

(iv) **THE MURTALA MUHAMMED/OLUSEGUN OBASANJO
REGIME, 1975-1979**

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime like Gowon's regime, operated in a period when oil fetched Nigeria some huge revenue which enabled the regime to exercise a reasonable degree of independence in foreign policy formulation and execution.

The specific aid given to Southern African Liberation Movements by this administration included:

- (a) provision of free training opportunities for the victims of apartheid in Nigerian schools
- (b) establishment of a Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) in 1975 to which Nigeria contributed N20 million for aid to victims of apartheid
- (c) N20,000,000 grant to Angola following Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government in December 1975.[69]
- (d) Grant of \$32,750 by the Federal Military Government in September 1975, to the African National Congress (ANC)

"for appropriate use in the interest of all the people of Zimbabwe."[70]

(e) Grant of \$250,000 to Mozambique in July 5, 1976, for use in Zimbabwe.[71]

(f) Support for the OAU decision to increase aid on education and publications of the evils of apartheid to all countries.

(v) AID DURING THE SHAGARI REGIME 1979-1983

During Shagari's administration, Nigeria continued to give aid to the under listed Southern African Liberation Movements both bilaterally and multilaterally through its contributions to the OAU Liberation Fund: SWAPO of Namibia, ANC (SA) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

During this period these liberation movements received direct financial grants from Nigeria as follows:[72]

(a) SWAPO of Namibia - 1981 - N1,000,000

1983 - N689,685.17

(b) PAC of South Africa 1981 - N502,000

1983 - N45,000 worth of
Drugs and medical equipment.

(c) ANC of South Africa 1981 – N1,000,000

1983 – N689,685.17

A sharp drop in aid could therefore be seen.

(vi) AID DURING BUHARI'S REGIME, DECEMBER

31ST 1983 - AUGUST 27TH 1985

The Buhari regime inherited the foreign policy objective to "Combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations" as provided in the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In keeping with this objective, Buhari's government made it clear that it would continue financial, material and diplomatic support to the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa despite Nigeria's economic problems.

Consequently on the inception of the administration, Nigeria continued to make prompt payments of her dues to the OAU Liberation Fund of which she was the Chairman then, and in addition, the government continued its moral and other direct fiscal and material assistance to the underlisted liberation movements as follows:[73]

(a) SWAPO of Namibia – 1984 – \$921,310.34

1985 – \$250,000.00

(b) ANC of South Africa 1984 – \$1,000,000

1985 – \$40,000 grant

(c) PAC of Azania (South Africa) – 1984 – Nil

1985 – \$100,000

There were therefore rises and falls compared with earlier years, but a pattern of decline was evident.

BABANGIDA'S ADMINISTRATION

Most of the contributions by this administration towards the Southern African cause have not been released because the President himself is involved in the 'Special Committee' which controls most of the funds to Southern African liberation movements. The conclusion drawn from the account given by most of my interviewees was that Babangida administration is as involved in Southern Africa as Murtala/Obasanjo's administration. Question marks must remain here given accusations of corruption levelled against Banbagida.

A CRITIQUE OF NIGERIA'S AID

POLICY TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

In spite of its own pressing domestic commitments and the fiscal restraints occasioned by the present economic difficulties, Nigeria accepted the principle of sharing its resources with other African countries including the liberation movements of the continent.

Furthermore, Nigeria in addition to being a major contributor to the OAU Liberation Committee Fund, also gives direct grants-in-aid for the political emancipation of oppressed parts of Africa and of those African countries which carry heavy financial burdens in providing support and facilities to nationalist movements particularly in the Southern African sub-region. Between 1975 to March 1980, Nigeria was reported to have expended an amount approximately N25 million[74] as aid to African countries and Liberation Movements.

Inspite of Nigeria's positive role in the liberation struggle in Africa, her aid policy in general, with particular reference to the Southern African Liberation Movements, deserve some critical comments or examination.

While many people have tended to justify the current policy of direct financial subventions to liberation movements, other argue that assistance in term of material and logistical equipments, would appear to be more cost-effective in strengthening the struggle for liberation. The latter group opined that the provision of cash grants tends to give room to abuse as well as making accountability difficult. There have been allegations of diversion of money and material assistance to purposes other than their intended objectives by the leadership of some of the national liberation movements. This position makes the case for a de-emphasis on cash gifts. This is to say that as long as Nigeria's system of aid and assistance to national liberation movements continues to be characterised by cash and material

grants, the actual benefits of its efforts would continue to go to the advanced countries where the cash gifts are spent for the purchase of materials and services.

From confidential sources speaking to the present author, it would appear there is a piecemeal approach in the doling out of aid whenever any arm of the liberation movements comes asking, since there has been no stipulated amount budgeted annually for the respective movements nor any report of expenditure ever requested from them. Furthermore, aid has often been given out to these liberation movements without proper evaluation of the political leverage to be derived by Nigeria from such gesture. Although Nigeria as a matter of policy does not believe in attaching any strings or pre-conditions to its aids to sister African countries and Liberation Movements, perhaps the time is propitious for a review of Nigeria's aid programme to these movements in particular and to African countries in general with a view to correcting the impression of Nigeria as a "Father Christmas" (as indicated by Professor Akinyemi during the author's interview with him).

Be that as it may, Nigeria's aid figures to Southern African Liberation Movements since 1981, seem to suggest that on the average, Nigeria gave out about one million United States Dollars annually to the African National Congress (ANC) and to the South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) while the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) received less.

In the decade from Obasanjo to Babangida there have been ups and downs in aid disbursement. Notwithstanding the new emphasis on economic policy, something of a slowly declining though still reasonably consistent aid disbursement record shows through. Here, notwithstanding economic difficulties, some measure of consistency is identifiable. One has the feeling, however, that change in South Africa could not have come fast enough.

CONCLUSION:

I clearly pointed out in the introduction the areas covered by this study. Starting from the origin of foreign policy formulation in Nigeria with special reference South Africa, it went on to include the study of policy as expressed within international organisations. The thesis also looked at the continuity of foreign policy within the various Nigerian governments and with emphasis on how it was formulated within military governments.

I enjoyed a great deal of satisfaction with the outcome of this research because of the major originalities uncovered. The areas identified include the importance of Ghana's relationship to Nigeria and the impact it made on the formulation of the Nigerian foreign policy especially as a result of the civil war. Another finding stressed the style and the actual formulation of Nigerian foreign policy and how dependent it is on the presidential office but not necessarily dependent on traditional divisions between military and civilian office. Finally, there is the survey of the involvement of Nigeria financially towards the liberation of Southern Africa.

The emphasis given different international organisations is also a helpful contribution to the literature.

I believe that my entire thesis makes a contribution to the act of knowledge. This is the first time there has been a sustained work which covers the history of the Nigerian foreign policy

formulation from the days of pre-independence right up to 1990. The unity that existed from the civilian to military government and military to the military government, all this continued right up to the emerging era with the advent of improved relationships with South Africa. Up to this critical point in time in 1990, I have outlined the development of policies, continuity of policies and continuity between government to government. This thesis was sought to act as a major critical exposition major critical exposition of how all this happened.

I am looking forward to a new Africa. This new Africa is one in which all states will have to drive a common policy. The policy, conceived by interdependent Africans towards Africa will be essentially the same, whether military or civilian in its origin. I look forward to this new day with the same fervour as I have studied and researched this thesis on an era now closing.

APPENDIX

SEMINAR ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IN TRANSITION HELD IN LAGOS, 10TH-12TH APRIL, 1990

INTRODUCTION

The decision to organise the seminar was taken by the Minister of External Affairs, Ike Nwachukwu following a discussion on the issue in the Policy Planning Committee of the Ministry in February, 1990. The objective was to review Nigeria's policy towards South Africa in response to the developments taking place in the Southern African region. The seminar was attended by Nigerian Heads of Mission in the Frontline States and Heads of Mission from the United Nations and representatives of the Presidency, Ministry of Defence, NIIA, NIPSS, NIA and the University of Lagos also participated at the seminar.

In his opening address, the Minister raised a number of issues which participants were expected address. He drew attention to the developments now taking palce in South Africa and asked:-

(a) "If Nigeria should review its present policy in view of the on-going developments which hopefully would lead to the establishment of a non-racial society in South Africa?

(b) Should Nigeria continue to hold on tenaciously to

its policy of non-collaboration with South Africa until there was an irreversible evidence aimed at dismantling apartheid?

- (c) Should Nigeria single-handedly or in concert with the OAU act to ensure a successful and satisfactory conclusion of the peaceful negotiations which have now been agreed between the ANC and the South African government?"

Finally, the Minister of External Affairs charged the participants to consider what Nigeria's position would be in a post-apartheid South Africa.

SITUATION REPORTS AND ANALYSIS BY PARTICIPANTS

The seminar took note of the recent changes in South Africa which led to the release of some political prisoners including Mr. Nelson Mandela. These changes, the seminar further noted, are attributable to internal as well as external factors. The external factors included Gorbachev's ascension to power in the Soviet Union and the effect of his policy of **Perestroika** and **Glasnost** which precipitated changes within the USSR and East European countries and introduced a new climate in the international political environment. The independence of Namibia, sanctions applied by the International Community, various United Nations and OAU resolutions and activities against the apartheid

regime, and South African military reverses in Angola were the other external factors responsible for the change. The internal factors included the activities of liberation movements, trade unions, students' groups, the role of the churches and the replacement of Mr. P.W. Botha by Mr. Frederick de Klerk as President.

The seminar noted the difficulty in sustaining the armed struggle since the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries which have been the main suppliers of arms and ammunition have advocated dialogue. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the armed struggle should be continued until the process of dismantling apartheid becomes irreversible. The seminar proceeded to examine desirability or otherwise of establishing contacts with the various groups in South Africa as a possible option for Government.

Two approaches emerged from the discussion. The first approach argued that Nigeria should establish contacts with the key actors across the broad political spectrum of South African society including the white community. However, discreet contacts with the South African government should be with the knowledge of the liberation movements.

The other position is the continuation of the policy of total isolation of the minority regime while continuing to intensify contacts with the various anti-apartheid groups in South Africa. Until then contacts with the regime should be conducted only

through the OAU monitoring group.

The meeting noted the position of the OAU in the unfolding development in South Africa as reflected in both the Harare Declaration and the Lusaka Statement of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on South Africa. In a bid to monitor the evolving of the Pretoria regime, the OAU has set up a Monitoring Group on South Africa, to be based in Lusaka. The monitoring group's responsibilities would involve among other things, contacts with South Africa. The seminar observed that this OAU position is a significant shift from the age-long policy which forbids any form of contacts with the racist regime.

The seminar observed that lack of unity in the ranks of the black nationalist groups in South Africa has weakened their solidarity and has inhibited the emergence of a common action front which is very crucial in the final battle against apartheid. The seminar is of the view that Nigeria has an important role to play in the reconciliation of the black nationalist movements and all the anti-apartheid groups in order to present a common position in the ensuing negotiations with the Pretoria regime.

The seminar noted that the apartheid system still remained intact, since its structures and laws were yet to be dismantled. The deplorable socio-economic condition of the blacks also provides fertile grounds for chaos.

The meeting drew attention to the peculiar complexity of the

internal situation in South Africa in terms of **heterogeneity** of race, ethnicity and class which should be taken into consideration. There is need to know more about them in re-assessing Nigeria's policy towards that region.

The meeting also observed that the various strata of the white community which constitute the fighting forces and the security apparatus were antagonistic to the present dispensation in South Africa and if care was not taken, they could embark on organised violence to provoke the blacks, thus intensifying violence that could upset the transition process.

The seminar considered economic cooperation between Nigeria and post-apartheid South Africa and was of the view that Nigeria should commence a programme of action aimed at cooperating with a post-apartheid South Africa in the economic field. It is expected that a post-apartheid government will be non-racial and acceptable to Nigeria and the international community, thereby facilitating economic cooperation and or competition. It was also noted that Nigeria and South Africa are economic giants in their respective zones and therefore there will be competition between the two countries.

In order to achieve a healthy competition there is need for Nigeria to carry out a survey of South Africa's economic capabilities. For instance, it is recognised that South Africa has comparative advantage over Nigeria in areas such as mining, manufacturing, agriuculture, livestock and fishing in which

meaningful cooperation could be established. On the other hand, since South Africa depends so much on external sources for its crude oil, Nigeria could readily meet part of that demand.

The meeting also recognised that a free South Africa will attract a return of capital which may make it possible for her to wish to invest in other States. Nigeria and ECOWAS countries constitute big markets for such investments provided there is political stability in the sub-region. Other possible areas of cooperation which are mainly confidence building measures are collaboration between professional bodies. In addition, cooperation in military field would also facilitate the realisation of some of the objectives of the Nigerian Defence Industries Corporation.

The seminar noted that cooperation between Nigeria and South Africa which are two main economic powers in the continent, will bring about a push in intra-African trade and cooperation. It also noted that economic growth will accelerate in a free South Africa, leading to increased economic penetration into all parts of Africa. It noted the dangers in terms of the possible domination of Nigeria's domestic economy by a more highly developed post-apartheid Nigeria's economic performance. Consequently, there is an urgent and, indeed, compelling necessity to rapidly transform the manufacturing and industrial base of Nigeria's economy in accordance with the Structural Adjustment Programme.

The seminar noted that the recent developments in South Africa may have the following implications for Nigeria and Africa:-

- (a) It will enhance the prospects for the eradication of apartheid leading to a united, democratic and non-racial society after a tough process of negotiations;
- (b) The eradication of apartheid will signify the achievement of one of Nigeria's major foreign policy objectives but would also remove a major rallying point in African politics for which Nigeria has provided leadership;
- (c) The eradication of apartheid will lead to the release of energy which can then be channelled to economic development issues. Similarly, the end of apartheid will remove those irritants in Nigeria's relations with some Western countries arising from her anti-apartheid stance;
- (d) The re-integration of a new South Africa into the international system would make her Nigeria's main competitor for political influence, economic and military power in sub-sahara Africa;
- (e) Percentage of capital flows going to South Africa

will rise as a proportion of total capital flows into Africa. Consequently the capital flows into Nigeria may considerably reduce.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The meeting agreed that the current situation in South Africa call for a clear articulation of Nigeria's national interests and therefore made the following recommendations:

(a) Political

- (i) Nigeria should continue to render diplomatic, financial, moral and material support to the Liberation Movements in order to maintain the momentum of the armed struggle and thereby enhance their negotiation power;
- (ii) Nigeria should continue to play a significant role in bringing about reconciliation among all anti-apartheid groups;
- (iii) Nigeria should continue to maintain contacts not only with the present nationalist leaders but also seek to cultivate their

likely successors and all those connected with the struggle in order to sustain its momentum;

- (iv) Nigeria should explore the possibility of establishing contacts with all relevant actors across the broad spectrum of the South African society, provided that Nigeria's credibility is not compromised;
- (v) The seminar welcomes the invitation to Mr. Nelson Mandela and recommends that same be extended to the other anti-apartheid leaders to visit Nigeria, for discussion and consultation;
- (vi) Nigeria should assist the Liberation Movements to physically establish their presence in South Africa;
- (vii) Nigeria should provide expertise to assist the Liberation Movements during the process of negotiations;
- (viii) Nigeria should be more circumspect in its offer of financial assistance to the Liberation Movements in South Africa. However, where direct financial grant has to

be made it should be monitored by the
Ministry of External Affairs.

(b) International Organisations

Nigeria should continue to use the United Nations, Commonwealth, and Non-Aligned Movement platforms to ensure that sanctions remain in force until the process for dismantling apartheid becomes irreversible.

(c) O.A.U.

- (i) The OAU should continue to urge International Organisations to enforce sanctions against the racist regime;
- (ii) The OAU as a body should mount campaign for discouraging the emigration to South Africa, especially by East Germans, East Europeans and the Arabs.
- (iii) Nigeria should make efforts to dissuade all African countries from relaxing existing measures for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa. In this regard, Mr. President may wish to consider making direct contacts with his African brothers with a view to dissuading them from establishing diplomatic

relations with South Africa until negotiations are successfully concluded;

- (iv) The OAU Monitoring Group should ensure that a political frame work is put in place to facilitate the process of negotiations that would lead to the emergence of a non-racial South Africa, as reflected in the Harare Declaration.

(d) **Economic**

- (i) Nigeria should strive to improve her economic performance and investment climate in order to adequately meet the challenges that a post-apartheid South Africa may pose;
- (ii) Since ECOWAS will be a target market for a post-apartheid South Africa, Nigeria should consolidate her economic position within a strengthened ECOWAS sub-region;
- (iii) In order to reach out to the South African market, Nigeria should cooperate with economic organisations in Southern Africa, such as Southern Africa Development Coordinating Council (SADCC) and

Preferential Trade Area (PTA)

- (iv) Nigeria should use Namibia as a springboard for economic relations with a free and democratic South Africa;

(e) **Military**

The military aspect of the situation was not exhaustively discussed and was therefore recommended for further examination. However, the seminar was of the view that there are possibilities for military cooperation between Nigeria and post-apartheid South Africa, especially in the defence industry and training.

(f) **General**

- (i) The Nigerian media particularly the Voice of Nigeria (VON) and Nigeria Television Authority (NTA), should be encouraged to play an important role in disseminating information on events in South Africa during the negotiations;
- (ii) A Presidential Special Envoy on South Africa should be appointed during the process of negotiations and when the climate is deemed appropriate, to make contact, monitor developments and influence where possible, the

attitude and positions of the negotiating parties;

(iii) A Study Group on Transition and post-apartheid South Africa should be set up;

(iv) Government should seize the opportunity of the Liberation Movements at the forthcoming meeting in Abuja of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa to forge closer contact with those movements;

(v) Government should relax travel restrictions for Nigerians to visit South Africa and liberalise its visa policy for foreigners who have visited South Africa.

On the peace initiative in Angola and Mozambique, the seminar noted the proposed meeting for the Angolan Government and UNITA in Lisbon for direct talks. Similarly, the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO proposed meeting in Malawi on April the 16th. These are happy developments in the relationship with the development in South Africa itself. It was, therefore, recommended that the Federal Government should continue to help to enhance these peace initiatives with a view to having a sharper focus on South Africa.

From official sources it has been confirmed that most of these

recommendations have been established and are functioning as part of the Nigerian government's strategy towards a post-apartheid South African.

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